Water, Light, & Gas Co. of Hutchinson v. City of Hutchinson, 207 U.S. 385

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Water, Light, & Gas Co. of Hutchinson v. City of Hutchinson, 207 U.S. 385
Full caption
WATER, LIGHT, & GAS COMPANY OF[385] HUTCHINSON, KANSAS, Appt., v. CITY OF HUTCHINSON et al
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
‘WATER, LIGHT, & GAS COMPANY OF
HUTCHINSON, KANSAS, Appt.,
v.
CITY OF HUTCHINSON et al. (No. 53.)
WATER, LIGHT, & GAS COMPANY OF HUTCHINSON, KANSAS, Appt., v.
CITY OF HUTCHINSON et al. (No. 54.)
(See S. C. Reporter’s ed. 385-398.)
Municipal corporations — powers — grant of exclusive franchise.
Municipal power to grant an exclusive franchise cannot be deduced from provisions of the Kansas statutes conferring, inter alia, power to provide for the general welfare, and to enable the municipality to construct water and lighting plants of its own, or to make contracts with any person or com¬ pany for such purposes, and giving such person or company the privilege of furnish¬ ing light for streets, lanes, or alleys for any length of time not exceeding twenty-one years, — especially where the section most relied upon as conferring this power had been so amended before its attempted exer-
385-387 Supreme Court of
rise as to omit the words “the exclusive privilege.”
[Nos. 53, 54.]
Argued November 13, 1907. Decided De cember 23, 1907.
APPEALS from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kan¬ sas to review decrees dismissing, on demur¬ rer, bills to enjoin a city from interfering with an alleged exclusive lighting, heating, and waterworks franchise. Affirmed.
See same case below, 144 Fed. 25C.
Statement by Mr. Justice McKenna: The ultimate question in these cases is the validity of ordinance No. 402 of the city of Hutchinson, which took effect March 17, 1897, and by which the Water, Light, & Gas Company claims to have, for the period of twenty years from such date, the exclu¬ sive right and privilege of supplying the city and its inhabitants with water, and with light, heat, and power by means of electricity and gas.
On the 19th of December, 1905, the city enacted and published ordinance No. 051, granting permits to Emerson Carey and oth¬ ers, their successors and assigns, to con¬ struct and operate a street railway in and along the streets of the city, and to con¬ struct and operate electric and gas plants for the purposes for which electricity may be used.
These suits were brought to command the city and those claiming under ordinance No. [386J051, to “desist from doing any *aets or ex¬ ercising any pretenses of right to act” under the ordinance which will in anywise affect the exclusive right of the Water, Light, & Gas Company “to furnish the city and its inhabitants with electric or gas light for lighting and heating purposes or power, ex¬ cept for street cars and electric railways, and also from making or proceeding to make any contract for furnishing light or gas to said city and its inhabitants” until the ex¬ piration of the “franchises and contracts” of that company.
The eases went o(T on demurrers to the bills. The circuit court, assuming that or¬ dinance No. 402 was exclusive in its terms and was intended to be so by the city, held that the city did not possess the power, either inherent or under the law of its crea¬ tion, to make a contract binding and ex¬ clusive of all others, and entered decrees dis¬ missing the bills. 144 Fed. 250.
The facts are: in 18S5 the city granted to the Holly Manufacturing Company, its successors and assigns, an exclusive right to build and operate waterworks for twenty years. The company erected and operated 258
tiie United States. Oct. Term,
the works until the subsequent assignment of its rights.
In the same year the city granted to the Interstate Gas Company the right to erect and maintain gas works for the period of twenty-one years; and in 1S80 granted to Drake and Orton the right for the period of twenty years to construct and operate an electric light plant. The latter right, and those granted to the two companies, passed by successive assignments, with the knowl¬ edge and consent of the city, to the Water, Light, & Power Company, and existed in that company at the time of the passage of ordi¬ nance No. 402.
The various companies expended in the aggregate on the construction of their plants and equipment $400,000, to secure which the Hutchinson Water, Light. & Power Com¬ pany executed a mortgage upon all the wa¬ ter, light, and gas rights and franchises and properties.
Subsequently, the city became financially embarrassed, so *that before the year 1897[38 it had become indebted for hydrant rentals in the sum of $12,800 in excess of its ability to pay.
On account of this default of the city the company became embarrassed and hindered in the payment of interest on its mortgage, and its mortgage bondholders took posses¬ sion of its property, and operated the plant during the year 1890 and until the read¬ justment of its affairs in the spring of 1897, resulting in the passage of ordinance No.

402.

By reason of its embarrassment the com¬ pany found it expedient to scale down its bonded indebtedness and secure a new fran¬ chise from the city, and in consideration of securing the same, and the readjustment of the contract obligations between the com¬ pany and the city, the bondholders agreed to reduce and scale down their mortgage in¬ debtedness from $400,000 to $212,500.
On March 5, 1897, at the earnest and re¬ peated solicitation of the city, and in con¬ sideration of its inability to discharge its past indebtedness to the company and to pay the current indebtedness thereafter, the com¬ pany agreed with the city to remit one half of the indebtedness then due; that is, to scale it down to $0,400, and to reduce the sum thereafter annually payable for hy¬ drant rental from $12,800 to $0,000 for the years of the contract, and to reduce the rental for hydrants thereafter located from $00 to $30, and reduce the number of hy¬ drants from twelve to ten per mile. These concessions and abatements were made on the condition of a renewal and extension of the franchise and contract rights of the company. And the city was to have, what it did not have before, the right to purchase
gO 7 U. S.

1907.

Water, Light, & Gas Co. v. Hutchinson.
387-390
or otherwise acquire the light and gas prop¬ erties at any time after ten years from the date of the renewal and adjustment. In view of these considerations and in pursu¬ ance of them the city passed ordinance No. 402, to take effect March 17, 1897, and by that ordinance “granted to the company, its successors and assigns, for the period of twenty years from, said date, the exclusive privilege of supplying the city and its in-
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habitants with the public utilities of *water, light, heat, and power by means of electric current and gas.” But it was agreed that the right for furnishing electric current or power should not be exclusive as to or for the operation of street railways, nor exclu¬ sive as to any person residing in the city, or any company doing business therein manu¬ facturing gas or electricity for his or its own use for light or fuel. A copy of the or¬ dinance was attached to and made part of the bill. The concessions and abatements would not have been made by the company except for the consideration of the exclusive rights and privileges granted; and the total of the reductions of monetary demands made for what was due and to become due for the period the water franchise had to run amounted to $05,240, which the company remitted from its contract rights and de¬ mands against the city. The mortgage bond¬ holders of the Water, Light, & Power Com¬ pany, for the purpose of effectuating the promises and agreements between the com¬ pany and the city contained in ordinance No. 402, scaled down their indebtedness from $400,000 to $212,500, and canceled their mortgage, and accepted a substitute mort¬ gage on the property, franchise, and con¬ tracts and on its income of $212,500.
The Water, Light, & Power Company, on the 4th of October, 1902, sold and trans¬ ferred to the Water, Light, & Gas Company, the complainant, all of its property rights and franchise, and complainant has since that date been in possession of the same, and in the fulfilment of the duties and obliga¬ tions imposed on it by its purchase and said ordinance liabilities with the consent of the city, and the city has ratified and approved the same, and contracted and dealt with the complainant as the successor of the Water, Light, & Power Company. The Water, Light, & Gas Company has, since its pur¬ chase, expended large sums of money in the improvement and enlargement of its prop¬ erties and the service rendered by it, and has, under the direction and order of the city, extended its water mains and placed hydrants upon such extensions, and, as agreed by it, has reduced the number of liy- i9]drants on *its extended mains from twelve to ten per mile, and generally has complied with the orders and requests of the city, 52 L. ed.
whether or not under the ordinance No. 402 it was required to comply with such or¬ ders, all of which was done in reliance on the obligations of the city and its good faith in carrying out all the terms and con¬ ditions and provisions of ordinance No. 402; but the city, notwithstanding, through its mayor and councilmen, on or about the 19th of December, 1905, enacted and published ordinance No. 051, by which it assumed to grant to Emerson Cary and others the right and privilege, for the term of twenty years thereafter, of establishing and operating in the city a plant and appliances for the man¬ ufacture and sale to the city and its inhab¬ itants of electric light and power and manu¬ factured and natural gas, with the right and privilege to lay and construct gas mains and pipes and erect poles and wires and all other things necessary to the maintenance of said public service in the streets, alleys, and public places of the city, in opposition to the business of complainant.
It is alleged that ordinance No. 402 con¬ stitutes a contract between the city and the complainant in respect to all the rights se¬ cured, and in particular in respect to the exclusive rights and privileges thereby con¬ ferred, and that the city, by and through or¬ dinance No. 651, illegally and inequitably impairs the same, in violation of the provi¬ sions of the Constitution of the United States, which forbids the impairment of the obligation of contracts by the several states of the Union.
Neither the city nor any of the grantees in ordinance No. 651 have paid or tendered complainant the monetary abatement, or the reductions and concessions paid or secured to the city in consideration of the enact¬ ment of ordinance No. 402, or to secure com¬ plainant from loss from the competition of the rival public service association or com¬ pany. At the time the public service enter¬ prises were undertaken by the grantors of complainant the city of Hutchinson had about 5,000 inhabitants, and, at the time complainant succeeded to their rights, about 10,000; and at both of said times it would have been impossible, and is now impossi-
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ble, to maintain rival or competing com¬ panies in the city so as to enable either to earn a fair and reasonable income on the cost of their respective properties, and at none of the times when the complainant or its grantors undertook the work of furnish¬ ing said public necessities would it or they have done so without being secured in the enforcement thereof for a reasonable time against the competition of rival companies, nor could the large sums of money have been obtained therefor except under like secu-
259
399
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct. Teem,
rity. The company has not, up to this time, and will not for many years to come, have secured the repayment of the purchase price of said public service and the cost of the betterments, extensions, and improvements.
The company alleges that it does not seek to prevent the granting by the city of a franchise or contract for the erection and maintenance of an electric railway in the city or elsewhere.
An injunction was prayed against the do¬ ing or exercising any pretenses of right un¬ der ordinance No. 651 which would in any way affect the exclusive rights of the com¬ pany to furnish electricity and gas for light¬ ing and heating purposes.
Messrs. John F. Dillon and Frank Dos- ter argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Harry Hubbard, Houston Whiteside, and Howard S. Lewis, filed a brief for appel¬ lant:
The furnishing of light to a city and its inhabitants is an exercise of the police power.
Statutes delegating the power to furnish light in cities are to be liberally construed, and are so construed in Kansas.
The statutes of Kansas authorized the
260
city of Hutchinson to make the exclusive contract in question to light the streets.
Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co. 202 U. S. 453, 50 L. ed. 1102, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 660; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Wa¬ ter Co. 172 U. S. 1, 43 L. ed. 341, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77; State v. Topeka, supra; Cleve¬ land v. Cleveland City R. Co. 194 U. S. 517, 48 L. ed. 1102, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 756; Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha, supra; California Re¬ duction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U. S. 306, 50 L. ed. 204, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 100.
Under the general welfare clauses and the general power to contract, the city had the power to confer an exclusive right to fur¬ nish light to its inhabitants as well as to light the streets.
The municipal power to furnish light carries with it the obligation to enter into all contracts and to exercise all subsidiary powers which the circumstances of the case require.
There are special features in these cases and special equities possessed by appellant which require that its contract with the city be upheld.
Binghamton Bridge (Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton Bridge Co.) 3 Wall; 51, 18
207 U. S.

1907.

Water, Light, & Gas Co. v. Hutchinson.
The power to provide for light is one essentially and peculiarly pertaining to mu¬ nicipal rule and regulation.
1 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 3a; Fawcett v. Mt. Airy, 134 N. C. 125, 63 L.R.A. 870, 101 Am. St. Rep. 825, 45 S. E. 1029.
The ordinary police and welfare clauses in a charter are sufficient, without more, to give a municipality power to procure a supply of water and light, and to do this, where the mode is not expressly restricted, by erecting works of its own, or by contract with others, in the discretion of the mu¬ nicipality.
In view of the imperative necessity of a water and light supply, the power to pro¬ vide water, when expressly conferred, is liberally expounded as to the mode of its exercise, in order to secure the object to be attained.
This is emphatically a case where the following two great principles of justice, declared by this court, are especially appli- • cable :

1. “Square dealing;” municipalities not

immune from moral obligation.
Zabriskie v. Cleveland, C. & C. R. Co. 23 How. 381, 16 L. ed. 488; Bissell v. Jeffer¬ sonville, 24 How. 287, 16 L. ed. 664; Na¬ tional L. Ins. Co. v. Board of Education, 10 C. C. A. 637, 27 U. S. App. 244, 62 Fed. 778; Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 351, 24 L. ed. 662 ; Hughes County v. Living¬ ston, 43 C. C. A. 541, 104 Fed. 316; Hackett v. Ottawa, 99 U. S. 86, 96, 25 L. ed. 363, 365; Columbu3 Waterworks Co. v. Colum¬ bus, supra; Green’s Brice, Ultra Vires, 372. note A; Aurora Water Co. v. Aurora, 129
2. Practical construction.
Van Hostrup v. Madison City, 1 Wall. 291, 17 L. ed. 538; Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384, 391, 17 L. ed. 564, 566; Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. § 94, p. 151; Washing¬ ton County v. Williams, 49 C. C. A. 621, 111 Fed. 801; Keith County v. Citizens’ Sav. & L. Asso. 53 C. C. A. 525, 116 Fed. 13; Wetzell v. Paducah, 117 Fed. 647; Schmitz v. Zeh, 91 Minn. 290, 97 N. W. 1049; Wash¬ ington County v. David, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 649, 89 N. W. 737.
Messrs. C. M. Williams and A. C. Mal¬ loy argued the cause, and, with Mr. F. F. Prig, filed a brief for appellees:
A city charter will give it no rights other than those expressly or by necessary implication conferred; and courts are not disposed to extend or enlarge the powers of municipalities by implication, but have gen¬ erally, as a rule, applied to their charter powers the same strict construction as in case of private corporations; and the pre¬ sumption exists that the state has expressly, in terms, granted all that it designed to grant, and ambiguities will be resolved in favor of the public. . . . Therefore a
oity which is invested with no exclusive rights, franchises, or privileges cannot con¬ fer exclusive privileges upon one electric light company in the use of its streets.
1 Joyce, Electric Law, §§ 163, 254A.
The power to make an exclusive contract for electric lighting resides in the state; and where the state Constitution confers no such power upon its cities, but merely em¬ powers the legislative branch of the state to organize cities under general laws, and to restrict their powers, a city which has no delegation of power for that purpose, ei¬ ther expressly or by implication, cannot, by contract, grant an exclusive right for a term of years to a corporation to supply electricity to a city and occupy the city’s streets for that purpose, so a3 to prevent the city from contracting with others for such supply, or from further exercising its powers in that respect.
1 Joyce, Electric Law* §§ 164, 254A, 371.
Statutes conferring municipal powers are to be strictly interpreted.
Black, Constr. & Interpretation of Laws, p. 315; Cooley, Const. Lim. 6th ed. p. 486;
1 Abbott, Mun. Corp. § 113; Paine v. Sprat- ley, 5 Kan. 545; Cleveland Electric R. Co. v. Cleveland, 204 U. S. 116, 51 L. ed. 399, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 202; Coffey ville Min. &
261
392-394
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct. Term,
Resort cannot be had to so-called general welfare statutes for authority to justify a municipality, under the laws of the state of Kansas, in granting an exclusive fran¬ chise or privilege.
3 Abbott, Mun. Corp. {?§ 924, 925; Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. pp. 392, 393.
The making of this contract with ap¬ pellant by the defendant city was not the exercise of its police power, but was the exercise of a power to contract, which must depend upon authority expressly given by the legislature of the state.
The claim of appellant of special equities in its favor cannot be considered in the determination of the legal question here involved. These considerations might be urged against a claim that the grant was absolutely void.
Mr. Max Pam also argued the cause for appellees.
Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opin¬ ion of the court:
The circuit court assumed that ordinance No. 402 was in terms exclusive and was in¬ tended to be made so by the city. We shall assume the same thing. Indeed, it would be impossible to decide otherwise. It re¬ cites that the Hutchinson Water, Light, & Power Company “is the owner of certain ex¬ clusive franchises and contracts with the city of Hutchinson,” under which it has ex¬ pended large sums of money, and that the city “is desirous of modifying and changing said franchise and contracts to the advan¬ tage of said city of Hutchinson, without canceling or abridging any of the rights or privileges vested in said company,” and that, therefore, in consideration of the surrender of all existing contracts and franchises, ex¬ cept as therein specified, “there is hereby given and granted” to the company, “its suc¬ cessors or assigns, the exclusive right and privileges for the term of twenty years from the date of the passage and approval of this [S9 3]ordinance, of ‘supplying the city of Hutchin¬ son, Reno county, Kansas, and the inhabit¬ ants thereof, by a system of waterworks, 262
with water . . . with electric current
for electric light and power, and for all oth¬ er purposes for which electric current may be used, except power for the operation of street railways.” The city, it is clear, in ex¬ press terms and for consideration received, granted exclusive rights. The power of the city to do this is denied, and this makes the question in the case. The circuit court ruled against the existence of the power, applying to the statutes conferring power upon the municipalities of the state the rule of strict construction. The ruling is challenged by appellants, and it is contended that the gen¬ eral welfare clause and “the municipal pow¬ er to furnish light carries with it the obli¬ gation to enter into all contracts and to ex¬ ercise all subsidiary powers whicli the cir¬ cumstances of the case require.” And it is further contended that, in Kansas, statutes delegating to cities the power to furnish light and water have been liberally con¬ strued by the supreme court of the state.
That grants to municipal corporations, like grants to private corporations, are sub¬ ject to the rule of strict construction, was announced by this court in Detroit Citizens’
43 L. ed. 67, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 732, follow¬ ing and applying the doctrine of previous cases. It was said that the power to grant an exclusive privilege must be expressly given, or, if inferred from other powers, must be indispensable to them, and that this principle was firmly fixed by authority. See also Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. § 80. The case was concerned with a grant to a street railway, and, in the argument of the cases at bar, a distinction is asserted between an exclusive privilege to occupy the surface of streets and interfere witli “a matter of com¬ mon right,” and a privilege to use the streets below the surface “as incidental only and subsidiary to the performance of a contract pertaining to another matter;” and on this distinction, it is argued, the “first must show an express grant of authority” to make the right exclusive, ‘but that the second is
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not limited by such requirement. The dis¬ tinction is only one of degree, and has not been considered as varying the application of the rule of construction announced. In Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport, 180 U. S.
598, 45 L. ed. 688, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 497, a statute of Illinois was considered which gave power to cities and villages to provide for the supply of water at such rates as might be fixed by ordinance and for a pe¬ riod not exceeding thirty years. And pass¬ ing upon these provisions as constituting a contract precluding a change of rates from time to time, we said: “The rule which governs interpretation in such cases has often been declared. We expressed it, fol-
207 U. S.

1907.

394-398
Wateb, Light, & Gas Co. v. Hutchinson.
lowing many prior decisions, in Detroit Citi¬ zens’ Street R. Co. v. Detroit R. Co. supra, to be that the power of a municipal corpora¬ tion to grant exclusive privileges must be conferred by explicit terms. If inferred from other powers, it is not enough that the power is convenient to other powers; it must be indispensable to them.” See also Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U. S. 024, 45 L. ed. 702, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 490; Joplin v. Southwest Missouri Light Co. 191 U. S. 150, 48 L. ed. 127, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43, and cases cited; Owensboro v. Owensboro Waterworks Co. 191 U. S. 358, 48 L. ed. 217, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 82. The doctrine was recognized as existing in Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co. 172 U. S. 1, 43 L. ed. 341, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77, and in Vicks¬ burg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co. 202 U. S. 453, 50 L. ed. 1102, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 000. In the two latter cases the power of the re¬ spective cities to make a contract precluding them from building waterworks and operat¬ ing their own water systems was declared. In the Vicksburg case it was pointed out that the power of the city to exclude itself from building waterworks of its own was recognized to exist by the supreme court of Mississippi.
In Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co. 200 U. S. 490, 51 L. ed.1155, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 702, a contract of the city, fixing a maximum rate, was sustained upon the authority of the decisions of the supreme court of the state, holding that, under a broad grant of power conferring, without restriction or limitation upon the city, the right to make a contract for a supply of the water, it was within the right of the city council, in the exercise of that power, to make a binding contract fixing the maximum
rate at which the water ’should be supplied to the inhabitants of the city for a limited term of years.
This case is especially relied on by appel¬ lant as establishing a right in the city of Hutchinson to grant an exclusive franchise under the statutes of the state, both from their letter and as construed by the supreme court of the state. A consideration of the statutes and decisions, therefore, becomes necessary. Those quoted by the circuit court in its opinion are inserted in the margin. f They confer power to provide for the gen¬ eral welfare, and enable a city to construct water and lighting plants of its own or “to
fSec. 35. The mayor and council of each city governed by this act shall have the care, management, and control of the city and its finances, and shall have power to en¬ act, ordain, alter, or repeal any and all or¬ dinances not repugnant to the Constitution and laws of this state, and such as it shall deem expedient for the good government of 52 L. ed.
make contracts with any person or company for such purposes,” and give such person or company “the privilege of furnishing light for the streets, lanes, or alleys of said city for any length of time not exceeding twenty- one years.”
In addition to these sections, appellant cites others, which give to the city the pow¬ er to make all contracts in relation to its property and affairs necessary to the exer¬ cise of its corporate* or administrative pow-[3 ers, the power to open and improve streets, purchase or condemn land for hospital and waterworks, to make regulations to secure the general health of the city, to enact ordi¬ nances for any of the above-mentioned pur¬ poses, and “for maintaining the peace, good government, and welfare of the city, and its trade and commerce.” Also a section which gives to gas and water companies the power to manufacture and furnish gas and water and to lay down pipes and mains in the streets “with the consent of the municipal authorities thereof and under such regula¬ tions as may be prescribed,” and a section giving power to such authorities “to con¬ tract with any such corporation for the lighting or supplying with water the streets, lots, lanes, squares, and public places in any such city, town, or village.”
It is from these provisions that the water company deduces the power of the city to make the privilege granted exclusive, and spe¬ cial stress is put upon the provision of § 05, which we have ([noted. Counsel say: “Lan¬ guage more explicitly expressing an absolute measure of power could hardly be framed. The power is given to light the streets, to make contracts for the lighting of the streets, and to confer the privilege of lighting the streets for a specific term of years.” And, fur¬ ther, counscd say: “It will be observed that the grant of power is to confer ‘the privilege of furnishing light.’ The definite article ‘the’ is used. Power to confer the privilege implies ex vi termini, the exclusive privilege, not a fractional or communal privilege. The priv¬ ilege conferred exists as a concrete and in¬ tegral whole, and therefore when conferred must pass in its entirety. The city pos¬ sessed the privilege of lighting its own streets as a function of its municipal au¬ thority. It was that privilege in its in¬ tegral and exclusive form which the legis¬ lature authorized the city to confer.” We cannot concur. The kind of privilege is de-
the city, the preservation of the peace and good order, the suppression of vice and im¬ morality, the benefit of trade and commerce, and the health of the inhabitants thereof, and such other ordinances, rules, and regu¬ lations as may be necessary to carry such power into effect.
Sec. 65. The council may provide for and
263
390-398
Oct. Term,
Supreme Court of the United States.
fined, not the extent of it. It is exclusive of some persons, but not of all. It is ex¬ clusive of those who have not a grant from proper authority. There are privileges which may exist in their full entirety in more
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than one person, and the privilege *or fran¬ chise or right to supply the inhabitants of a city with light or water is of this kind. A grant of power to confer such privilege is not necessarily a grant of power to make it exclusive. To hold otherwise would im¬ pugn the cited cases and their reasoning. It would destroy the rule of strict construc¬ tion. The foundation of that rule requires the grant of such power to be explicit — ex¬ plicit in the letter of the grant — or, if in¬ ferred from other powers or purposes, to be not only convenient to them, but indispen¬ sable to them. And these conditions are im¬ perative, — too firm of authority to be disre¬ garded upon the petition of equities, how¬ ever strong.
It is, however, contended that the statutes of Kansas fulfil the rule by the construc¬ tion put upon them by the supreme court of the state, and the case is therefore brought, it is further contended, within the rule of Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co. 206 U. S. 496, 51 L. ed. 1155, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 762. The Kansas cases relied on are Eureka Light & Ice Co. v. Eureka, 5 Kan. App. 669, 48 Pac. 935; State v. Topeka, 68 Kan. 177, 74 Pac. 647; Cherryvale Water Co. v. Cherryvale, 65 Kan. 219, 69 Pac. 176. In those cases the court did say, in deter¬ mining what duties were imposed or powers conferred upon the city, that the statute should be liberally construed to effectuate the general purpose of the legislature, but the powers under consideration were differ¬ ent from the powers herein involved, other¬ wise those cases would not be reconcilable with Paine v. Spratley, 5 Kan. 545, and Coffeyville Min. & Gas Co. v. Citizens’ Nat¬ ural Gas & Min. Co. 55 Kan. 178, 40 Pac.
regulate the lighting of the streets, and the erection of lamp posts, and the numbering of the buildings in the city, and the con¬ struction of sewers, and the council shall have power to make contracts with any per¬ son, company, or association for such pur¬ poses, and give such person, company, or association the privilege of furnishing light for the streets, lanes, or alleys of said city for any length of time not exceeding twenty- one years.
Sec. 83. That cities of the second class of the state of Kansas are hereby granted full power and authority, on behalf 6f said cities, to purchase, procure, provide, and contract for the construction of and construct water¬ works, electric light and gas plants for the purpose of supplying such cities and the in¬ habitants thereof with water, light, and gas for domestic use and any and all other pur¬ poses.
964

326. In Paine v. Spratley the general prin¬

ciples respecting the power of municipal cor¬ porations were said to be those which we have expressed. In Coffeyville Min. & Gas Co. v. Citizens’ Natural Gas & Min. Co. one of the companies, claiming an exclusive right, sought to test the validity of two city ordinances, granting the other the use of the streets, and to restrict it from using the privileges granted. For this purpose the court said the plaintiff company clearly had no standing in court, because the city au¬ thorities alone were charged with the duty of preventing encroachment on the *streets,[3 9 8] and they, alone, could test the validity of the ordinance. The court said further :
“The city did not, in terms, attempt to give the plaintiff company a right to the exclu¬ sive use of the streets and alleys for the purpose of laying its pipes. If it had at¬ tempted to do so it could not, for want of power.”
The conclusion from these cases is rein¬ forced by a change in the statutes confer¬ ring power upon the cities of the state. Section 65, supra, was § 30 of the statutes of 1868, and as such gave to a city the pow¬ er to make the contracts therein expressed, and give “the exclusive privilege of furnish¬ ing gas to light the streets, lanes, and al¬ leys of said city for any length of time, not exceeding twenty-one years.” This provi¬ sion was repeated in § 59 of the statutes of

1872. But in 1885 that section was amend¬

ed, so as to omit the words “the exclusive privilege.” Statutes 1885, p. 147, § 7. And as thus amended it was re-enacted in 1901. Statutes 1901, § 1000.
Decrees affirmed.
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