Carfer v. Caldwell, 200 U.S. 293 (1906)

W. H. CARFER, Sheriff of Wood County, West Virginia, Appt., v.

C. T. CALDWELL.

(See S. C. Reporter’s ed. 293-297.)

naUeas corpus— jurisdiction of Federal conrts.— The Federal courts have no Juris¬ diction to release, hy habeas corpus, a person held In the custody of the state authorities to answer for a contempt in refusing to appear and testify before a legislative inves¬ tigating committee, either because such a committee cannot sit in vacation, or because the subject for investigation is excluded from the jurisdiction of the legislature by the pro¬ vision of the state Constitution for the separation of legislative, executive, and ju¬ dicial powers, since no question under the Federal Constitution or laws is involved.

[No. 360.]

Submitted January 8, 1006. Decided Jan¬ uary 22, 1906.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern Dis¬ trict of West Virginia to review an order discharging, on habeas corpus, a person held in the custody of the state authorities to answer for a contempt in refusing to ap¬ pear and testify before a legislative investi¬ gating committee. Reversed and remanded, with directions to quash the writ and dis¬ miss the petition.

See same case below, 138 Fed. 487.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Lawrence Maxwell, Jr., and William E. Chilton submitted the cause for appellant:

The Federal courts have no authority to discharge a person held for contempt by a committee of the legislature of a state, act¬ ing in pursuance of a law of the state and a resolution passed by a branch of the legis¬ lature, on the ground that such law and resolution are repugnant to the Constitu¬ tion of the state.

Re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 34 L. ed. 500, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 850; Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272, 275, 39 L. ed. 422, 423, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; Storti v. Massachusetts, 183 U. S. 138, 142, 46 L. ed. 120, 124, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 72.

The committee was acting under a resolu¬ tion duly passed by the house of delegates, and in pursuance of a law of the state, giv¬ ing power to committees of either house, authorized to sit during recess, to enforce obedience to summonses issued by them;

Note. — On habeas corpus in the Federal courts — see notes to Re Reinitz, 4 L.R-.A. 236 ; State ex rel. Cochran v. Winters, 10 L.R.A. 616 ; Re Huse, 25 C. C. A. 4 ; and Tinsley v. Anderson, 43 L. ed. U. S. 91.

488

and if they did not have the power which they assumed to exercise, it was because the resolution or law or both were repugnant to the Constitution of the state, and not be¬ cause they were in conflict with the Con¬ stitution or any law or treaty of the United States.

Drcyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71, 83, 84, 47 L. ed. 79, 85, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 28; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 47 L. ed. 563, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390.

Mr. C. T. Caldwell, in propria persona, submitted the cause for appellee. Messrs. J. (I. McClure, Reese Blizzard, and Cald¬ well & Watson were on his brief:

“Due process of law” undoubtedly means in the due course of legal proceeding ac¬ cording to those rules and forms which have been established for the protection of private rights.

Cooley, Const. Lim. 6th ed. p. 433; Note to Pearson v. Yewdall, 24 L. ed. U. S. 436; Portland v. Bangor, 65 Me. 120, 20 Am. Rep. 681. See also Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 536, 28 L. ed. 232, 239, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. Ill, 292.

In cases where the right of appeal seems inadequate by reason of its delay, the court may hold the person entitled to habeas corpus as a means of speedy determination of the question.

Ex parte Kieffer, 40 Fed. 399.

In general, the writ may be issued by Federal courts in every case where a party is restrained of his liberty without due process of law in the territorial jurisdiction of such court.

Ex parte Farley, 40 Fed. 66; Re N eagle (Cunningham v. Neagle) 135 U. S. 1, 34 L. ed. 55, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 658; New York v. Eno, 155 U. S. S9, 39 L. ed. 80, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Re Huse, 25 C. C. A. 1, 48 U. S. App. 318, 79 Fed. 305.

There is no question as to the jurisdiction of the Federal court in proceedings involv¬ ing the life, liberty, and property of the aggrieved citizen.

State v. Sponaugle, 45 W. Va. 424, 43 L.R.A. 727, 32 S. E. 283.

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a final order of the circuit court in habeas corpus, dischar¬ ging Charles T. Caldwell, a citizen of West Virginia, from custody, taken on the ground that the circuit court was without juris¬ diction, as a court of the United States, to issue the writ or discharge the peti¬ tioner, — the question of jurisdiction being certified. The case was heard on the peti¬ tion, the return, and the exhibits attached.

It appeared therefrom, in brief, that at a regular biennial session *of the legislature

200 U. S.

Guss v. Nelson.

296-298

of West Virginia, the house of delegates passed a resolution instructing the speaker of the house to appoint a committee of three members “to investigate fully and thoroughly” certain charges and matters set forth therein. The committee was in¬ structed by the resolution to meet as soon as practicable and select one of its mem¬ bers chairman ; was given leave to sit after the adjournment of the session; and was empowered “to compel the attendance of witnesses, and to send for persons and papers, to appoint a sergeant at arms, necessary stenographers and clerks, and to employ such counsel as may be .necessary to conduct said investigation.”

The committee organized, and summoned Charles T. Caldwell to appear before them “to testify, and the truth to speak, of and concerning the matters and things in said resolution to be inquired of.” He refused to appear, and was taken into custody by W. H. Carfer, sheriff of Wood county, W’est Virginia, in pursuance of an order of at¬ tachment issued by the committee to bring him before them to answer for his con¬ tempt for failing to attend and testify. This writ was issued and Caldwell was discharged. 138 Fed. 487.

The jurisdiction of courts of the United States to issue writs of habeas corpus is limited to cases of persons alleged to be restrained of their liberty in violation of the Constitution or of some law or treaty of the United States, and cases arising under the law of nations. Re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 591, 34 L. ed. 500, 502, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 850; Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272, 275, 39 L. ed. 422, 423, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; Storti v. Massachusetts, 183 U. S. 138, 142, 46 L. ed. 120, 124, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 72.

And it did not appear in this case that petitioner was restrained in violation of the Constitution or any law or treaty of the United States.

The circuit court held that the house of delegates had no power, under the Con¬ stitution of West Virginia, to appoint a committee for the purpose of investigating the matters set forth in the resolution, and to clothe it with power to sit and compel the attendance of witnesses in vaca¬ tion, but took jurisdiction, nevertheless, on

the ground that the condition was *so “ex¬ traordinary” as to “warrant the interven¬ tion of the first court, state or Federal, applied to.” This view ignored the settled law that a circuit court of the United States has no jurisdiction to issue the writ to release a citizen from imprisonment by another citizen of the same state, merely because the imprisonment is wrongful. The committee was acting under a resolution 200 U. S.

of the house of delegates, and in pursuance of a law of the state, giving power to com¬ mittees of either house, authorized to sit during recess, to enforce obedience to sum¬ monses issued by them; and if they did not have the power they assumed to exercise, it was because the resolution or law, or both, was or were repugnant to the state Constitution, and the courts of the state are the appropriate tribunals for the vin¬ dication of the state Constitution and laws.

The circuit court was of opinion that the subject which the committee was ap¬ pointed to investigate was not within the jurisdiction of the legislature, as defined by article 5 of the Constitution of West Virginia, declaring that “the legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither shall exercise the powers properly belong¬ ing to either of the others.” But that objection does not “present any question under the due process of law clause of the 14th Amendment.” Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71, 83, 47 L. ed. 79, 85, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 28; Rcctz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 47 L. ed. 563, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390.

Viewed in any aspect, we perceive no ground on which Caldwell’s case can be considered as arising under the Constitu¬ tion and laws of the United States.

Final order reversed and cause remanded with a direction to quash the writ and dis¬ miss the petition.