Danforth’s Lessee v. Thomas, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 155 (1816)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Danforth’s Lessee v. Thomas, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 155 (1816)
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
1816
Disposition
And, as this court have been uni¬ formly disposed to pay great respect to the de¬ cisions of the state courts respecting- titles to real estate, this decision has its full influence on the present question; and, therefore, the judgment of the Circuit Court is unanimously affirmed with costs. Judgment affirmed
DANFORTH’S LESSEE v. THOMAS.
The act' of assembly of North Carolina, passed be¬ tween the years 1783 and 1789, avoids all entries, sur¬ veys, and grants of lands set apart for the Cherokee Indians, and no title can be thereby acquired to such lands.
The boundaries of the reservation have been al¬ tered by successive treaties with the Indians, but it seems that the mere extinguishment, of their title did not subject the land to appropriations, unless expressly authorized by the legislature.
ERROR to the Circuit Court for the District of East Tennessee. This cause, depending mainly on the same principles with the preced¬ ing case of Preston v. Browder,'2 was argued by Key for the plaintiff, and by Jones for the de¬ fendant in error. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.
*Todd, <•/. , delivered the opinion of
the court as follows :
This was an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiff in error against the defendant in error. On the trial of the cause in the Circuit Court, it appeared from evidence that the land in controversy was situate in the tract of coun¬ try lying south of Holston and French broad river, and between the rivers Tennessee and Big Pigeon, the Indian title to which was ex¬ tinguished by the treaty of Holston. The plaintiff claimed by virtue of a grant, issued by the state of North Carolina, bearing date the 26th of December, 1791. The defendant, claimed under a grant from the state of Ten¬ nessee, bearing date the 2d of January, 1809. The defendant, by his counsel, objected to the grant under which the plaintiff claimed title being admitted in evidence, on the ground that it was for land which the laws of North Caro¬ lina had prohibited from being entered, sur¬ veyed, or granted. The court sustained the ob¬ jection, and prohibited the grant from going in
1.— In England the Court of Chancery will not, in general, entertain a bill for a specific performance of contracts for the sale of chattels, or which relate to merchandise, but leaves the parties to their reme¬ dy at law, where it is much more expeditious. One exception to this general rule is where the agree¬ ment is not final, but is to be made complete by subsequent acts, without which it would be deemed imperfect at law. (3 Atk., 383, Buxton v. Lister et al.; 1 Pere. Will., 570; Bunb.,135; lOVes., Juii., 161.) The ground upon which a specific performance is refused, in these eases, is, that an adequate remedy exists at law, where damages may be recovered, and that the value of merchandise varies so much at, different times, and under different circumstances, as to render it frequently unjust to compel a speci¬ fic performance. But where the question was, upon what terms a party should be relieved against the penalty of a bond which had been forfeited, for not transferring stock at a given day, according to his agreement, the English Court of Chancery de¬ creed him to transfer the stock in specie, and to ac¬ count for all dividends accrued since he ought to have transferred it. (2 Vern., 394; 1 Bro. Pari. Cas., 193.)
2.— Ante, p. 115.
55)
156
Supreme Court op the United States.
1816
evidence to the jury; whereupon a verdict and judgment was rendered in favor of the defend¬ ant. A hill of exceptions was taken to the opinion of the court, and the cause was brought up to this court by writ of error.
The correctness of the opinion of the Circuit Court depends on the sound construction of the act of the general assembly of the state of IJorth Carolina, passed in 1783, c. 2, s. 5 and 6, whereby the lands, within certain. limits therein designated (including the lands in con¬ troversy), are reserved for the Cherokee. Indians, 157] and the citizens prohibited from enter¬ ing and surveying lands within those limits. It is contended, on the part of the plaintiff, that this act cannot be construed, nor did the legislature mean to give the Indians a right of property in the soil, but merely the use and en¬ joyment of it. * That the succeeding legisla¬ tures, by the acts of 1784, 1786 and 1789, have changed this reservation for the use of the In¬ dians, and given unlimited access, for the pur¬ poses of making entries and surveys “to all lands not before specially located,” and to “ all vacant lands” within the limits of the state. Consequently, locations could be made, and grants issued to perfect titles of lands lying within the limits of the Indian reservation.
Whether the legislature had the power, or intended to give the Indiansa right of property in the soil, or merely the use and enjoyment of it, need not be inquired into, nor decided, by this court ; for it is perfectly clear that the 5th section of the act of 1783, c. 2, prohibits all persons from making entries or surveys for any lands within the bounds set apart for the Chero¬ kee Indians, and declares all such entries and grants thereupon, if any should be made, utter¬ ly void. They had the power, and have de¬ clared, unequivocally, an intention to prohibit entries from being made within those reserva¬ tions. The several acts of 1784, 1786 and 1789, although they contain general expres¬ sions, which, if taken singly, might seem to sanction entries and surveys for “ all lands not before specially located,” or to " all vacant lands;” yet, when taken together, these general 158] expressions must be controlled by the restrictions and prohibitions as to the reserva¬ tions for the Indian tribes. The reasoning used in the case of Preston v. Browder, 1 applies with equal, if not greater, propriety, to this case. And, although at different periods different sections of these reservations have been sub¬ jected to appropriation by entries and surveys, it has been in consequence of the several trea¬ ties with the Indians, by which the boundaries of the reservations have been altered, and the Indian claim extinguished; but it is believed that the mere extinguishment of the Indian title did not subject the' land to appropriation, until an act of the legislature authorized or per¬ mitted it. Whatever doubts this court might entertain on this subject, were they now con¬ struing these laws upon the first impression, that doubt would be removed on a view of the case of Avery v. Strother, in the Reports in Con¬ ference, p. 431, decided by the judges of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. This is a decision directly in point, made by the Supreme Court of the state, construing the laws brought
1.— Ante, 115.
60
into the view of this court, and is decisive of this case. And, as this court have been uni¬ formly disposed to pay great respect to the de¬ cisions of the state courts respecting- titles to real estate, this decision has its full influence on the present question; and, therefore, the judgment of the Circuit Court is unanimously affirmed with costs.
Judgment affirmed.
Cited— 9 Wheat. 676, 677 ; 12 Pet. 746.
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THE ANTONIA JOHANNA.
A neutral ship was chartered for a voyage from London to St. Michaels, thence to Faya!, thence to St. Petersburg- or any port in the Baltic, and back to London, at the freight of 1,000 guineas. On her passage to St. Michaels she was captured and brought into the port of Wilmington, N. C., for ad¬ judication. A part of the cargo was condemned, and part restored.
The freight was held to be chargeable upon the whole cargo, as well upon that part restored as upon that condemned.
Qucere, Whether more than a pro rnta freight was due to the master. It seems that the property of a house of trade in the enemy’s country is con¬ fiscable as prize of war, notwithstanding the neu¬ tral domicile of one or more of its partners.
A PPEAL from the Circuit Court for the Dis- 1A trict of North Carolina. This was the case of a Russian ship, captured on the 2d of June, 1814, by the privateer Herald, on a voyage from London to St. Michaels, and brought into the port of Wilmington, N. C., for adjudica¬ tion. The ship was chartered by Messrs. Bur¬ nett & Co., a mercantile firm at London, for a voyage from London to St. Michaels, thence to Fayal, thence to St. Petersburg or any port in the Baltic, and thence to return to London, at the stipulated freight of one thousand guineas. The ship and cargo were libeled as prize of war, and, upon the hearing in the District Court, that part of the cargo which was not claimed was condemned. The residue of the cargo, excepting one moiety of certain *packages, claimed on behalf of Messrs.
Ivens & Burnett, a mercantile firm at St. Michaels, was restored. The whole freight was decreed to be paid to the master, and charged exclusively upon the proceeds of the property condemned, and the moiety of the property restored to Messrs. Ivens & Burnett. From so much of this decree as respected the controversy between the captors and the claimants of the cargo, an appeal was interposed to the Circuit Court, where the decree was affirmed, and the cause was brought, by appeal from the latter decree, to this court.
Wheaton, for the appellants and captors. The cause may be divided into three branches :
1st. As to the claim for the three invoices of goods shipped by Messrs. Burnett & Co. , of London, to Messrs. Ivens & Burnett, of St. Michaels.
• 2d. As to the remainder of the cargo.
3d. As to the order respecting the freight.
1. There is a hostile trade which will affect
the property engaged in it with confiscation, as completely and effectually as a hostile domicile,
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1816
The Antonia Johanna.
160
and that without regard to the national charac¬ ter of the individual.. Thus, the produce of an estate in the enemy’s country, belonging to a person domiciled in a neutral country, is liable to capture and condemnation. 1 This principle was adopted and confirmed by this court in the case of Mr. Bentzen, a Danish subject, resident in Denmark, whose claim to 30 hogs- 161] heads of sugar, the produce of an es¬ tate belonging to him, in a West India Island possessed by the enemy, was rejected, and the property condemded.2 So a vessel purchased bona fide in the enemy’s country, by a neutral, continuing in her foTmer trade, is good prize.3 And the property of a house of trade estab¬ lished in the enemy’s country, though some of the parties may be domiciled in a neutral coun¬ try, is prize of war.4 Apply these authorities to the present case: the share of Mr. Ivens can¬ not escape the same fate with that of his part¬ ner domiciled in London; the partnership is domiciled there, and his interest is so mixed up with hostile interests that it cannot be separat¬ ed. These principles were recognized by a learned judge of this court, in the first circuit, in the case of the St. Jose Indiano,5 the decree in which was acquiesced in by the counsel. Their general spirit was adopted by that vener¬ able tribunal, the Continental Court of Appeals in prize causes, and applied even to a treaty stipulation, that free ships should make free goods, which was held not to extend to a trade carried on by a neutral, but hostile in its nat¬ ure.6 2. As to the other portions of the cargo, the evidence to restore or condemn must come, in the first instance, from the documentary 162] evidence and *the examinations in pre¬ paratory. In this case, that is neither sufficient for condemnation, nor does it afford satisfac¬ tory grounds for immediate restitution; further proof ought, therefore, to be ordered. 3. The neutral master is undoubtedly entitled to his freight; but this is not to be charged, exclu¬ sively, upon the property condemned and order¬ ed to be sold, whilst the property specifically restored escapes the burden which is imposed, solely upon the ground of an implied perform¬ ance of the contract on the part of the master. The law says that capture is equivalent to de¬ livery; it does not say that condemnation only is equivalent to delivery, and that, therefore, the portion of the cargo restored shall be charged with no part of the freight. On the contrary, in a case where the cargo had been unlivered. and the whole was restored upon the original evidence, the freight was held to be a charge upon the cargo, though it was not car¬ ried to the port of destination.1 But, here, a pro rata freight only ought to be allowed; but a small part ' of the whole voyage, for which the 1,000 guineas was stipulated to be paid,
1. — 5 Rob.. 20, The Phoenix.
2. — Feb. T. 1815.
3. — 1 Rob., 1, The Vigilantia ; 14 Rob., 31, The Jem¬
my; 3 Rob., 41, The Jonge Amelia, cited in the case of The Portland.
4. — 1 Rob., 1, The case of Mr. Coopman, cited in
5. — Claim of Messrs. Dyson, Brothers & Fennie.
6. -2 Dali., 34, Darby et al. v. the brig;Erstern.
7. -3 Rob., 101, The Race Horse ; See also the Mar¬
tha and the Hamilton, in a note to the same case
Wheat. 1.
was to be performed in the service of this cargo, which was to be delivered at St. Michaels. The master was not bound to wait longer than the first adjudication; indeed, the unlivery com¬ pletely dissolved the contract between him and the owners of the goods, and entitled the master to whatever freight he might have earned in their service.8
•
Gaston, contra. 1. The captors can-
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not now object that the freight, decreed in the court below to be paid to the master, was un¬ reasonable in itself, or not chargeable to them. They have acquiesced in this part of the decree, and it has been definitively carried into execu¬ tion. 2. The goods shipped to Messrs. Ivens & Burnett, of St. Michaels, were shipped by order, and on account and risk of that house of trade. The claim, the documentary proof, and the preparatory examinations, are perfectly con¬ sistent, and establish that a moiety of this ship¬ ment is the property of that house, the partners of which are domiciled in a neutral country; they must, therefore, be regarded as neutral by both belligerents, with reference to the trade which they carry on with the adverse belliger¬ ent, and with all the world. In the case of The St. Indiano it was insisted that the principle of condemnation applied in cases where a part¬ ner of a neutral house is domiciled in the ene¬ my’s country, and ships to such house, goods, the manufacture of that country; but the position was expressly overruled. Even if the hostile and the neutral house here consisted of the same partners, and the shipment was made from the hostile to the neutral partner, for their joint concern, it would, nevertheless, be contended that the share of the hostile part¬ ner was alone subject to condemnation. How¬ ever sincere and profound a respect is felt for the learned judges, who are said to have de¬ cided that the belligerent character of one part¬ ner shall avail to condemn, and the neutral character of the other shall not avail to save, where the house has a *domicile both in
the neutral and belligerent country ; these sup¬ posed decisions cannot be reconciled with the dictates of justice, or the principles of reason, and it is, therefore, believed that they will not receive the sanction of the highest judicial tribunal of this country. 3. No specific ground has been taken by the captor’s counsel to sup¬ port the appeal as to the remaining portions of the cargo. The claims are verified by the documentary evidence showing the goods to have been shipped by order, and for the account and risk of persons, subjects of, or domiciled in, a neutral country.
Wheaton, in reply. 1. If the captors have improvidently closed the door, in the court be¬ low, upon the question as to what amount of freight shall be paid to the master, it is still open as to whether any portion of the cargo is to be exempt from contributing to the payment of freight. That is, emphatically, a contro¬ versy between the captors and claimants; the master has nothing to do with it ; he has been paid his freight, and gone away. The bring¬ ing in the vessel and cargo for adjudication, was not a wrong done by the captors to the
8.— 6 Rob., 231, The Hoffnung; 1 Edwards, 246, The Friends ; 1 Rob., 289, The Copenhagen ; 4 Rob., 77, The Isabella Jacobina.
61
164
Supreme Court op the United States.
1816“
claimants, who may ultimately prove to be neu¬ tral; it was an inconvenience to which the lat¬ ter subjected themselves by. lading their goods in the same vessel with enemy’s property; and it is not for the captors to indemnify them by paying the freight of the neutral claimants’ goods, as well as those which have become the property of the captors jure belli. 2. Accord¬ ing to the claimant’s counsel, the shipments by 165] Messrs. Burnett & Co. were made by •the hostile house, as the agents, and bona fide, exclusively on the account and risk of the neu¬ tral house. On no other ground whatever can this case be extracted from the principle of the St. Indiano; and, upon that ground, the whole of the property ought to be restored, according to the limitations of the principle stated by the learned judge in the case of The St. Indiano. It is the domicile of the house, and the nature of its trade, and not the belligerent character of one of the partners, that avails to condemn. And it is a doctrine that may be vindicated upon every principle of reason and justice. Upon what principle is the property of a neu¬ tral subject, personally domiciliated in the enemy’s country, liable to condemnation? Not upon the ground that his original national char¬ acter is lost, but that his property is undistin- guishably incorporated with that of the enemy, and employed exclusively in carrying on his trade, and strengthening his resources. Is not the property of a house of trade, established in the enemy’s country, wheresoever the partners may reside, in the same predicament? It is believed that the decisions cited to support these principles will be sanctioned by this tribunal; that they are corollaries from the rules of prize law which have already been sanctioned by it; that they are supported by all the analogies of that law, and are essential to its perfection as a system of jurisprudence im¬ partially administered between belligerents and neutrals. The interest which a power at war has in maintaining the principles of these de¬ cisions, is obvious. What interest has a fair 166] and just neutral in contesting it? His subjects may carry on their usual trade through its accustomed channels, untouched by the flames of war spreading on every side. Do they wish to export their commodities to the enemy’s country, they may consign them to commission merchants there, or to their own supercargoes on board. Do they wish to im¬ port the productions of the enemy’s country into their own, they may purchase them by the same instrumentality. Do they wish to become the carriers of both to every region of the globe, they may do it with impunity. A neutral merchant cannot, therefore, wish to be a partner in a house of trade in the enemy’s country, unless for the purpose of lending his national character as a shield against the just rights of the other belligerent. It is by a more remote application of the same principle now contended for that the property of persons taken in breach of blockade, as contraband of war, or sailing under an enemy’s license, is lia¬ ble to be considered as enemy’s property, pro hac vice. It is taken adhering to the enemy, clothed with his character, and inseparably blended with his interests. This rule is pre¬ cisely settled by the positive adjudications of the British prize courts, and there is reason to 62
believe is practiced in those of Prance and other countries. It is not one of those interpo¬ lations into the code of public law of which that great civilian by whom it is expounded has been accused. This is not like the rule which prohibits to neutrals, in the time of war, all trade not open in peace; nor like the rule which declares whole coasts and countries in a state of blockade, ^without investing or
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besieging a single port ; nor like that which ex¬ tends the infection of contraband to a return voyage; not that which swells the list of contraband, with every article however re¬ motely useful in war. Nor is it a rule of recent invention; at least, there is no evidence that the cases mentioned in The Vigilantia, were de¬ cided contrary to the practice and opinions, maintained by the British courts of prize, when this country was a portion of the British em¬ pire. 3. The remaining claims are said to be verified by the papers found #on board. But how are these papers verified? It is well known that papers are a mere dead letter, unless sup¬ ported by the testimony of living witnesses. When it is considered that the cargo was laden in the enemy’s country, and the papers put on board by enemy shippers, only one of whom the master knows anything about, so as to be able to swear, even as to his belief, it is not too much to say that this part of the case requires- further proof to justify restitution of the goods as claimed.
Story, ./. , delivered the opinion of the court, and, after stating the facts, proceeded as fol¬ lows:
Upon the argument no specific objection was taken to the restitution of any of the property claimed, excepting that included in the claim of Messrs. Ivens & Burnett. This shipment was made by Messrs. Burnett & Co., of Lon¬ don, to Messrs. Ivens & Burnett, of St. Mich¬ aels, and the invoices declare the goods to be by order, and for account and risk, of the lat¬ ter gentlemen. It is contended, in behalf of the *captors, that both houses are com-
posed of the same persons, viz., William S. Burnett, who is domiciled at London, and William Ivens, who is domiciled at St. Mich¬ aels; and that the documentary evidence, and private correspondence, show that the ship¬ ment was made on account of the hostile house. If the fact of the identity of the two houses were material to a decision of the cause, it might furnish a proper ground for an order for further proof. But admitting the fact to be as the captors contend, we are satisfied that it can be of no avail to them. It is clear, from the whole documentary evidence, that this shipment was not made on the account and risk of the hostile house, but bona fide on the account and risk of the neutral house. It does not, therefore, present a case for the applica¬ tion of the principle, that the property of a house of trade in the enemy’s country is eon- demnable as prize, notwithstanding the neutral domicile of one of its partners. On the con¬ trary, it presents a case for the application of the 'ordinary principle which subjects to con¬ fiscation, jure belli, the share of a partner in a neutral house, where his own domicile is in a hostile country. And, on this view, the decis¬ ion of the Circuit Court is entirely correct, and
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The Nekeid, Pinto, Claimant.
168
is consistent with the doctrines established in the cases cited at the argument.
The next inquiry is, as to the freight decreed o the master. As no appeal was interposed to the decree of the District Court, allowing the whole freight for the whole voyage, the ques¬ tion, whether more than a pro rata freight was due (a question which would otherwise have 169] deserved grave consideration), does not properly arise. The only discussion which can now be entertained, is whether the freight so decreed ought not to have been charged upon the whole cargo instead of being charged upon a portion of it. And we are all of opin¬ ion that it was properly a charge upon the whole cargo. Although capture be deemed, in the prize courts, in many cases, equivalent to delivery, yet the captors cannot be liable for more than the freight of the goods actually re¬ ceived by them. The capture of a neutral ship, having enemy’s property on board, is a strictly justifiable exercise of the rights of war It is no wrong done to the neutral, even though the voyage be thereby defeated. The captors are not, therefore, answerable in pcenam to the neu¬ tral for the losses which he may sustain by a lawful exercise of belligerent rights. It is the misfortune of the neutral, and not the fault of the belligerent. By the capture, the captors are substituted in lieu of the original owners, and they take the property cum oriere. TJiey are, therefore, responsible for the freight which then attached upon the property, of which the sen¬ tence of condemnation ascertains them to be the rightful owners succeeding to the former proprietors. So far the rule seems perfectly equitable; but to press it farther, and charge them with the freight of goods which they have never received, or with the burden of a charter-party into which they have never enter¬ ed, would be unreasonable in itself, and incon¬ sistent with the admitted principles of prize law. It might, in a case of justifiable capture, by the condemnation of a single bale of goods, 1 7 O] Mead the captors to their ruin by load¬ ing them with the stipulated freight of a whole cargo.
On the whole, we are all of opinion that the decree of the Circuit Court ought to be affirmed, except so far as it charges the freight upon the property condemned, and the moiety claimed by Messrs. Ivens & Burnett; and as to this, it ought to be reversed, and that the freight should be decreed to be a charge upon the whole car¬ go, to be paid by each parcel thereof, in pro¬ portion to its value.
Decree affirmed, except as to the freight.'
1.— It has been held that the charter-party is not the measure by which the captor is, in all cases, bound, even where no fraud is imputed to the con¬ tract itself. When, by the events of war, naviga¬ tion is rendered so hazardous as to raise the price of freight to an extraordinary height, captors are not, necessarily, bound to that inflated rate of freight. When no such circumstances exist, when a ship is carrying on an ordinary trade, the charter- party is undoubtedly the rule of valuation, unless impeached ; the captorputs himself in the place of the owner of the cargo, and takes with that specific lien upon it. Hut a very different rule is to be ap¬ plied, when the trade is subjected to every extra¬ ordinary risk and hazard, from its connection with the events of war, and the redoubled activity and success of ihe belligerent cruisers. (5 Hob., 82 ; The Twilling Rigetd
Wlieat. 1.
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THE NEREID. Pinto, Claimant.
Under the prize act of June 26th, 1812. and the act of the 2d of August, 1813, allowing a deduction of thirty-three and one-third per centum on “all goods captured from the enemy, and made good and lawful prize of war, &c., and brought into the United States,” are not. included goods captured and brought in for adjudication, sold by order of court, and ultimately restored to a neutral claim¬ ant as his property ; but such goods are chargeable' with the same rate of duties as goods imported in foreign bottoms.
THIS cause was originally brought into the Circuit Court by appeal from the District Court for the Southern District of New York, in which the property claimed by Mr. Pinto had been condemned as prize of war. The de¬ cree of the District Court was affirmed in the Circuit Court, September term, 1814, pro forma, for the purpose of taking the cause, by appeal, before the Supreme Court, for its final determina tion; which was accordingly done, and the de¬ cree of the Circuit Court reversed, February term, 1815, except as to the undivided fourth part which Mr. Pinto claimed of certain goods, part of the cargo, his claim to which was re¬ linquished by his counsel, on the argument of the cause before the Supreme Court. All the other property claimed by Mr. Pinto, for him¬ self and others, was ordered to be restored to him. The cause was then remanded to the Circuit Court, with directions to carry the de¬ cree *of the Supreme Court into effect ;
and the mandate for that purpose was tiled in the Circuit Court, April term, 1815, and an order made in pursuance of the mandate. It was then stated, and made to appear to the satisfaction of the Circuit Court, that,, after the Nereid and her cargo had been libeled by the captors, as prize of war, in the District Court, and after the condemnation thereof, except the parts of the cargo which were claimed by Mr. Pinto, and during the pen¬ dancy of such claim, Peter II. Schencli, the prize-agent of the Governor Tompkins, entered the whole of the cargo of the Nereid at the cus¬ tom-house of the city of New York, and secured the duties thereon; Mr. Pinto having consent¬ ed that the goods which he claimed should be entered with the others, and be subject to the payment of such duties as they were by law liable to, without prejudice to his rights under his claim; that the prize-agent did enter the goods, so condemned (as also the said goods of which Mr. Pinto claimed the one-fourth), as prize goods, and bonded therefor for prize duties; but was required by the collector of the customs, and did enter all the residue of the goods claimed by Mr. Pinto, as neutral property, subject to the full duties payable on goods regularly imported in foreign bottoms, and bonded for the same accordingly. The goods claimed by Mr. Pinto were afterwards, and before condemnation, sold by the marshal of the district, together with the goods con¬ demned, in pursuance of an order of the Dis¬ trict Court, to which Mr. Pinto also consented, subject to the same reservation of his rights; and the proceeds of the sales of the[l73 goods claimed by Mr. Pinto, after deducting; the duties, were paid into court; the amount of the said duties having been paid by the marshal
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173
Supreme Court of the United States.
1816
to the prize-agent, with the consent of Mr. Pinto, for the" prize-agent’s indemnity. The difference between the duties thus secured to he paid by the prize-agent on the goods finally restored to Mr. Pinto, according to the decis¬ ion of the Supreme Court, and those which would have been payable on them, as prize goods, under the act of the 2d of August, 1813, entitled, “ An act for reducing the duties pay¬ able on prize goods captured by the private %rmed vessels of the United States,” amounted to $11,079.59. After the mandate and decree of the Supreme Court, respecting the restitu¬ tion of the goods claimed by Mr. Pinto, was carried into effect by the Circuit Court, there remained in the District Court the sum of $18,771.63, being the amount of the net pro¬ ceeds of the fourth part of the goods, Mr. Pinto’s claim to which had been relinquished.
A motion was made in the Circuit Court on behalf of Mr. Pinto, that the prize-agent should be ordered to pay to him, out of any of the proceeds of the sales of the condemned part •of the Nereid and cargo, and which were in, or might come to, his hands, the said sum of $11,079.59, the difference between the two rates of duties on the goods finally restored to Mr. Pinto, as before mentioned.
It then appeared to this court that three bonds had been given, by the prize-agent, for the duties on those goods which were thus or- 174] clered to be restored to Mr. Pinto; that the two of those bonds which first became due had been paid by the prize-agent ; but that the last, which became payable on the 9th of February, 1815, and which was for the sum of $8,782.97, the collector had suffered, as he said, to remain unpaid until it should be ascer¬ tained wThether the property, on which said du¬ ties were thus secured, was condemned to the captors or restored to the claimant. That after the mandate of the Supreme Court was returned to the Circuit Court, the collector re¬ quired the prize-agent to pay this bond, and he paid the same accordingly on the 7th of April, 1815.
The court were divided in opinion on the point respecting the rates of duties chargeable on the goods so restored to Mr. Pinto ; where¬ upon it was ordered that the said sum of $11,079.59 shall remain subject to the opinion ■of the Supreme Court, and that the residue of the $18,771.65 be paid to Mr. Sclienck, as the prize-agent ; and that the point on which the disagreement of the judges of the Circuit Court took place should be certified to the Su¬ preme Court for their final decision thereon.
Hoffman, for the appellant and claimant. The statutes on this subject are: 1st. The Prize Act of the 26th of June, 1812, s. 14, which repeals the non-importation act, so far as respects goods ‘ ‘ captured from the enemy, and made good and lawful prize of war;” and de¬ clares that such goods, ‘ ‘ when imported and brought into the United States, shall pay the 175] same duties as goods imported in American vessels in the ordinary course of trade,” &c. 2d. The act of the 2d of August,
1818, which provides “that all goods capt¬ ured from the enemy, and made good and law¬ ful prize of war, &c., and brought into the United States, shall be allowed a deduction of thirty-three and one-third per centum.” 3d. •64
The acts of non-importation, prohibiting the importation of British goods. 1. The goods in question being of British manufacture, could only be imported under the prize act, and the* act of the 2d of August, 1813. They were captured from the enemy, for they were on board an enemy’s vessel; they were taken as enemy’s property; they were captured and brought in as good and lawful prize of war. 2. The character of the goods is determined at the time they were brought in; it is not to be determined by subsequent events: duties are payable on goods on their being first imported or brought in; and the prize act puts these ■goods on the same footing with other importa¬ tions, and, of course, makes the duties on them payable at the same time. 3. The words ‘ ‘ good and lawful prize of war” refer to the time of capture, and not of condemnation. By the very act of capture, the goods became prize ; and being captured by a lawfully-com¬ missioned vessel, were good and lawful prize. The expression ‘ ‘ such goods” refers to goods so captured. They are to pay when brought in, and not subsequently, upon condemnation.
4. The condemnation does not make the goods
prize of war; it merely puts an end to th ejics recuperandi of the former owner, and gives a new title to the purchaser The character of prize is, *then, either confirmed by con-
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demnatiyn or lost by restitution. If the prop¬ erty is restored, it is released from the character it had before borne from the time of capture, and ceases to be prize of war, but being capt¬ ured and brought in as such, is to pay the prize duties.
Pinkney , for the respondents and captors. The question now raised seemed to be settled by the decision in the case of The Concord, at the last term. But, independently of author¬ ity, the question is manifestly against the claimant. 1. The goods were not entered under the prize act, and the act of the 2d of August, 1813; but as neutral property imported in a foreign bottom, and having been sold, are evidently liable to the full duties on such goods, unless these acts authorize a diminution of them. 2. These acts do not authorize such diminution ; the goods were not captured from the enemy, and have never been made good and lawful prize.’ They were taken from Mr. Pinto, who was no enemy, either in fact or con¬ structively, according to the judgment of the court. If anything, then, has made them law¬ ful prize, how has it happened that they have been restored? The claimant’s counsel, to avoid the appearance of too bold a paradox, mitigates his conclusion on this head in such a way as proves nothing for the purpose of his argument. He ends with saying that these goods were captured and brought into the United States as good and lawful prize. He can scarcely, however, have intended to stop here ; for if his conclusion goes no farther, it surrenders the *whole argument, un-
less it can be shown that to seize and bring in as prize that which is not good and lawful prize, and never can become so, makes good and lawful prize of the thing so seized and brought in ; or, in other words, that a seizure and bringing in, as prize, of neutral property, makes it, ipso jure, good prize, although the owner is, nevertheless, entitled to have it
Wheat. 1.
Hepburn and Dundas's Heirs and Ex’rs v. Dunlop & Co., Ac.
1816
again, as not being good prize, and has, in fact, got it again accordingly, 8. The character of these goods, with reference to their liability to •duty, was not determined at the time they were brought in, If they had been specifically re¬ stored, and withdrawn from the United States by the claimant, they would have been liable to no duty. 4. The words “ made good and law¬ ful prize” do not refer to the capture merely : the act speaks of the capture first, and then adds, “and made good and lawful prize.” The capture, too, must be of enemy’s goods, either in fact or in contemplation of law. To say that the goods are, by the act of capture, made good and lawful prize, because the capt¬ ure is made by a lawfully-commissioned cruis¬ in', is to drop more than a moiety of the defini¬ tion of good and lawful prize, or, rather, to insist on that which is not an essential part of its definition. Prize may be made (as a droit) by a non-commissioned captor; but good and lawful prize cannot be made by any captor, un¬ less the goods be liable to condemnation. It is the formula of a sentence of condemnation, to ■condemn the thing taken as “ good and lawful prize” to the captors; and this not because it was taken by a lawfully-commissioned cruiser, 1 7 <8*1 but because, being so taken, it *was under all the circumstances subject to confisca¬ tion. 5. Capture gives possession; but it is the condemnation which ascertains that the things taken are good prize of war: until con¬ demnation. it cannot be known whether they are good prize or not. But, certainly, it is self- evident, that after restitution it must be held that they were not good prize. The con¬ demnation does more than destroy the just re- ■cupemndi. It establishes what nothing else can establish — that the goods were lawful prize. Restitution, on the other hand, establishes, conclusively, that they never were lawful prize, although they might be justifiably seized, upon probable cause, as such.
Marshall, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court, that the goods were chargeable with the same rate of duties as goods imported in foreign bottoms, according to the decision In the case of The Concord, at the last term.
Cited — Olcott, 347.
177
^[chancery.] [* 171)