Arthur v. Browder, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 488 (1819)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Arthur v. Browder, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 488 (1819)
Full caption
M’ ARTHUR v. BROWDER
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
1819
M’ ARTHUR v. BROWDER.
The rule which prevails in Kentucky and Ohio, as to land titles, is that, at law, the patent is the foundation of title, and neither party can bring- his entry before the court. But a junior patentee, claiming under an elder entry may, in chancery, support his equitable title.
A description which will identify the lands is all that is necessai-y to the validity of a grant : but the law requires that an entry should be made with such certainty that subsequent purchasers may be enabled to locate the adjacentresiduum.
An entry for 1,000 acres of land in Ohio, on Deer Creek, “ beginning where the upper line of Ralph Morgan’s entry crosses the creek, running with Morgan’s line on each side of the creek 400 poles, *thence up the creek 400 poles in a direct
line, thence from each side of the given line with the upper line at right angles with the sideline for quantity ; ” held, to be a valid entry.
Distinction between amending and withdrawing an entry.
j^PPEAL from the Circuit Court of Ohio.
The bill in equity filed in this cause by the appellant, M’ Arthur, states that George Math¬ ews, on the 19th of September, 1799, made the following entry with the surveyor of the Vir¬ ginia army lands :
“No. 3717; 1799, September 19tli, George Mathews, assignee, enters 1,000 acres of land, on part of a military warrant, No 4795, on Deer Creek, beginning where the upper line of Ralph Morgan’s entry, No. 3665, crosses the creek, running with Morgan’s line on each side of the creek 200 poles; thence up the creek 400 poles on a direct line, thence from each side of the given line with the upper line at right angles with the side lines for quantity.”
That afterwards the entry of Ralph Morgan was withdrawn; and that in consequence George Mathews made the following entry: “No. 3717; 1801, October 26th. George
Mathews, assignee, enters 1,000 acres of land on part of a military warrant, No. 4795, on Deer Creek, beginning at two elms on the south¬ west bank of the creek, upper corner to Henry Mossies’ survey, No. 3925, running south 45 west 120 poles, north 65 west 172 poles, north 17 west 320 poles, north 76 east 485 poles, thence south 1 west 292 poles, thence to the be¬ ginning.” The bill charges, that the last entry was not intended as a new one; but only as an amendment or explanation of the first. This last entry was surveyed the 7th of *Octo-
her, 1807. And upon an assignment to the complainant, the land embraced in the survey was patented to the plaintiff, the 16th of July

1806.

The title of Browder, the respondent, is stated in the bill as follows:
That on the 20th of July, 1798, Nathaniel Randolph made the following entry: ’‘No, 3310; July 20, 1798. Nathaniel Randolph, as¬ signee, enters 300 acres of land on three mili¬ tary warrants, Nos. 4165, 4250, and 4664, on the lower side of Deer Creek, beginning at a walnut and two elms, cornered 5 poles from the bank of the creek, running south 61 west 200 poles to two white oaks, and two hickories, thence north 7 west 234 poles, thence north 61 east 200 poles, thence to the beginning.” That the last entry was surveyed for Randolph, and the oldest patent obtained by him, which he
Wheat. 4.
1819
M’Arthur v. Browder.
499
conveyed to Browder, who lias recovered upon an ejectment.
By the answer and exhibits, it appears that Randolph’s survey was made the 1st of August, 1798; that a patent was granted to Randolph, the 29th of September, 1800, who conveyed to the respondent. The respondent, Browder, having brought an action of ejectment, recov¬ ered the possession of the land in question ; and the appellant, M’Arthur, filed this bill in equity, praying for an injunction; a convey¬ ance of so much of the land claimed by the respondent as interferes with his claim; and for general relief. The bill was dismissed by the Circuit Court, and the cause brought by appeal to this court.
This cause was argued by Mr. Scott and Mr. 491] Brush for the appellant, and by the Attorney -General and Mr. Doddridge for the respondent.
Marshall, 6 h. J. , delivered the opinion of the court;
In this case, the appellee claims under the elder grant founded on the elder entry. Con¬ sequently, if his entry be valid, the bill of the appellant cannot be sustained. But the entry is so defective in description that it was neces¬ sarily abandoned; and the appellee relies on his patent; anterior to the emanation of which, the appellant contends that the land was ap¬ propriated by his entry. The validity of this entry, also, is denied. But before we examine the objections made to it, we must consider those which have been urged against the juris¬ diction of this court as a court of equity.
The rule which prevails both in Kentucky and Ohio is, that, at law. the patent is the foundation of title, and that neither party can bring his entry before the court. In conse¬ quence of this rule, it has been also well settled that the junior patentee, claiming under an elder entry, may, in chancery, support his equitable title, and obtain a decree for a con¬ veyance of so much of the land as, under his entry, he may be entitled to. But the general principle is supposed to be inapplicable to this case, because the words of the entry are intro¬ duced into the grant; and if they were too vague to appropriate the land when used in the entry, they must be too vague to appropriate it when used in the grant, which is a 492] question triable at law, and which was tried in the ejectment brought by the appellee for the land. »
Were the fact precisely as stated, it could not support the argument which is founded on it. When lands are granted, a description which will identify them is all that is necessary to the validity of the grant. But identity is not all that is necessary to the validity of an entry. The law requires that loca¬ tions should be made with such certainty that subsequent purchasers may be enabled to locate the adjacent residuum. All grants are founded on surveys. They recite the surveys, and all that is required in an ejectment is to prove that the land claimed is that which was surveyed. But more is required in a contest respecting an entry. Nothing is more common than for courts to declare an entry void for un¬ certainty, notwithstanding the clearest proof
Wheat. 4.
that the land claimed, and that located, are the same.
There is, then, nothing in the resemblance between the words of the grant and of the en¬ try to distinguish this from other cases, in which the party claiming under the first good entry comes into chancery to obtain a conveyance of lands held under a senior patent. We proceed, then, to examine the entry under which the appellant claims. That entry is made for 1,000 acres of land on Deer Creek, “begin¬ ning where the upper line of Ralph Morgan’s entry crosses the creek, running with Morgan’s line on each side of the creek 200 poles, thence up the creek 400 poles on a direct line, thence from each side of the *given line, with
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the upper line at right angles with the side lines, for quantity.”
That entries, which contain such descriptive words as clearly to designate the place where the land lies, shall, with respect to their more particular locative calls, be supported; if they can on fair construction be supported, is a prin¬ ciple which pervades the whole of that curious and intricate fabric which has been erected by the decisions on land titles in Kentucky, and has been taken as a model for those in the mili¬ tary district of Ohio. If a subsequent locator, brought to the spot where the lands lie, with the location in his hand, might, by the applica¬ tion of the rules which the courts have estab¬ lished, know how to place the entry so as to enable himself to locate the adjacent residuum, the entry must be sustained.
In this case it is admitted that the beginning is described with sufficient certainty. The place where the upper line of Ralph Morgan’s entry crosses Deer Creek is ascertained. From that beginning the entry calls to run “with Ralph Morgan’s line on each side of the creek 200 poles. ” It is said to be entirely uncertain whether this line is to be 200 poles on each side of the creek, so as to amount to 400 poles, or to be only a line of 200 poles altogether. Did this ambiguity really exist in the words themselves, it is entirely re¬ moved by the other parts of the location. The entry is made for 1,000 acres of land, and can¬ not, on any construction, be made to exceed 500 acres, unless the base line be 400 poles. We have then a given line of 400 poles. The entry then proceeds, *‘ ‘ thence up the
creek 400 poles on a direct line.” The plain meaning of these words is, that the land lies up the creek, so that a direct line of 400 poles will reach its upper boundary. If the location stop¬ ped here, adding only “for quantity,” the de¬ cisions of Kentucky would establish it as a good entry for a square formed on the upper side of the base line of 400 poles, which would con¬ tain 1,000 acres of land. But the entry pro¬ ceeds, “thence from each side of the given line, with the upper line at right angles with the side lines, for quantity.” This part of the description has been said to produce uncertain¬ ty, because two lines are given, and a subse¬ quent locator could not tell to which reference was made.
If it would make any difference whether the base line or the line up the creek was taken as the given line, this might produce some difficul- ty; but if the entry must cover precisely the same ground, whether the one or the other be taken as the given line, it can make none.
623
494
SupAeme Court of the United States.
1819
Let the base line be considered as the given line. It is plain that the words from each side must mean from each end, because the land is to lie up the creek; whereas, if you proceed from each side, it would lie partly down the creek. The line, too, which is to give the quantity wdth the side lines is the upper line, and that is removed from the base line the dis¬ tance necessary to include the quantity of land required. As this quantity is to be inclosed from the whole entry taken together, within lines which form a square, the entry must be understood to require that the side lines should be drawn from the ends of the base line, 495] and the inaccuracy of the expression could not mislead.
But the entry is understood to refer as the given line to that which is last mentioned; that is, to the line of 400 poles, which is perpendic¬ ular to the base. You are then carried up the creek 400 poles in a direct line from the base line. From each side of this line you are car¬ ried “with the upper line at right angles with the side lines,” until you get 1,000 acres. This construction gives full effect to every word of the entry, and gives a square which will con¬ tain 1,000 acres. It is, we think, the natural construction. The entry would be so under¬ stood by every subsequent locator. On any construction, then, which can be given to the words, the entry must not only have the same form, but must cover precisely the same land.
If, then, the original entry had never been amended, there could be no doubt of the right of the party claiming under it. This leads to the inquiry, whether the amendment affects this right.
The distinction between amending and with¬ drawing an entry is well established, and com¬ pletely understood. An amended entry retains its original character, so far as it is unchanged by the amendment. So far as it is changed, it is a new entry. The survey in this case, is un¬ derstood to conform precisely to the amended entry; and it contains a part of the land com¬ prehended in the original entry. So far as re¬ spects the land within the appellee’s patent, which is comprehended by the original entry, the amended entrv, and the survey, we think 496 ] the appellant was entitled to a decree, and, consequently, the Circuit Court erred in dismissing his bill. The decree is to be re¬ versed, and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court, with directions to enter a decree con¬ forming to this opinion.
Decree. — This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the court of the United States for the seventh circuit, and district of Ohio; and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, this court'is of opin¬ ion that the plaintiff in the Circuit Court had a good title in equity to so much of the land contained in the defendant’s patent as is com¬ prehended in the original entry made by George Matthews, in September, 1799, and also in his amended entry, and in his survey ; and that the decree of the said Circuit Court, dismissing the bill, is erroneous, and ought to be reversed, and it is, accordingly, reversed; and this court doth farther direct and order, that the said cause be remanded to the said Circuit Court, with direc¬ tions to enter a decree, directing the defendant <; j 4
to convey to the plaintiff so much of the land contained in his patent as is comprehended in the original entry, and also in the amended en¬ try and survey, on which the grant of the plaintiff was founded.
*[prize.]
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THE NEUSTRA SENORA DE LA CARI- DAD. Bages et al. , Claimants.
A cruiser, equipped at the port of Carthagena, in South America, and commissioned under the au¬ thority of the province of Carthagena, one of the United Provinces of New Grenada, at war with Spain, sailed from the said port, and captured on the high seas, as prize, a vessel and cargo belonging to the subjects or the king of Spain, and put a prize crew on board ; and ordered her to proceed to the said port of Carthagena; the captured vessel was afterwards fallen in with by a private armed vessel of the United States, and the cargo taken out and brought Into the United 'States for adjudication as the property of their enemy. The original Span¬ ish owner, and the prize-master from the Cartha- genian cruiser, both claimed the goods. The posses¬ sion was decreed to be restored to the Carthagenian pri ze-master.
War having been recognized to exist between Spain and her colonies hy the government of the United States, it is the duty* of the courts of the United States, where a capture is made by either of the belligerent parties without any violation of our neutrality, and the captured prize is brought inno¬ cently within our jurisdiction, to leave things in the same state they find them ; or to restore them to the state from which they have been forcibly re¬ moved by the act of our own citizens.
The Spanish treaty held not to apply to the above case, as the court could not consider the Cartha¬ genian captors as pirates, and the capture was not made within the jurisdictional limits of the United States ; the only two cases in which the treaty en¬ joins restitution.
A PPEAL from the Circuit Court of North 1Y Carolina.
This was a prize allegation against certain goods, taken by a private armed vessel of the United States, The Harrison, during the late war with Great Britain, *out of a ship
called The Neustra Senora de la Caridad. A claim was interposed by Salvador Bages, and others, Spanish subjects, domiciled at St. Jago, in the Island of Cuba, alleging that the ship was a Spanish ship, and with the goods, their property, was raptured on the high seas, by an armed vessel cruising under the pretended col¬ ors of Cajtliagena, the commander of which produced no commission, nor did the claimants know, or admit, he had one, and who detained the Caridad as prize, and put a prize crew on board. That having separated from the capt¬ uring vessel, they wTere met with and boarded by the privateer Harrison. That the said privateer captured and took possession of the Caridad, and the captors unladed the cargo from on board of her, into the Harrison, and having brought the same into the port of Wilmington, North Carolina, proceeded against it as prize of war.
A cross claim was filed by Pedro Brugman, master and commander of the Carthagenian armed schooner Neustra Senora de la Popa, in behalf of himself, and others, the owners of said privateer, to the goods thus proceeded against
Wheat. 4.
1819
The Neustra Senora de la Caridad, Bases et al., Claimants.
498
as prize of war by the commander, officers and ■crew of the Harrison. This claim pleaded that the goods were not at the time of the proceed¬ ings, nor at the time of capture by the Harrison, the property of any British subjects, or of any persons domiciled in the dominions of Great Britain, nor of any of the enemies of the United States, but that the same then were, and yet are, the property of the owners, officers and crew of the La Popa, from whose lawful possession 499]the same had been violently and wrong¬ fully taken, on the high seas, by the Harrison, as before mentioned. That the La Popa, hav¬ ing been duly commissioned by the sovereign authority of the independent state of Cartha- gena, and furnished with letters of marque and reprisal, authorizing her to capture, on the high seas, the property of the enemies of said state, left the port of Carthagena in the month of December, 1814, on a cruise. That on the 21st of January, 1815, while cruising off St. Jago de Cuba, the said privateer La Popa, com¬ manded by the claimant, seized and captured the ship La Caridad, sailing from Jamaica to Cuba, loaded with dry goods, and belonging, with the cargo, to the enemies of the said inde¬ pendent state of Carthagena, as the papers on board, and the information of the master and •crew, convinced the claimant to be the fact. That the claimant put a prize-master and crew on board the captured vessel, and ordered her to proceed to the said port of Carthagena. That the said prize-master and crew retained the pos¬ session for four days, and while they were pro¬ ceeding to Carthagena, the Caridad was forcibly taken by the Harrison from their possession, the goods taken out, and brought into the port of Wilmington, as aforesaid.
An order was made by the court below, that the claimant, Pedro Brugman, should be allow¬ ed to make further proof, that the commission which he produced, and under which he alleg¬ ed the original capture to have been made, was issued by the authority acting as the sovereign authority of the United Provinces of New Grenada.
500] At the hearing it was proved, by the
testimony of witnesses, that the La Popa be¬ longing to and had been actually fitted out in Carthagena, one of the said United Provinces •of New Grenada; that the commission produced by the commander was in the usual form in which letters of marque were issued by the sov¬ ereign authority of that province; that the seal affixed to the same was the seal used at the time by those who exercised the sovereign authority of Carthagena to authenticate the commissions by them granted ; that the officers of state by whom the same was signed, were at the time, and had been for some time before, respectively, the Governor and the Secretary of War, and the Marine of the said province; that the witnesses were acquainted with the handwriting of the said governor and secretary, the witnesses hav¬ ing often seen them write as well as seen their public and acknowledged writings, and verily believed the same to be their signatures. And the commission was also proved to be genuine, and to have regularly issued, by the certificates and declarations of the officers of state of the Province of Carthagena. The original capture by the La Popa, the retaking by the Harrison, and the proprietary interest of the original Wheat. 4. U. S., Book 4.
Spanish owners of the goods were all fully- proved.
The Circuit Court decreed, at May term, 1818, the goods to be restored to the possession of Pedro Brugman; from which sentence an appeal was taken to this court by the claimant, Salvador Bages, for himself and the original Spanish owners.
The cause was submitted without argument.
^Johnson, J. , delivered the opinion ['*50 1 of the court :
This case arose out of a capture made in the late war. The La Popa, a commissioned cruis¬ er of the Province of Carthagena, had made prize of the Caridad, a Spanish vessel, in a voy¬ age from Jamaica to Cuba. The American private armed vessel Harrison fell in with the Caridad, then in possession of the prize crew of the La Popa, and suspecting her cargo to be British, took possession of it, and transshipped it into their own vessel. On the arrival of the Harrison in a port of North Carolina, the cargo was claimed both by the Caridad and La Popa, and finally restored to the La Popa.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Circuit Court of North Carolina, made by the original Spanish owner, and the case has been submitted on the evidence and the grounds tak¬ en in the argument- below.
There is no doubt that the property w-as Span¬ ish, nor that the privateer La Popa was com¬ missioned as a cruiser, whilst the Province of Carthagena had an organized government; and there is the fullest evidence that her armament and equipment was unaffected by any charge of having been made in violation of our laws.
The only question in the case is, whether an original Spanish owner is entitled to the aid of the courts of this country, to restore to him property of which he has been dispossessed by capture, under a commission derived from the revolted colonies? and this question is consid¬ ered, by this court, as having *been
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fully decided by the principles assumed in the case of The United States v. Palmer ,* at the last term, and by the decisions in the cases of The Estrella 2 and Birina Pastora3 at the pres¬ ent term.
War notoriously exists, and is recognized by our government to exist, between Spain and her colonies. This is an appeal to the highest of all tribunals on a question of right. No neu¬ tral nation can act against either, without tak¬ ing part with the other in the war. All that the law of nations requires of us, is strict and impartial neutrality. And no friendly nation ought to demand of the courts of this country to do an act which may involve it in a war with the victor. Our duty is, where the property of either is brought innocently within our juris¬ diction, to leave things as we find them; much more to restore them to that state from' which they have been forcibly removed by the act of our own citizens. The treaty with Spain can have no bearing upon the case, as this court cannot recognize such captors as pirates, and the capture was not made within our jurisdic-
2. — Ante, p. 298.
3. — Ante, p. 52.
40 (525
1819-
Supremk Court of the United States.
502
tional limits. In those two«cases only does the treaty enjoin restitution.
Decree affirmed with costs.
^[common law.]
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