Fisk v. Henarie, 142 U.S. 459 (1892)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Fisk v. Henarie, 142 U.S. 459 (1892)
Full caption
FISK v. HENARIE.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Jan. 4, 1892
FISK v. HENARIE.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
DISTRICT OF OREGON.
No. 118. Argued December 3, 4,1891. — Decided January 4, 1892.
The act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, c. 373, with regard to the removal of causes from state courts, (corrected by the act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433, c. 866,) repealed subdivision 3 of Rev. Stat. § 639.
The words in that act “ at any time before the trial thereof,” used in regard to removals “ from prejudice or local influence ” were used by Congress with reference to the construction put on similar language in the act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, c. 137, by this court, and are to receive the same construction, which required the petition to be filed before or at the term at which the cause could first be tried, and before the trial thereof.
The court stated the.case as follows :
This action was commenced in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the county of Wasco, on November 13, 1883, by James H. Fisk against Daniel V. B. Henarie, Eleanor Martin, Peter Donahue, Thomas S. Martin, Edward Martin and John D. Wilcox, to recover a commission of ten per cent, amounting to $60,000, on an alleged sale of a tract of land, known as the Dalles Military Road Grant, containing about 600,000 acres, situated in the counties of Wasco, Grant and Baker. The first three of the defendants were residents and citizens of California, and the latter three of Oregon. Service of summons was had on the citizens of Oregon, and they appeared and answered. On February 2, 1884, publication of the summons was ordered as to the California defendants, who appeared and answered August 21, 1884.
The answers of the defendants controverted the allegations on which the plaintiff based his demand, and contested his right to recover anything from them, or either of them, on any sale of the lands.
On September 1, 1884, plaintiff replied to the answers, and on the 16th of the same month, on motion of the defendants, p. 460the venue was changed to Multnomah County, where the plaintiff and the Oregon defendants resided when the action was commenced, none of the parties residing in Wasco County. The case was afterwards tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Multnomah County, who, on April 15, 1885, found a verdict under the direction of the court for the defendants, on which there was a judgment for costs in their favor; which judgment was on January 11, 1886, reversed by the Supreme Court, (13 Oregon, 156,) and a new trial ordered, which, being had, resulted, May 21, 1886, in a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum of $60,000.
On the 18th of May, before the jury was empanelled, the death of Peter Donahue was suggested, and his executors, James M. Donahue, Annie Donahue, and Mary Ellen Von Schroeder, citizens of California, were substituted as defendants.
The case was afterwards heard on the motion of plaintiff for judgment and two motions of the defendants for a new trial, and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On June 30, 1886, plaintiff’s motion was denied, and defendants’ for judgment non obstante allowed, on the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and thereupon judgment was entered for costs in favor of the defendants, which judgment was on October 20,1886, on writ of error, reversed by the Supreme Court, (14 Oregon, 29,) and the cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.
On December 18, 1886, the Circuit Court allowed the motion for a new trial and set aside the verdict, from which order the plaintiff appealed .to the Supreme Court, and the appeal was on April 18, 1887, dismissed. 15 Oregon, 89. Thereafterwards the cause was again tried, and the jury, being •unable to agree, were discharged without finding a verdict. July 30, 1887, the defendants Henarie, Eleanor Martin and the executors of Peter Donahue, deceased, applied to the state court for the removal of the cause to the Circuit Court bf the United States for the District of Oregon, and on the first day of August, 1887, an order removing it was entered by the judge of the state court.
The petition for removal was filed on behalf of those defendants who were citizens of California in the state circuit court, and addressed to the judge thereof, and set up the citizenship of the petitioners; that at the time the action was commenced and the petition was filed there was a controversy therein between the plaintiff and the petitioners; the amount involved; the alleged cause of action; the issue thereon ; and proceeded thus: “ That said action has not been tried and is now pending in the above entitled court. That from prejudice and local influence your petitioners will not be able to obtain justice in this court or in any other state court to which the said defendants may under the laws of this State remove said cause. That the other defendants in said action, Thos. S. Martin, Edward Martin and John D. Wilcox, now and at all times since the commencement of said action have been citizens and residents of the State of Oregon, residing in Portland, therein; that your petitioners desire to remove said cause to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Oregon under the provisions of the act of Congress approved March 3, 1887. Your petitioners further say that they have filed the affidavit required by the statute in such cases, and they herewith offer their bond, with surety, in the penal sum of one thousand dollars, conditioned as by the statutes of the United States required. Your petitioners therefore pray that said bond may be accepted and approved, and that said cause may be removed into the next Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Oregon, and that no further proceedings may be had therein in this court.”
Henarie, one of the petitioners, verified the petition upon belief; and it was accompanied by the affidavit of Henarie and Eleanor Martin to the effect that they had reason to believe and did believe, and so stated, that from prejudice and local influence, the defendants, to wit, the affiants and the executors of Peter Donahue, would not be able to obtain jushce in said state court or in any other state court to which said defendants under the laws of the State of Oregon had the right to remove the same, on account of such prejudice and local influence. The state court ordered the removal under the act of Congress of March 3, 1887.
The transcript was filed in the Circuit Court of the United States, September 30, 1887, and on October 8 following, a motion was made to remand upon the grounds: that the application for the removal of the cause was not made in time, or before trial of the cause in the state court; that the petition and affidavit were insufficient, in that they did not set forth the facts and reasons showing the alleged prejudice or local influence; that the removal papers were not served on the plaintiff in accordance with the rules of practice in the state courts; and that the petition and accompanying papers did not show a cause for removal; and the motion concluded with a denial of the existence of any prejudice or local influence which would prevent the defendants or any of them from obtaining justice in the state courts or at all, and asked the court to examine into the truth of the affidavits alleging prejudice and local influence, and the grounds thereof, and thereupon to direct the action to be remanded to the court from whence it was removed. This motion referred to the record and certain affidavits filed in its support. The motion was denied by the Circuit Court, October 26, 1887, (the opinion will be found reported in 32 Fed. Rep. 417,) and on December 17 the cause was tried by a jury and a verdict rendered for the defendants. Judgment was thereupon entered against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendants for costs. A motion for a new trial was filed, assigning, among other grounds, that the court had no jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter of the action, and erred in denying the motion to remand. This motion was overruled, (35 Fed. Rep. 230,) and a writ of error sued out from this court.
Section 2 of the act of Congress of March 3, 1887, entitled “ An act to amend the act of Congress approved March 3,1875, entitled 1 An act to determine the jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of the United States and to regulate the removal of causes from state courts, and for other purposes;’ and to further regulate the jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of the United States, and for other purposes ; ” 24 Stat. c. 373, pp. 552, 553, is as follows:
“ Sec. 2. That any suit of a civil nature, at law or in p. 463equity arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, of which the Circuit Courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction by the preceding section, which may now be pending, or which may hereafter be brought, in any state court, may be removed by the defendant or defendants therein to the Circuit Court of the United States for the proper district any [. Any} other suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, of which the Circuit Courts of the United States are given jurisdiction by the preceding section, and which are now pending, or which may hereafter be brought, in any state court, may be removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for the proper district by the defendant or defendants therein being non-residents of that State; and when in any suit mentioned in this section there shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States, and which can be fully determined as between them, then either one or more of the defendants actually interested in such controversy may remove said suit into the Circuit Court of the United States for the proper district. And where a suit is now pending, or may be hereafter brought, in any state court, in which there is a controversy between a citizen of the State in which the suit is brought and a citizen of another State, any defendant, being such citizen of another State, may remove such suit into the Circuit Court of the United States for the proper district, at any time before the trial thereof, when it shall be made to appear to said Circuit Court that from prejudice or local influence he will not be able to obtain justice in such state court, or in any other state court to which the said defendant may, under the laws of the State, have the right, on account of such prejudice or local influence, to remove said cause : Provided, That if it further appear that said suit can be fully and justly determined as to the other defendants in the state court, without being affected by such prejudice or local influence, and that no party to the suit will be prejudiced by a separation of the parties, said Circuit Court may direct the suit to be remanded, so far as relates to such other defendants, to the state court, to be
Citations for Defendants in Error.
proceeded with therein. ‘ At any time before the trial of any suit which is now pending in any Circuit Court or may hereafter be entered therein, and which has been removed to said court from a state court on the affidavit of any party plaintiff that he had reason to believe and did believe that, from prejudice, or local influence, he was unable to obtain justice in said state court, the Circuit Court shall, on application of the other party, examine into the truth of said affidavit and the grounds thereof, and unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of said court that said party will not be able to obtain justice in such state court, it shall cause the same to be remanded thereto.’ Whenever any cause shall be removed from any state court into any Circuit Court of the United States, and the Circuit Court shall decide that the cause was improperly removed, and order the same to be remanded to the state court from whence it came, such remand shall be immediately carried into execution, and no appeal or writ of error from the decision of the Circuit Court so remanding such cause shall be allowed.”
Mr. John H. Mitchell, (with whom were Mr. George II. Williams and Mr. George II. Durham on the brief,) for plaintiff in error, cited from the decisions of this court in support of the proposition that the removal was too late: Insurance Co. v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214; Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U. S. 73; Alley v. Nott, 111 U. S. 472; Scharffs. Levy, 112 U. S. 711; Gregory v. Hartley, 113 U. S. 742 ; Laidly v. Huntington, 121 U.S. 179; Holland v. Chambers, 110 U. S. 59; Core v. Vinal, 117 U. S. 347; Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Bates, 119 U. S. 464; Hancock v. Holbrook, 119 U. S. 586.
Mr. J. N. Dolph, for defendants in error, cited in reply to that point from the decisions of this court: Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U. S. 407; King v. Cornell, 106 U. S. 395; Holland n. Chambers, 110 U. S. 59; Ayers v. Watson, 113 U. S. 594; Bible Society v. Grove, 101 U. S. 610; Hess n. Reynolds, 113 U. S. 73; Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Bates, 119 U. S. 464; Insurance Co. N.Dunn, 19 Wall. 214; Vannevar v. Bryant, 19 Wall. 41; Yulee v. Vose, 99 U. S. 539 ; Railroad Co. v. IK
Kinley, 99 U. S. 147; Schroeder Manufacturing Co. n. Parker, 129 U. S. 688; Hancock v. Holbrook, 119 U. S. 586; Babbitt v. Clark, 103 U. S. 606; Alley v. Nott, 111 IL S. 472; Scharff n. Levy, 112 U. S. 711.
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
After this case had been' pending in the state courts from November 13, 1883, to August 1, 1887; had been tried three times before a jury in the Circuit Court, there being one verdict for defendants, one for plaintiff and one disagreement; and been heard in various phases three times in the Supreme Court of the State, the application was made for removal. Was this application in time? This question is to be determined upon a proper construction of section 2 of the act of Congress of March 3, 1887, for it is not, and could not be, contended that the right of removal could then have been invoked on the ground of diverse citizenship. The application was filed July 30,1887, and by its terms purported to be made under the act of 1887, to which act the order of the state court referred. Indeed, if subdivision 3 of section 639 of the Revised Statutes were repealed by the act of 1887, or, since some of the defendants were then and at the commencement of the suit citizens of the same State as the plaintiff, if a removal could be had at all, it could only be under the act of 1887.
The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. c. 20, § 12, pp. 73, 79, provided that a party entitled to remove a cause should file his petition for such removal “ at the time of entering his appearance in such state court.” 1 Stat. 79.
The act of July 27, 1866, relating to separable controversies, provided that “ the defendant who is a citizen of’a State other than that in which the suit is brought, may, at any time before the trial or final hearing of the cause, file a petition for the removal of the cause,” etc. 14 Stat. 306, c. 288.
The act of March 2,1867, relating to removal on the ground of prejudice or local influence, provided that the plaintiff or defendant “ may, at any time before the final hearing or trial
VOL. CXLII—30
of the suit, file a petition in such state court for the removal of the suit,” etc. 14 Stat. 558, c. 196.
The first subdivision of section 639 of the Revised Statutes was a reenactment of the 12th section of the Judiciary Act; the second subdivision, of the act of July 27, 1866; and the third subdivision, of the act of March 2, 1867; and this subdivision adopted the phraseology of the act of July 27, 1866, namely: “ At any time before the trial or final hearing ” of the suit. /
The act of March 3, 1875, said nothing about prejudice or local influence, but provided in the case of diverse citizenship that the party desiring to remove a cause should make and file his petition in the state court “ before or at the term at which said cause could be first tried and before the trial thereof.” 18 Stat. 470, 471, c. 137.
This act repealed the first and second subdivisions of section 639 of the Revised Statutes, but left subdivision 3 unrepealed. Baltimore de Ohio Railroad v. Bates, 119 U. S. 464, 467.
In Insurance Company n. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214, it was held that the word “final” as used in the phrase “at any time before the final hearing or trial of the suit ” applied to the word “ trial ” as well as to the word “ hearing.” And it has been often ruled that if the trial court had set aside a verdict and granted a new trial, or if the appellate court had reversed the judgment and remanded the case for trial de novo, it was not too late to apply to remove the cause under the act of 1867 and subdivision 3. Vannevar v. Bryant, 21 Wall. 41; Jifkins v. Sweetzer, 102 U. S. 177; Baltimore de Ohio Railroad v. Bates, 119 U. S. 464, 467, and cases cited. But these and like decisions were inapplicable to proceedings under the act of 1875, as the petition was thereby required to be filed “before or at the term at which said cause could be first tried and before the trial thereof.” This has been construed to mean the first term at which the cause is in law triable — the first term in which the cause would stand for trial if the parties •had taken the usual steps as to pleadings and other preparations; and it has also been decided that there cannot be a removal after the hearing on a demurrer to a complaint p. 467because it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Gregory v. Hartley, 113 U. S. 742, 746; Alley v. Nott, 111 U. S. 472; Laidly v. Huntington, 121 U. S. 179.
The act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, c. 373, and also as corrected by the act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433, 435, c. 866, provided that “any defendant, being such citizen of another State, may remove such suit into the Circuit Court of the United States for the proper district, at any time before the trial thereof, when it shall be made to appear to said Circuit Court that from prejudice or local influence he will not be able to obtain justice in such state court, or in any other state court to which the said defendant may, under the laws of the State, have the right, on account of such prejudice or local influence, to remove said cause.”
In view of the repeated decisions of this Court in exposition of the acts of 1866, 1867 and 1875, it is not to be doubted that Congress, recognizing the interpretation placed on the 'word “ final,” in the connection in which it was used in the prior acts, and the settled construction of the act of 1875, deliberately changed the language, “at any time before the final hearing or trial of the suit,” or “ at any time before the trial or final hearing of the cause,” to read: “ at any time before the trial thereof,” as in the act of 1875, which required the petition tp be filed before or at the term at which the cause could first be tried, and before the trial thereof.
The attempt was manifestly to restrain the volume of litigation pouring into the Federal courts, and to return to the standard of the judiciary act, and to effect this in part by resorting to the language used in the act of 1875, as its meaning had been determined by judicial interpretation. This is the more obvious in view of the fact that the act of March 3, 1887, was evidently intended to restrict the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts, as we have heretofore held. Smith v. Lyon, 133 U. S. 315; In re Pennsylvania Company, 137 U. S. 451.
We deem it proper to add that we are of opinion that the act of 1867, or subdivision third of section 639, was repealed by the act of 1887.
The subject matter of the former acts is substantially p. 468covered by the latter, and the differences are such as to render the intention of Congress in this regard entirely clear.
Under the previous acts the right of removal might be exercised by plaintiff as well as defendant; the application was addressed to the state court; there was no provision for the separation of the suit; the ground of removal was based upon what the affiant asserted he had reason to believe and believed; and action on the motion to remand could be reviewed on appeal or writ of error or by mandamus; while under the latter act, the right is confined to the defendant; the application is made to the Circuit Court; the suit may be divided and remanded in part; the prejudice or local influence must be made to appear to the Circuit Court, that is, the Circuit Court must be legally satisfied, by proof suitable to the nature of the case, of the truth of the allegation that, by reason of those causes, the defendant will not be able to obtain justice in the state courts ; and review on writ of error or appeal, or by mandamus is taken away. In re Pennsylvania Company, 137 U. S. 451; Malone n. Richmond & Danville Railroad Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 625.
The repealing clause in the act of 1887 does ndt specifically refer to these prior acts, but declares that “ all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this act, be, and the same are hereby repealed.” The provisions relating .to the subject matter under consideration are, however, so comprehensive, as well as so variant from those of the former acts, that we think the intention to substitute the one for the other is necessarily to be inferred and must prevail.
In King v. Cornell, 106 U. S. 395, 396, it was held that subdivision second of section 639 was repealed by the act of 1875, the repealing clause in which was the same as here, and Mr. Chief Justice Waite, delivering the opinion of the court, said: “ While repeals by implication are not favored, it is well settled that where two acts are not in all respects repugnant, if ft16 latter act covers the whole subject of the earlier, and embraces new provisions which plainly show that it was intended as a substitute for the first, it will operate as a repeal.” The rule thus expressed is applicable, and is decisive.
Dissenting Opinion: Harlan, Field, JJ.
Many other questions of interest and importance arise upon this record and have been argued by counsel, but the conclusion at which we have arrived renders their determination unnecessary.
We are of opinion that the application for removal came too late. The judgment must therefore be
Reversed, and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court, with a direction to remand it to the state court.
Mr. Justice Harlan, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Field, dissenting.
Mr. Justice Field and myself do not concur in the cohstruction which the court places upon the act of 1887.
Section three of that act, requiring the petition for removal to be filed in the state court, “at the time, or at any time before the defendant is required by the laws of the State or the rule of the state court in which such suit is brought to answer or plead to the declaration or complaint of the plaintiff,” excepts from its operation the cases mentioned in the last clause of section two, namely, those in which a removal is asked upon the ground of prejudice or local influence. As to the latter eases, the statute provides that the removal may be had, upon a proper showing, “ at any time before the trial.” This means, at any time before a trial in which, by a final judgment, the rights of the parties are determined. Under the act of 1887, there can be no removal, upon the ground of prejudice or local influence, unless it be made to appear to the Circuit Court of the United States that, on account of such prejudice or local influence, the defendant citizen of another State cannot obtain justice in the state courts. The existence of such prejudice or local influence is often disclosed by a trial m the state court in which the verdict or judgment is set aside. The fact of prejudice or local influence may be established by overwhelming evidence; still, under the decision of the court, there can be no removal if the application for removal be not made before the first trial. We do not mean to say that when
Dissenting Opinion: Harlan, Field, JJ.
a trial is in progress the cause may be removed before its termination, even upon the ground of prejudice or local influence. But, if at the time the application is made the cause is not on trial and is undetermined, that is, has not been effectively tried, the act of 1887, in our judgment, authorizes a removal, on proper showing, upon the ground of prejudice or local influence, although there may have been a trial, resulting in a verdict which has been set aside.
The error, we think, in the opinion of the court, is in applying to the act of 1887 the decisions under the act of 1875. The words in the latter act limiting the time within which the application for a removal must be made — “ before or at the term at which said cause could be first tried, and before the trial thereof ” — necessarily meant, as this court has held, the first trial, whether it resulted in a verdict or not, and although the verdict and judgment may have been set aside; because the express requirement was that the application for removal must, in any event, be made before or at the term at which said cause could be first tried. No such requirement is found in the act of 1887, in respect to cases sought to be removed upon the ground of prejudice or local influence. While, in respect to all cases of removal except those upon the ground of prejudice or local influence, the latter statute provides that the application shall be made at the time, or at any time before the defendant is required by the laws of the State, or the rule of the state court in which the suit is brought, to answer or plead to the declaration or complaint of the plaintiff, the removal, because of prejudice or local influence, may be applied for “ at any time before the trial thereof.” This difference in the language of the two acts means, we think, something more than the court attributes to it. Congress could hardly have intended to give the defendant citizen of another State simply the time between his answering or pleading, and the calling of his case for the first trial thereof, to determine whether he should apply for a removal upon the ground of prejudice or local influence. In our judgment, it meant to give the right of removal, upon such ground, at any time, when the case is not actually on trial, and when there is in force no judgment p. 471fixing the rights of the parties in the suit. If a case is open for trial, on the merits, an application for its removal before that trial commences is made “ before the trial thereof.” In our opinion, the interpretation adopted by the court defeats the purpose which Congress had in view for the protection of persons sued elsewhere than in the State of which they are citizens.
THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY.
No. 1$4. Argued December 15,16,1891. — Decided January 11,1892.
The tax imposed upon distilled spirits by Rev. Stat. § 3251, as amended by the act of March 3,1875,18 Stat. 339, c. 127, attaches as soon as the spirits are produced, and cannot be evaded except upon satisfactory proof, under section 3221, of destruction by fire or other casualty.
When distilled spirits upon which a tax has been paid are exported, they are to be regauged St the port of exportation alongside of, or on, the vessel, and the drawback allowed is to be determined by this gauge, although a previous gauge may have shown a greater amount. The execution of an exportation bond, under the internal revenue laws, is • only evidence of an intention to export; and it is open to doubt whether the actual exportation can be considered as beginning until the merchandise leaves the port of exportation for the foreign country.
This was an action on a bond in the penal sum of $41,000, given by the defendant Thompson and his sureties for the exportation of certain distilled spirits. The bond was dated October 23, 1885, and after reciting a prior bond given on the 8th of April, 1885, by the same parties, conditioned for the delivery of certain distilled spirits therein named on board ship at the port of Newport News, Virginia, for exportation to Melbourne, Australia, and for the performance of certain other things therein named, and after further reciting that it was found desirable to deliver a portion of such spirits on board ship at the port of New York for exportation to p. 472Bremen, namely nine hundred and twenty-nine packages of Bourbon whiskey, the marks and numbers of which were given, by certain railways to New York, from distillery warehouse No. 63 in the 8th district of the State of Kentucky, was conditioned “ that if the whole of the aforesaid merchandise shall be safely delivered to the Collector of- Customs at the said port of New York within fifteen days from date hereof, and if the said John B. Thompson, principal, shall export or cause to be exported the said merchandise in accordance with the internal revenue laws and the regulations of the Treasury Department made in pursuance thereof immediately on the arrival of said merchandise at said port of New York, and shall within fifteen days thereafter produce to the collector of internal revenue for the 8th district of the State of Kentucky the certificate of the Collector of Customs of the said port of New York showing that the said merchandise has been duly exported, and shall also produce within nine months thereafter his certificate that the said merchandise has been duly landed at the port of Bremen or at some other port without the jurisdiction of the United States, or shall produce satisfactory proof of the loss thereof at sea without fault or neglect of the owner or shipper thereof as required by law and regulations, then this obligation to be void,” etc.
The breach of the condition of the bond laid in the petition was that the defendants failed to deliver to the Collector of Customs at New York, within fifteen days, or within any other time, 1065 gallons of the said spirits, as appeared from a regauge made on October 27, 1885, the object of the suit being to recover the tax of ninety cents a gallon on the said deficiency, being $958.50, with interest at the rate of one per cent per month, and a penalty of five per cent.
The prior bond alluded to in the bond in suit was executed by the same parties April 8, 1885, and recited that Thompson, the principal, had made request to the collector of the 8th district of the State of Kentucky for the transportation of 1085 packages of Bourbon whiskey to the port of Newport News for exportation, and contained similar conditions to the bond in suit, except that it provided for exportation by the way of Newport News, within seven months from the date of such p. 473bond, to Melbourne, Australia. It appeared that the 929 packages covered by the bond in suit were part of the 1085 packages covered by the prior bond. It also appeared that the deficiency of 1065 gallons in the spirits represented the loss thereon by evaporation and leakage while the same were in warehouse and previous to transportation for export.
The answer, among other things, denied that the said 1065 gallons were removed from the bonded warehouse, or that the collector ever demanded the tax of the defendants; and further, that the bond in suit was given to meet the requirements of certain rules and regulations of the Treasury Department, and that at the time the prior bond was given, April 8, the spirits on which it was sought to collect the tax were in the packages covered by such bond; that by the acceptance of said bond of April 8 the spirits referred to therein were free from any obligation for taxes, and were in due process of exportation on and after such date, to Bremen, Germany, where they have arrived; and that the tax sued for was a deficiency tax upon the spirits covered by the bond of October 23, 1885, which were actually exported, and to allow the recovery of such tax would be to enforce an export duty on the spirits exported as aforesaid, in violation of the prohibition of the Constitution of the United States in that particular. The answer contained further averments not necessary to be noticed here. The government demurred to each paragraph of the answer, and the demurrer was sustained as to all such paragraphs except the first, upon which there was a trial, resulting in a judgment and verdict for the full amount claimed, namely, $1023.61, with interest, etc. A writ of error was sued out from the Circuit Court, by which the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. A writ of error was thereupon sued out from this court.
Mr. Philip B. Thompson, Jr., for appellants.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Maury for appellee.
Mr. Justice Brown, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The sole question presented for our consideration in this case is whether defendants are liable for the tax upon 1056 gallons of spirits lost by evaporation between the giving of the first bond in April, 1885, and the second bond on October 23d of the same year. This depends upon the construction of the excise laws of Congress regulating the taxing and exportation of distilled spirits manufactured in this country. By Revised Statutes, section 3248, distilled spirits are defined to be “ that substance known as ethyl alcohol, hydrated oxide of ethyl, or spirit of wine, which is commonly produced by the fermentation of grain, starch, molasses or sugar, etc. . . . and the tax shall attach to this substance as soon as it is in existence as such” By section 3251, as amended by the act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 339, c. 127: “There shall be levied and collected on all distilled spirits ... a tax of ninety cents on each proof gallon, or wine gallon when below proof, to be paid by the distiller, owner or person having possession thereof, before removal from the distillery bonded warehouse.” By section 3293, as amended by the act of May 28, 1880, 21 Stat. 145, provision is made for the entry and deposit of all spirits removed to the distillery warehouse, requiring that “ the said distiller or owner shall at the time of making said entry give his bond . . . conditioned that the principal named in said bond shall pay the tax on the spirits as specified in the entry, or cause the same to be paid, before removal from said distillery warehouse, and within three years from the date of said entry. . . . If it shall appear at any time that there has been a loss of distilled spirits from any cask or other package hereafter deposited in a distillery warehouse, other than the loss provided for in section 3221 of the Revised Statutes of the United States” [which authorized an abatement of taxes upon satisfactory proof of actual destruction by accidental fire or other casualty while in any distillery warehouse], “ which, in the opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is excessive, he may instruct the collector of the district in which the loss has occurred to require the withdrawal from warehouse, of such distilled spirits, and to collect the tax accrued upon the original quantity of distilled p. 475spirits entered into the warehouse in such cask or package, notwithstanding that the time specified in any bond given for the withdrawal of the spirits entered into warehouse in such cask or package has not expired.”
The evident intention of Congress, to be gathered from these provisions is, that the tax shall attach as soon as the spirits are produced, and that such tax shall not be evaded except upon satisfactory proof, under section 3221, of destruction by fire or other casualty.
The spirits covered by this bond were put in defendant Thompson’s own warehouse, and were originally intended to be entered for exportation to Melbourne, Australia, and in pursuance of such intention, the bond of April 8,1885, was given. At this time the spirits were regauged in obedience to section 17 of the act of May 28,1880, 21 Stat. 149, which provides that “whenever the owner of any distilled spirits shall desire to withdraw the same from the distillery warehouse, or from a special bonded warehouse, he may file with the collector a notice giving a description of the packages to be withdrawn, and request that the distilled spirits be regauged. ... If upon such regauging it shall appear that there has been a loss of distilled spirits from any cask or package, without the fault or negligence of the distiller or owner thereof, taxes shall be collected only on the quantity of distilled spirits contained in such cask or package at the time of the withdrawal thereof from the distillery warehouse, or special bonded warehouse.” Under this provision of the law an allowance for outage, or loss by evaporation while in warehouse, was then duly made; but instead of being exported to Melbourne the spirits were kept in the warehouse until the period of seven months named in the bond of April 8, 1885, as the time limited for exporting, had nearly expired, and until it was too late to export by the way of Newport News without a breach of the conditions of the bond. Thereupon the distiller determined to export the bulk of these packages through the port of New York to Bremen, and accordingly they were again entered for exportation, and the second exportation bond of October 23 was executed, under which the exportation was made. p. 476There seems to be no provision in this act for a second regauging, or allowance for outage, in case the spirits are not actually withdrawn from the warehouse after the first regauging, provided for in section 17. Nor does there seem to have been any other notice to the collector, or a request for regauging, as contemplated in that section. It would seem to be just and equitable, if from any cause, not arising from his own fault, the owner should fail to export the liquors under the first regauging, he should be entitled, at any time within the three years provided by the same act, to make another request for regauging, and be entitled to an allowance for any deficiency for evaporation occurring after the prior regauging; but the law seems to contemplate but one notice of withdrawal, and the regulation of the commissioner, circular No. 296, requires that where spirits covered by an exportation bond are actually removed from the distillery warehouse for exportation, the gauger shall carefully reinspect each package, and if an additional outage is. found to exist in any of the packages so inspected, which reduces the number of taxable gallons in the packages, as last previously reported, he shall report the same to the collector, and the collector shall at once require payment of the tax on the taxable gallons represented by such reduction, even though it is alleged that the loss is occasioned by a casualty. This regulation was within the scope of the commissioner’s authority and was in force when the second bond was given.
By Revised Statutes, section 3329, provision is made for the exportation of distilled spirits “ upon which all taxes have been paid,” and minute regulations prescribed for the method of such exportation, one of which is that “ the casks or packages shall be inspected and gauged alongside of or on the vessel by the gauger designated by said collector, under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe,” and “ the drawback allowed shall include the taxes levied and paid upon the distilled spirits exported . . • as per last gauge of said spirits prior to exportation? etc. By section 3330, provision is made for the withdrawal of distilled spirits from bonded warehouses, for exportation in the original
THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES. 4H
casks, without the payment of taxes, under regulations to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with a proviso “ that the bonds required to be given for the exportation of distilled spirits shall be cancelled upon the presentation of satisfactory proof and certificates that said distilled spirits have been landed at the port of destination named in the bill of lading, or upon satisfactory proof that after shipment the same were lost at sea without fault or neglect of the owner or shipper thereof.”
Taking these provisions together, it is evident that when spirits upon which the tax has been paid, are exported, they are regauged at the port of exportation alongside of or on the vessel, and the drawback allowed is determined by the amount of this gauge, notwithstanding a previous gauge may have shown a greater amount. The result is that the owner receives no drawback upon any deficiency occurring prior to the last regáuge. While section 3330, regulating the export of spirits upon which the tax has not been paid, does not contain similar provisions, it is very improbable that Congress should have intended to exempt the deficiency in the case of exportations without payment of tax, and tax it in case of drawbacks upon exportations after payment of tax.
Defendant’s position that the spirits in this case were in process of exportation after the execution of the bond of April 8 is untenable. Exportation is defined to be the act of carrying or sending merchandise abroad, and it cannot be considered as beginning until the spirits are removed from the warehouse for that purpose. The execution of the bond is evidence of nothing more than an intention to export. As Well could the taking out of a passport, or the engagement of passage upon a transatlantic steamer, be regarded as the commencement of a journey to foreign parts. Indeed, it may admit of doubt whether exportation can be considered as beginning until the merchandise leaves the port of export for a foreign country. That the execution of the bond was not the commencement of exportation is also evident in this case from the fact that the exportation provided, for in the first bond, by the way of Newport News, was wholly abandoned, and a p. 478second bond was executed in October covering an export to Bremen through the port of New York. As the exportation which was actually made, was not contemplated at all when the first bond was given, how is it possible to say that this was the beginning of such exportation ? If the giving of the bond can in any sense be said to be the commencement of the exportation, it must apply to the bond which was given to cover the export which was actually made, and as the evaporation occurred before that time, we do not think that the constitutional inhibition against the taxation of articles exported from a State is drawn in question.
As the law contemplated but one withdrawal entry for exportation, and made allowance only for a deficiency upon such entry, it was within the power of the collector to assess a tax upon the deficiency that accrued between the dates of the two bonds, since that deficiency represented spirits that could not be exported and were not within the exemption of any statute.
The act of December 20, 1879, 21 Stat. 59, providing for an allowance to be made for leakage or loss by any unavoidable accident “occurring during transportation from a distillery warehouse to the port of export,” cuts no figure in this case, since the evaporation occurred before the spirits left the distillery warehouse, and before the execution of the last bond.
The case is doubtless one of considerable hardship to the defendants, but in view of the exceeding stringency of the laws with respect to the taxation of distilled spirits, we do not see our way to relieve them from the payment of this tax, and the judgment of the court below is therefore
Affirmed.
Me. Justice Field dissented.