Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Sims, 191 U.S. 441 (1903)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Sims, 191 U.S. 441 (1903)
Full caption
NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY et al., Plffs. in Err., v. JOHN R. SIMS, Sheriff, etc
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Dec. 7, 1903
Disposition
Reversed
Concurrence
Brown (Justice)
Concurrence
White (Justice)
NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY COM¬ PANY et al., Plffs. in Err., v.
JOHN R. SIMS, Sheriff, etc.
(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 441-451.)
Interstate commerce — validity of license taco on goods shipped C. 0. D.
The license tax Imposed by N. C. Lhws 1901, p.
Note.— On state regulation of interstate or foreign commerce — see notes to Norfolk & W. It. Co. v. Com. 13 L. R. A. 107 ; McCanna & F. Co. v. Citizens’ Trust & Surety Co. 24 C. C. A. 13 ; Ratterman v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 32 L. ed. 254
’he United States.
116, § 52, upon all those “engaged In the busi¬ ness of selling” sewing machines in the state, is an unconstitutional interference with Inter¬ state commerce so far as applied to the sale of a single machine shipped into the state by a nonresident manufacturing corporation, upon the written order of a customer, under an ordinary C. O. D. consignment.
[No. 74.]
Argued November 12, 1903. Decided Decem¬ ber 7, 1903.
N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of North Carolina, to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the Superior Court of Person County in that state, enforcing a license tax for selling a sewing machine in the state. Reversed, and remanded for further proceedings.
See same case below, 130 N. C. 556, 41 S.
Statement by Mr. Justice Brown:
This was a controversy between the sher¬ iff of Person county, North Carolina, on the one part, and the railway company and Mrs.
O. L. Satterfield on the other, which might have been the subject of a civil action, and which the parties agreed to submit, under the Code of North Carolina, to the judge of the superior court upon the following facts, and upon the question of the liability of the defendants for a license tax under § 52 of “An Act to Raise Revenue,” ratified March 15, 1901. * ( Laws of 1901, p. 116.) The ma-
terial part of the section reads as follows :
“Every manufacturer of sewing machines, and every person or persons or corporation engaged in the business of selling the same in this state, shall, before selling or offering for sale any such machine, pay to the state treasurer, a tax of $350, and obtain a li¬ cense, which shall operate for one year from the date of the issue.”
The Norfolk & Western Railway Com¬ pany, a Virginia corporation, operates a railroad from its main line at Lynchburg, Virginia, via Roxboro in Person county,
North Carolina, to Durham in the same state. This company had itself complied with the revenue act of 1901, and paid a license tax for the privilege of carrying on its business as a common carrier within the state of North Carolina.
Sears, Roebuck, & Company (incorpor¬ ated), of the city of Chicago, are manufac¬ turers and dealers in sewing machines at Chicago, Illinois.
The defendant, Mrs. Satterfield, a resident of Person county, N. C., about November 1,
U. S. 229 ; Harmon v. Chicago, 37 L. ed. U. S.
216 ; Cleveland, C. C. & St. I,. R. Co. v. Backus,
38 L. ed. U. S. 1041 ; and Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Adams, 39 L. ed. TJ. S. 311.
On license taxes as affecting interstate com-
191 U. S.

1903.

Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Sims.
1901, sent an order by mail to Sears, Roe¬ buck, & Co. for a sewing machine, which was shipped by them as railroad freight from Chi¬ cago to Mrs. Satterfield at Roxboro, the rail¬ way company at Chicago issuing, on behalf of itself and its connecting railroad lines, a through bill of lading therefor, under which the sewing machine was to be delivered to Mrs. Satterfield on surrender of the bill of lading, and payment of freight charges to the delivering carrier, the Norfolk & West¬ ern Railway Co.
The bill of lading was sent by Sears, Roe¬ buck, & Co. by express, C. 0. D., to the ex¬ press agent at Roxboro, who received from Mrs. Satterfield the price of the sewing ma¬ chine, and delivered the bill of lading to her. The express agent and the railway station agent were one and the same person. Mrs. Satterfield, having paid the purchase price, presented the bill of lading to the station agent, tendered the freight charges, and de¬ manded the delivery of the sewing machine.
*The railway company was willing and would have delivered the same had not the plaintiff, the sheriff and ea; officio tax collect¬ or of Person county, insisted that Sears, Roebuck, & Co. could not sell the machine to Mrs. Satterfield without paying the license tax of $350, and forbade the delivery of the machine until the tax was paid, and there¬ upon levied upon the machine for such tax. He also insisted that the railway company would, by delivering tbe machine, be acting as the agent of Sears, Roebuck, & Co., and would be liable to prosecution for misde¬ meanor in aiding and abetting them in an unlawful sale of the sewing machine.
It also appears in the agreed statement of facts that other machines were sent by the same consignors to various purchasers in North Carolina, upon the lines of other in¬ terstate railroads, and were delivered upon the presentation of other bills of lading un¬ der the same conditions as above described.
The court found that Sears, Roebuck, & Co. were indebted to the state for $350 li¬ cense tax; that the levy upon the machine was lawful and valid, and plaintiff was or¬ dered to sell the machine and apply the pro¬ ceeds to the payment of the tax. The judg¬ ment was affirmed by the supreme court of the state. 130 N. C. 556, 41 S. E. 673.
Messrs. Theodore W. Reath and William. A. Guthrie argued the cause, and, with Mr. Jos. I. Doran, filed a brief for plaintiffs in error:
The sale of a sewing machine by a citizen
merce — see notes to Rothermel v. Meyerle, 9 L. R. A. 306, and American Fertilizing Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 11 L. R- A. 179.
Respecting peddlers and drummers as related
191 U. S.
442, 443
of Illinois to a citizen of North Carolina upon a mail order, the order being received in Illinois and the machine being sent from Illinois to North Carolina C. O. D., is com¬ merce among the several states, which can¬ not be regulated or taxed by the states.

35.

Messrs. Robert B. Gilmer and James E. Shepherd argued the cause and filed a brief for defendant in error:
The railroad and express agents concerned in all of these transactions were the agents of the Chicago company, and it was only through them as such agents that a com¬ plete sale of machines was effected.
Hutchinson, Carr. §§ 389-391; Norfolk S. R. Co. v. Barnes, 104 N. C. 25, 5 L. R. A. 611, 10 S. E. 83; Tiedeman, Sales, § 85.
Where the seller determines, or the con¬ tract requires him to make, the common carrier his own agent there is no transfer of possession until the goods have been de¬ livered by the carrier to the vendee or his agent.
Tiedeman, Sales, §§ 87, 95; Dows v. Na¬ tional Exch. Bank, 91 U. S. 631, 23 L. ed.

218.

The case of O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 324, 36 L. ed. 450, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 693, is decisive of the one at bar upon this, and also upon the question of interstate com¬ merce.
The carrier’s duty has been performed, and it holds the machines in its warehouse as the agent of the Chicago company, and such agency concerns, alone, the completion of a sale by the receipt of the purchase money and delivery. It has nothing what¬ ever to do with the carriage of the goods,
to interstate commerce — see notes to Re Spain, 14 L. R. A. 97, and Stockard v. Morgan, 46 L. ed. V. S. 785.
255
446-448
Supreme Coubt of the United States.
Oct. Teem,
and, therefore, no interstate commercial ele¬ ment can enter into the matter.
2 Shinn, Attachm. § 578; Freeman, Execu¬ tions, § 160; Schouler, Bailments & Car¬ riers, § 498.
Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court:
To the ordinary mind it seems a some¬ what startling proposition that a manufac¬ turing corporation, located and doing its main business in a distant city, having no manufactory in North Carolina, no stock in trade, no place for the sale of its goods there, and no agent authorized to sell them, can be compelled to take out a license re¬ quired of all those “engaged in the business of selling,” from the mere fact that it had done what hundreds of others were doing daily, — sent a single machine there upon a written order of a customer, and under an ordinary C. O. D. consignment. If this may be done, the revenues of every state may be largely increased by adopting a similar sys¬ tem, since a large part of the business of re¬ tail shops in the principal cities is done toy orders received, filled, and the goods deliv¬ ered in the same way. Of course, it is im¬ possible to estimate the number of business houses in other states which are accustomed to collect their accounts in this manner.
If this were the law it would also follow that the consignor of every cargo of wheat sent to New York for export under a bill of lading, accompanied by a draft for the pay¬ ment of the money in the usual method, might be compelled to take out a license in the state of New York as a dealer in pro¬ duce, notwithstanding that all the real busi¬ ness was done in Chicago or North Dakota.
So, too, what the state may do directly it may authorize its municipalities to do, and if, under legislative sanction, each of the large towns in the state of North Carolina
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saw fit to adopt *a similar license tax, the consequence would be, not a simple interfer¬ ence with interstate commerce, but a practi¬ cal destruction of one important branch of it.
While it may be entirely true that the property in the thing sold does not pass un¬ der a C. 0. D. consignment until delivery of the goods and payment to the carrier, and hence it may be said that the sale is not completed until then, yet, as matter of fact, the bargain is made, and the contract of sale completed as such, when the order is re¬ ceived in Chicago, and the machine shipped in pursuance thereof.
A sale really consists of two separate and distinct elements: first, a contract of sale, which is completed when the offer is made and accepted; and, second, a delivery of the property which may precede, be accompanied 256
by, or follow the payment of the price, as may have been agreed upon between the parties. The substance qf the sale is the agreement to sell, and its acceptance. That possession shall be retained until payment of the price may or m^y not have been a part of the original bargain, but in sub¬ stance it is a mere method of collection, and we have never understood that a license could be imposed upon this transaction ex¬ cept in connection with the prior agreement to sell, although, in certain cases arising un¬ der the police power, it has been held that the sale is not complete until delivery, and sometimes not until payment. Were it not for the opinion of the supreme court of North Carolina, we should have said that the words “engaged in the business of sell¬ ing the same within the state” had reference to the word “selling” in its popular and ordinary sense of selling from a stock on hand or upon a special order' to a manufac¬ turer, and not to a mere method of collecting the money; but, however this may be, it is evident the state courts could not give it a construction which would operate as an in¬ terference with interstate commerce, and that upon this question the opinion of this court is controlling.
The cases relied upon by the state do not support its contention. In Hoice Mach. Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676, 25 L. ed. 754, a Con¬ necticut Corporation, manufacturing sew-[448 ing machines at Bridgeport, had an agency atNashville, Tennessee, from which an agent was sent out to sell machines. It was held that he was subject to a license tax upon “all peddlers of sewing machines, without regard to the place of growth or produce of material or manufacture.” As it appeared that the sale was made, and wholly made, in the state of Tennessee, and apparently from a stock kept in that state, through an agent of the company, the case is not in point.
This case was followed, upon a similar state of facts in Emerl v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296,
39 L. ed. 430, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 68, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367.
The case most earnestly pressed upon at¬ tention, however, is that of O'Neil v. Ver¬ mont, 144 U. S. 323, 36 L. ed. 450, 12 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 693. This was a prosecution be¬ fore a justice of the peace for selling, fur¬ nishing, and giving away intoxicating li¬ quors. The defendant was a dealer in li¬ quors at Whitehall, New York, and was in the habit of receiving at his store orders for liquors from Vermont, accompanied by a jug to contain the liquor; and the liquors, as in this case, were sent under a C. O. D. consign¬ ment.
It was held by this court that, as the only question considered by the Supreme Court in its opinion was whether the liquor was
191 U. S.

1903.

Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Sims.
448-450
sold by O’Neil at Rutland or at Whitehall, and the court arrived at the conclusion that the completed sale was in Vermont, that this conclusion did not involve any Federal question, and the writ of error was dis¬ missed. Mr. Justice Blatchford took ex¬ press pains to say that “no point on the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States was taken in the county court, ... or considered by the su¬ preme court of Vermont.” The case was put by the supreme court of the state solely upon its police power. “If,” said that court, “an express company or any other carrier or person, natural or corporate, has in possession within this state an article in itself dangerous to the community, or an ar¬ ticle intended for unlawful or criminal use within the state, it is a necessary incident of the police powers of the state that such article should be subject to seizure for the protection of the community.”
(no text on this page in the source reporter)
*It will thus be seen that the supreme court of Vermont disclaimed the decision of the very question involved in this case as to the power of the states to interfere with in¬ terstate commerce by taxation of the thing imported, and the writ of error was dis¬ missed upon the ground that no Federal question was presented for its decision, and none was necessary to the determination of the case. Mr. Justice Field, in his dissent¬ ing opinion, thought the commerce clause of the Constitution was involved, and that the transaction was a clear interference with commerce between the states.
Upon the other hand, for the past seventy- five years, and ever since the original case of Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678, we have uniformly held that states have no power to tax directly, or by license upon the importer, goods Imported from for¬ eign countries or other states, while in their original packages, or before they have be¬ come commingled with the general property of the state, and lost their distinctive char¬ acter as imports. In that case a law of Maryland required importers to take out a license before they could be permitted to sell their imported goods. That was declared to be void not only as a tax upon imports, but as an infringement upon the power of Con¬ gress to regulate commerce. The case is one of the most important ever decided by this court, and has been adhered to by a uniform series of decisions since that time.
In Rol bins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489, 30 L. ed. 694, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592, it was declared that a tax upon commercial agents not hav¬ ing a. business house in the state was uncon¬ stitutional as a regulation of commerce when applied to soliciting the sale of goods on behalf of individuals or firms doing busi- 191 U. S. U. S., Book 48.
ness in another state, Mr. Justice Bradley remarking, apropos of what was subsequent¬ ly decided in O'Neil v. Vermont, “that the only way in which commerce between the states can be legitimately affected by state laws is when, by virtue of its police power, and its jurisdiction over persons and prop¬ erty within its limits, a state provides for the security of the lives, limbs, health, and comfort of persons and the protection of property; or, when it does those ‘things
which may otherwise incidentally affect commerce, such as . . . the imposition
of taxes upon all property within the state, mingled with and forming part of the great mass of property therein. But in making such internal regulations a state cannot im¬ pose taxes . . . upon property import¬
ed into the state from abroad, or from an¬ other state, and not yet become part of the common mass of property therein, . . .
and no regulations can be made directly af¬ fecting interstate commerce.” This case wa3 affirmed in Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S.
The same rule was applied in Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347, and Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, 29 L. ed.
691, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 454, to a statute requir¬ ing the payment of a license from persons dealing in merchandise not the growth, pro¬ duce, or manufacture of the state, and re¬ quiring no such license from persons selling goods grown, produced, or manufactured within the state. In McCall v. California,
Rep. 181, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 881, a license tax imposed upon the agent of a railroad be¬ tween Chicago and New York, soliciting business in San Francisco, was held to be void. To the same effect are Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 35 L. ed. 649, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 851 ; Brennan v. Titusville,
336, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229, another of the same line of cases, it was held that a city ordinance imposing a license upon every per¬ son engaged in the business of selling or de¬ livering picture frames, etc., was an inter¬ ference with interstate commerce, so far as applied to picture frames made in other states, and shipped to an agent in the state of North Carolina; and that the transaction wa3 not taken out of the protection of the commerce clause by the fact that the agent placed the pictures in their proper frames, and delivered them to the persons ordering them. Most of the prior cases are noticed in this opinion.
17 257
450-453
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct. Term,
Indeed, the cases upon this subject are al¬ most too numerous for citation, and the one under consideration is clearly controlled by them. Tlie sewing machine was made and sold in another state, shipped to North Car-
olina in its original package *'for delivery to the consignee upon payment of its price. It had never become commingled with the gen¬ eral mass of property within the state. While technically the title of the machine may not have passed until the price was paid, the sale was actually made in Chicago, and the fact that the price was to be collect¬ ed in North Carolina is too slender a thread upon which to hang an exemption of the transaction from a rule which would other¬ wise declare the tax to be an interference with interstate commerce.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is therefore reversed and the case remanded to that court for further pro¬ ceeding not inconsistent with this opinion.
Mr. Justice Holmes did not participate in the decision of this case.
SCHUYLER NATIONAL BANK OF SCHUYLER, NEBRASKA, and William H. Sumner, l'lffs. in Err., v. .
JAMES GADSDEN, George Thrush, Mattie Thrush, et al.
(See S. C. Reporter’s ed. 451-461.)
Usury by national bank — Federal law gov¬ erns.
A controversy respecting usurious interest paid on a note held by a national bank, secured by collateral note and mortgage, which arises in a suit to foreclose the mortgage, is none the less governed by the Federal law on the subject of usury by national hanks, as ex¬ pressed in U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5198 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1001, p. 3493), affording the rem¬ edy of an independent action to recover back the usurious payments, because the collateral note and mortgage were executed in favor of the bank president for the benefit of the bank, which was prohibited by the Federal law from taking real estate security for a debt coinci- dentiy contracted.
[No. 50.]
irgued and submitted November 3, 1903.
Decided December 7, 1903.
IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska to review a judgment
Note. — On the effect of usury try national bank — see note to Citizens’ Nat. Bank v. Gentry, 56 L. K. A. 673.
On usury by national banks generally — see note to Farmers’ & M. Nat. Bank v. Dearing, 23 L. ed. U. S. 196.
258
which affirmed a judgment of the District Court of Dodge County of that State, allow¬ ing a recovery by way of set-off of usurious interest paid to a national bank. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
See same case below, 63 Neb. 881, 89 N.
Statement by Mr. Justice Whites
*On August 8, 1890, George Thrush, one[452] of the defendants in error, being indebted to the Schuyler National Bank, one of the plaintiffs in error, for money then and there¬ tofore lent, executed a note to the bank for the sum of $5,000, payable six months after date. As collateral security for the pay¬ ment of this note, Thrush and his wife exe¬ cuted a note and mortgage for $5,000 to one Sumner, who was at that time the president of the bank. The collateral note and mort¬ gage were delivered to the bank, and by it retained. The note made tQ the bank was renewed by the bank from time to time, and various payments of interest and on account of the principal were made to the bank, the principal sum thereby being reduced in March, 1894, to $3,000. In that month and year a new note was executed to the bank for the principal sum then due and interest, in all, $3,229. No money dealings were had at any time between either Thrush and his wife and Sumner individually.
James Gadsden, one of the defendants in error sued Thrush and his wife in a Nebras¬ ka court to foreclose an asserted mortgage on real estate. J unior encumbrances of rec¬ ord were made parties defendant, among them being Sumner, to whom the mortgage for $5,000, securing the collateral note pre¬ viously referred to, had been executed. He answered and by cross petition asserted the lien of the mortgage, which he alleged was made to him as trustee, for the benefit of the Schuyler National Bank; he prayed foreclo¬ sure of such lien, and the payment of the indebtedness to the bank, stated to be $3,229 and interest. The Schuyler National Bank was subsequently made a party defendant; and, by answer and cross petition, claimed the benefit of the mortgage to Sumner, se¬ curing the indebtedness just stated, and joined in the prayer for foreclosure. Sepa¬ rate answers, similar in tenor, were filed on behalf of Thrush and his wife, in which were averred, in numerous paragraphs, many pay¬ ments to the bank of usurious interest dur¬ ing a period of five years, and in substance it was prayed that the amount of such pay¬ ments might be deducted *from the princi-[453] pal sum claimed by the bank to be due. In each of the answers was contained the fol¬ lowing paragraph:
“That the said note of $5,000 of the de¬ fendants George Thrush and Mattie N.
191 U. S.

1903.

Schuyler Nat. Bank v. Gadsden.
453, 454
Thrush, together with the mortgage secur¬ ing the same, were not executed and deliv¬ ered to said William H. Sumner upon any consideration whatsoever, but the same are simply held by said defendant as collateral security to the amount owing by the defend¬ ant, George Thrush, on the said indebted¬ ness now being evidenced by said $3,229 note, in this: that the said note of $5,000 and the mortgage securing the same were executed and delivered by this defendant and Mattie N. Thrush to said Sumner for the purpose that said Sumner might protect therewith said bank on account of the indebtedness of said George Thrush to said bank, and said note and mortgage were accepted by said Sumner with the knowledge and consent of said bank, and because said bank refused to take said mortgage, and said Sumner in no¬ wise protected said loan or advanced any money thereon and at the time of the ma¬ turity thereof, by virtue of the premises and the payments of usurious and illegal inter¬ est made thereon, as aforesaid, there was due and owing, after deducting the pay¬ ments made upon the principal and the said payments of usurious interest, the small balance, to wit, of $252.20, and for the aforesaid balance the said defendant Sumner is entitled to a lien upon said premises un¬ der and by virtue of said mortgage and promissory note of $5,000.”
A reply was filed to these answers. It •was therein stated in substance that most of the alleged usurious interest had been paid to the bank more than two years before the commencement of the action, and that the remaining interest payments were not in ex¬ cess of the rate allowed by law to be con¬ tracted for. The pleading concluded with the claim “that this court has no jurisdic¬ tion in this action to consider the question raised in said answer to each and every item of interest mentioned in said answer as paid to said Schuyler National Bank; that said items are not proper items of set-off or coun- [454]ter claim and cannot *be adjudicated except in a suit brought expressly for that purpose under the provisions of § 5198 of the Re¬ vised Statutes of the United States ( U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493).”
A decree was entered determining the pri¬ ority of liens between the respective lien¬ holders, -and providing for a foreclosure. Among other things it was adjudged that the mortgage to Sumner was executed and delivered for the benefit of the bank, and that the bank was entitled to the proceeds of the note and mortgage. As to the defense of usury set up in the answers, it was de¬ cided that, as the transaction was one with a national bank, it was governed by the laws of the United States, and, therefore, re¬ covery by way of set-off of the usurious in- 191 II. S.
terest alleged to have been paid was refused. Recovery of the interest embraced in the claim of the bank was, however, denied, and judgment was entered only for the principal sum found to be due and owing to the bank.
On appeal, the supreme court of Nebras¬ ka reversed the judgment of the district court in the particular just noticed, and re¬ manded the cause with directions “to ascer¬ tain the amount of money advanced to Thrush by the Schuyler National Bank, de¬ duct therefrom all payments, whether of principal or interest, and award foreclosure for the remainder, if any.” 56 Neb. 565, 76 N. W. 1060. On a rehearing, the appellate court reaffirmed its previous decision. 58 Neb. 340, 45 L. R. A. 654, 78 N. W. 632. Thereupon a writ of error was allowed from this court, which was subsequently dis¬ missed for want of jurisdiction. 179 U. S. 681, 45 L. ed. 384, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 918. Sub¬ sequently the state district court entered a judgment in conformity with the mandate of the supreme court of Nebraska, and such judgment was affirmed on appeal. 63 Neb. 881, 89 N. W. 403. The present writ of error was thereupon allowed.
Mr. Charles J. Phelps argued the cause and filed a brief for plaintiff in error:
The penalties imposed by §§ 5197, 5198, of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493) are the only ones which can be imposed in this suit.
Farmers' & M. Nat. Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29, 23 L. ed. 196.
Where real-estate security has been taken to secure a present or future loan, no one but the government can be heard to com¬ plain that the bank has exceeded its power.
The debt is the basis of the bank’s claim and rights; the mortgage is a mere inci¬ dent of the debt, and follows it.

638.

As between these parties, no burden would fall upon the bank had it been named in the mortgage as a mortgagee.
Usurious interest paid in cash upon re¬ newals of a note given to a national bank, and of all other notes of which it was a con-
259
456-453
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct. Term,
solidation, cannot be set off in an action against the note, as the remedy provided by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5198 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493), when such usurious interest has been actually paid — viz., a recovery in an action of twice the amount of interest thus paid — is exclusive.
Maseltine v. Central Nat. Bank, 183 U. S. 130, 46 L. ed. 117, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 49.
George Thrush and Mattie N. Thrush in propriis personis submitted the cause for defendants in error. Messrs. George E. Thomas and Frank Dolezal were on their brief.
Mr. Justice White, after making tbe foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:
The question for decision is, Did the su¬ preme court of Nebraska rightly decide that the controversy concerning usurious interest paid was to be governed by the statutes of Nebraska on that subject, and not by the laws of the United States on the same sub¬ ject, as expressed in § 5198 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493) ? We say this is the sole question, because it is undoubted that if the rights of the parties are to be determined by the laws of the United States, the ruling below was wrong. This results from the prior adjudications of this court, holding that where usurious in¬ terest has been paid to a national bank, the remedy afforded by § 5198 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3493), is exclusive, and is confined to an independ¬ ent action to recover such usurious pay¬ ments. Haseltine v. Central Nat. Bank, 183 U. S. 132, 46 L. ed. 118, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50, and cases cited. If, on the other hand, the controversy is governed by the local law of Nebraska, then the construction and appli¬ cation of that law made by the court of last resort of the state is binding.
In fact, this is not controverted and could not be since the supreme court of Nebraska conceded that if the contention as to usuri¬ ous interest ought to be determined by the laws of the United States, the conclusion which the court reached was erroneous. That court, however, held that the rights of the parties were to be measured by the law of the state instead of the law of the United States, because the collateral mortgage was not made, eo nomine, to the bank, but to an individual. This view was deemed to be fortified by the suggestion that, as the col¬ lateral note was secured by mortgage on [457]real estate, *it could not, under the laws of the United States, have been lawfully made in favor of a national bank. The collateral note and mortgage, it was, therefore, inti¬ mated, must be assumed to have been exe¬ cuted to an individual to avoid the effect of 260
the laws of the United States, and the con¬ sequent knowledge which would have been conveyed to the proper officers of the United States that the bank was violating the law.
The reasoning by which the judgment of the supreme court of Nebraska was con¬ trolled is, in our opinion, erroneous. The court did not hold that) because the collat¬ eral mortgage was taken in the name of an individual, it could not be enforced by the bank under the law of Nebraska, but simply held that, although it was enforceable by the bank, the remedy as to the usurious interest was governed exclusively by the state law, upon the theory that the transaction was not with the bank. But the usurious inter¬ est had all been paid, not to the individual upon the collateral note, but to the bank, upon the principal obligation held by it. It was this interest so paid to the bank on the principal note held by it which was in effect imputed so as to fix the amount due. The result of this was to treat the transaction as an individual one in order thereby to ex¬ clude the law of the United States, and then at once to treat it as a bank transaction for the purpose of ascertaining and imputing the sums of usurious interest which had been paid. This was to administer the rights of the parties upon distinct and wholly in¬ consistent theories. Either it was an indi¬ vidual transaction or it was not. It could not in reason have been at one and the same time both the transaction of the bank ex¬ cluding the individual and a dealing between individuals excluding the bank. As the usu¬ rious interest for which a remedy was af¬ forded had been paid to the bank in dealings by the bank with its debtor, and as the nec¬ essary effect of the judgment below was to reduce the debt due to the bank by allowing the imputation of the sum of the usurious interest, we are of opinion that the contro¬ versy was governed by the laws of the Unit¬ ed States, and not by the law of the state of Nebraska.
*Nor do we think the suggestions made in[458] the opinion of the court below respecting the power of a national bank under the laws of the United States to accept real estate secur¬ ity operate in any way to modify the con¬ clusion we have just expressed. It is not contended that under the law of Nebraska an agent, acting in his own name, may not take security for the benefit of a principal, or that there is or could be any valid stat¬ ute of the state of Nebraska discriminating against national banks, and depriving them of the benefit of transactions so consum¬ mated. This being true it follows that the taking of real estate security by the presi¬ dent, of the bank in his individual name, for the benefit of the bank, was in legal effect but the taking of security by the bank it-
191 U. S.

1903.

self. Now it is no longer open to contro¬ versy that the provisions of the statutes of the United States forbidding the taking of real-estate security by a national bank for a debt coincidently contracted do not oper¬ ate to make the security void, and thus en¬ able the individual who has contracted with the bank to defeat recovery, but simply sub¬ jects the bank to be called to account by the government for exceeding its powers. In Logan County Nat. Bank v. Toivnsend, 139 U. S. 67, 35 L. ed. 107, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 496, the rule on this subject, as settled by the previous authorities, was thus stated by the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan (p. 76, L. ed. p. Ill, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 499) :
“In Union Nat. Bank v. Mattheios, 98 U. S. 621, 25 L. ed. 188, it appeared that a na¬ tional bank loaned money upon the security of a note and a deed of trust of lands, both of which were assigned to it. The statute declared that a national banking association could loan money ‘on personal security,’ and could purchase, hold, and convey real estate for certain named purposes, ‘and for no others,’ among which was not included the securing of a present loan of money by a deed of trust or mortgage on real property. The court, while assuming that the statute, by clear implication forbade the bank from making a loan on real estate, refused to re¬ strain the bank from enforcing the deed of trust. The decision went upon these grounds: That the bank parted with its money in good faith ; that the question as [459]to the violation *of its charter by taking ti¬ tle to real estate for purposes unauthorized by law could be raised only by the government in a direct proceeding for that purpose; and that it was not open to the plaintiff in that suit, who had contracted with the bank, to raise any such question in order to defeat the collection of the amount loaned. If any doubt existed as to the scope of the decision in that case, it was removed by National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S. 99, 26 L. ed. 443, where it was held that the right of a na¬ tional bank to enforce a mortgage of real es¬ tate taken by it to secure indebtedness then existing, as well as future advances, could not be questioned by the debtor, and that a disregard by the bank of the provisions of the act of Congress upon that subject only laid the association open to proceedings by the government for exercising powers not conferred by law.”
It follows from the foregoing reasons that the supreme court of Nebraska erroneously determined the rights of the parties by the rule of the state law, when it should have applied the law of the United States.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska is reversed, and the cause is re- 191 U. S.
458-460
manded for further proceedings not incon¬ sistent with this opinion.
Mr. Justice Brown, with whom was Mr. Justice Brewer, dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the opin¬ ion of the court in this case.
The facts, concisely stated, are as follows: George Thrush executed a note to the bank for $5,000, payable in six months. At the same time Thrush and wife executed a col¬ lateral note and mortgage for the same amount to Sumner, president of the bank.
This note and mortgage, given partly for an antecedent and partly for a contemporaneous debt, were delivered to the bank, and re¬ tained by it.
The note made to the bank was renewed from time to time, *and various payments of[460] interest and principal were made, and the principal sum thereby reduced, in March,
1894, to $3,000. At that time a new note was executed to the bank for the principal sum due and interest, namely, $3,229. No dealings were had at any time between Thrush and wife and Sumner individually.
Suit having been begun by Gadsden to foreclose a. prior mortgage, and Sumner hav¬ ing been made a party as junior encum¬ brancer, he answered, and by cross petition asserted the lien of the mortgage, which he alleged was made to him as trustee of the bank. The bank being also made defendant, filed an answer and cross petition, claiming the benefit of the mortgage to Sumner.
It is clear that there was but one actual debt. The question is, whether, in asserting its right to foreclose the mortgage made to Sumner individually, it must not submit it¬ self to the laws of the state affecting usury; in other words, whether, in the foreclosure of a mortgage created under the laws of a state, and executed by one citizen of a state to another, its obligations are to be deter¬ mined by state law or Federal law. Con¬ gress forbids such a mortgage; the state permits it. There can be no doubt that the bank caused the mortgage to be given to Sumner on account of the law forbidding na¬ tional banks from receiving security by way of mortgage upon real estate, and to obviate any difficulties which might be interposed either by the mortgagor or by the govern¬ ment, by taking the mortgage in the name of the bank.
Had the mortgage expressed upon its face the exact truth, namely, that it was given for the benefit of a national bank, and partly, at least, for the security of a con¬ temporaneous debt, it would have fallen with¬ in the ban of the Federal statute. It is true the state law permitted it, but accompanied it with a forfeiture of the entire interest
261
Schuyler Nat. Bank v. Gadsden.
460-462
if usury were taken. The question is whether, in enforcing this mortgage, which the bank was prohibited from taking in its own name, it may claim an exemption from the usury laws of the state. So long as the [461]*dealings were solely between the bank and Thrush, and payments were made upon the bank note in question, the transaction with regard to usury was governed by the Fed¬ eral law. But in case the bank elected to foreclose 'the mortgage, I think it took the benefit of it cum onere. He who seeks equity must do equity. It could not take the ben¬ efit of the mortgage to Sumner, and claim a right to foreclose for the amount due, with¬ out, at the same time, admitting that the payments which had been made were made upon a debt secured by the mortgage, and subject to the disability of the state law. As was justly said by the supreme court of Nebraska : “It would be highly unconscion¬ able to permit a person to give a contract a false form to evade the burdens which would follow from its true expression, and then permit him to show the truth as against the form to evade the burdens cast by a con¬ tract in the form which has been so chosen.” [56 Neb. 565, 76 N. W. 1060.] The bank ought not to be permitted to blow hot and cold in the same transaction. If it claimed the benefit of a mortgage made to an indi¬ vidual, it should take it with such burdens as would rest upon it if the transaction had originally been what it was represented to be upon its face. The opinion of the court suggests an easy method by which the pro¬ hibition of the Federal statute against the lending of money upon real estate security may be successfully evaded without the slightest danger to the bank.
Oct. Tehm,
fore attempting to cross railroad tracks, stopped, looked, and listened.

2. An instruction as to the effect of closed

gates at a railway crossing as a notice of danger to a person attempting to cross the tracks is not erroneous, 'where it tells the jury that if the gates were generally kept down at night without regard to the presence or absence of passing trains, and the pedes¬ trian had knowledge of that fact, then the circumstance that the gates were down when he was run over in attempting to cross the tracks at night was not of itself a warning to him of the presence of danger, and that contributory negligence could not be Imputed to him from that fact alone.

3. The issue whether a person attempting to

cross railway tracks was struck by a runa¬ way car or an express train is properly sub¬ mitted to the jury, where there was evidence on the issue from which reasonable men might draw different conclusions.
[No. 71.]
Argued November 10, 11, 1003. Decided De¬ cember 7, 1003>
T N ERROR to the Court of Appeals of the J- District of Columbia to review a judg¬ ment which affirmed a judgment of the Su¬ preme Court of the District in favor of plaintiff in an action to recover damages for a death alleged to be due to negligence. Af¬ firmed.
See same case below, 20 App. D. C. 135.
Statement by Mr. Justice McKenna:
This action was brought under the death statute of the District of Columbia for dam¬ ages for the death of the husband and intes¬ tate of defendant in error. The death was the result of injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the plaintiffs in error. The negligence is alleged to have con¬ sisted in the insufficient coupling of the cars of the plaintiffs in error, whereby one broke loose from the others and ran over the de¬ ceased; in not equipping the car with good brakes; and not having upon it a light suf¬ ficient to give warning of its approach. The answer was not guilty.
The case was tried to a jury, which re¬ turned a verdict in favor of the defendant in error in the sum of $6,500. This amount was agreed to as correct if the jury should find on the other issues for the defendant in error.
Judgment was entered for that amount and costs. It was affirmed on appeal to the court of appeals of the District.
The testimony is somewhat long, and we think it is only necessary to give an outline
On Die province of the court arid jury in de¬ termining the question of negligence — see notes to Roux v. lllodgett & D. Lumber Co. 13 L. R. A. 728, and Ernry v. Raleigh & G. R. Co. 15 L. R. A. 332.
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