Ensten v. Simon, Ascher & Co., 282 U.S. 445 (1931)

Case details
Bluebook Citation
Ensten v. Simon, Ascher & Co., 282 U.S. 445 (1931)
Full caption
ENSTEN et al. v. SIMON, ASCHER & COMPANY, INCORPORATED.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Feb. 2, 1931
Argument for Petitioners.
ENSTEN et al. v. SIMON, ASCHER & COMPANY, INCORPORATED.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
No. 46. Argued December 12, 1930.—Decided February 2, 1931.
1. To protect the valid part of a patent containing an invalid claim, the patentee must disclaim the invalid part without unreasonable neglect or delay. Rev. Stats., §§ 4917, 4922; U. S. C., Title 35, §§ 65, 71. P. 449.
2. By interlocutory decree in a suit for infringement, the District Court upheld some of the patent claims and adjudged another invalid. The infringer took an interlocutory appeal, unsuccessfully, to the Circuit Court of Appeals; but the patentee took none, and thereafter, when the case, upon remand from that court, was again before the District Court for an accounting, he disclaimed the invalid part in the Patent Office. This was almost two years after the invalidity of the claim had been adjudged by the District Court. Subsequently he brought this suit in another circuit, on the remainder of the patent. Held, that the bill for an injunction was properly dismissed, upon the ground that the patentee had unreasonably neglected and delayed making the disclaimer and therefore was not entitled to the benefits of the disclaimer statute. P. 455.
38 F. (2d) 71, affirmed.
Certiorari, 281 U. S. 708, to review a decree upholding the dismissal of the bill in a patent infringement suit.
Messrs. 0. Ellery Edwards and Harold Elno Smith for petitioners.
The patentee had several options after the adverse decision of Judge Westenhaver. He could disclaim immediately; he could wait until a higher court had passed upon the issue of validity; he could have brought a new suit elsewhere. In case he chose to appeal, he could appeal within thirty days or he could wait until the final decree. He took no interlocutory appeal, and he did not
Argument for Petitioners. 282 U.S.
file a disclaimer, but left the matter open for future determination, either by final appeal or by a new suit elsewhere. Under the doctrine of O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, he was entitled to do this.
At that time a decision in his favor on Claim 2 by the appellate court would have done him no good because the other claims were ample to protect the invention and did protect it so that there was a very substantial recovery. Accordingly, after the Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the validity of the other claims, and before any final decree was entered, Ensten disclaimed Claim 2 instead of taking an appeal on an issue which would have been largely moot, as it would in no way have affected the matter of damages and profits or the injunction, whichever way the case had been decided. To get the peculiar characteristics necessary for the commercial exploitation of his invention, it was essential to use the elements covered by the other claims which were held valid.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that Ensten was well within the rule laid down in O’Reilly v. Morse, supra, because he filed his disclaimer prior to the final decree, unless he was prejudiced by the fact that the Judicial Code of 1914 had changed the law so as to permit an interlocutory appeal of which he had not taken advantage, having preferred to let the whole matter go over until the final decree, or until he might file a disclaimer short of that time. He is not to be penalized for doing this. Seymour v. McCormick, 19 How. 96; Minerals Separation v. Butte & Superior Mining Co., 250 U. S. 336.
The filing of the disclaimer has nothing to do with the validity of the patent as to Claims 1, 3, 4, and 5, and relates to costs only. Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U. S. 129; Hailes v. Albany Stove Co., 123 U. S. 582.
Through and including the law of 1836, a patent was void which covered too much. A disclaimer under the law of 1837 saved a patent otherwise void under the Act of
1836. The Act of 1870 repealed the laws of 1836 and 1837, but reenacted the law of 1837 as to disclaimers. Thereafter the disclaimer law was no longer applicable to the conditions it was designed to meet. The law of 1870 confirmed the bargain theory earlier held by courts. It was the deliberate intention of Congress to abolish the old features of the combined patent law and common law which made a patent incurably void if too broad, and to substitute in lieu the more humane and just doctrine, first enunciated by Lord Eldon in 1800. Cartwright n. Armott, 1 Abb. P. C. 171, 174; Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218, 241; Seymour n. Osborne, 11 Wall. 533.
Mr. John F. Neary, with whom Messrs. Harry S. Handler, Ramsey Hoguet, and Daniel L. Morris were on the brief, for respondent.
Messrs. Benjamin T. Roodhouse, James A. Brown, and Charles Neave, by special leave of Court, filed a brief on behalf of the Excelsior Steel Furnace Company, as amicus curiae.
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the Court.
By an original bill presented to the District Court, Southern District of New York, November 9, 1929, petitioners sought to prevent respondent from further infringing Letters Patent No. 1,313,080, for improvements in knitted caps and to recover damages. They asked a preliminary injunction; affidavits were presented by both sides; the facts are not controverted.
It appears—
That the patent, 6 claims, issued to Louis H. Ensten August 12, 1919. In the first suit upon it—Ensten v. Rich-Sampliner Co., et al.—commenced in the District Court, Northern District of Ohio, an interlocutory decree, [p. 448] dated May 24, 1922, adjudged claims 1, 3, 4 and 5 valid and infringed; claim 2 invalid.
That within 30 days the defendants appealed from so much of that decree as upheld the four claims; the complainant might have but did not appeal. The Circuit Court of Appeals approved the decree so far as challenged, June 20, 1923; the validity of claim 2 was not before it. Rehearing was denied October 4, 1923; mandate issued October 18, 1923. 291 Fed. 1003.
That after such remittance the District Court ordered an accounting. The complainant offered to show damages to his exclusive licensee, Lion Knitting Mills Company. As that Company was not party to the cause, the Master rejected the offer; the court affirmed his action.
That on April 30, 1924, Ensten disclaimed as to claim 2 in the Patent Office., Thereafter, he and the Lion Knitting Mills Company presented a joint bill against the original defendants. A motion to dismiss because of unreasonable neglect and delay in making the disclaimer was sustained April 5, 1926, 13 F. (2d) 132—Judge Westenhaver. The Circuit Court of Appeals, May 9, 1927, held the second bill was in effect an amendment to the original one; declared the objection based upon failure to disclaim more promptly moot; reversed the decree of the District Court; and remanded the cause for appropriate proceedings. Subsequently, the parties settled their differences; the defendant paid substantial damages; and final decree went for the complainants November 1, 1928.
No facts except those above detailed are relied upon.
Having heard the parties to the present proceeding, the trial court held that Ensten, the patentee, unreasonably neglected and delayed to disclaim claim 2 after the District Court in Ohio had declared it invalid, denied an application for injunction and dismissed the bill. The
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this action February 4, 1930, Ensten et al. v. Simon, Ascher & Co., 38 F. (2d) 71; called attention to the conflict between its views and those of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Excelsior Steel Furnace Co. v. Meyer de Bro. Co., 36 F. (2d) 447, and suggested the desirability of an authoritative determination of the controverted question of law.
The petition here for certiorari asked for the writ because of the conflict of opinion in the two Circuits. The point contested below and differently ruled in the Circuit Courts of Appeals concerns the effect of the delay in disclaiming. According to the usual practice we will consider nothing else.
Determination of the issue presented must turn upon the construction and effect of §§ 65 and 71, Title 35, U. S. C. (R. S. §§ 4917, 4922; 7 and 9, Act of 1837, 5 Stat. 193), copied in the margin.*
*
“ Sec. 65. Disclaimer. Whenever, through inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without any fraudulent or deceptive intention, a patentee has claimed more than that of which he was the original or first inventor or discoverer, his patent shall be valid for all that part which is truly and justly his own, provided the same is a material or substantial part of the thing patented; and any such patentee, his heirs or assigns, whether of the whole or any sectional interest therein, may, on payment of the fee required by law, make disclaimer of such parts of the thing patented as he shall not choose to claim or to hold by virtue of the patent or assignment, stating therein the extent of his interest in such patent. Such disclaimer shall be in writing, attested by one or more witnesses, and recorded in the Patent Office; and it shall thereafter be considered as part of the original specification to the extent of the interest possessed by the claimant and by those claiming under him after the record thereof. But no such disclaimer shall affect any action pending at the time of its being filed, except so far as may relate to the question of unreasonable neglect or delay in filing it. (R. S. § 4917.) 'Sec. 71. Suit for infringement where specification too broad. Whenever, through inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without any willful default or intent to defraud or mislead the public, a 22110°—31------29
Opinion of the Court. 282 U.S.
The first of these sections provides in substance that whenever, through inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without any fraudulent or deceptive intention, a patentee has claimed more than that of which he was the original or first inventor or discoverer, he may be permitted to make disclaimer of such parts of the thing patented as he shall not choose to claim or hold by virtue of his patent. The other permits the patentee to maintain a suit on his patent, although through inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without any wilful default or intention to mislead the public, he has claimed some material or substantial part as an invention of which he was not the original or first inventor. He is deprived, however, of the right to recover costs, unless he has filed proper disclaimer before commencement of his suit. And it further provides: “ But no patentee shall be entitled to the benefits of this section if he has unreasonably neglected or delayed to enter a disclaimer.”
In order properly to apply these sections consideration must be given to the provisions touching review of inter-
patentee has, in his specification, claimed to be the original and first inventor or discoverer of any material or substantial part of the thing patented, of which he was not the original and first inventor or discoverer, every such patentee, his executors, administrators, and assigns, whether of the whole or any sectional interest in the patent, may maintain a suit at law or in equity, for the infringement of any part thereof, which was bona fide his own, if it is a material and substantial part of the thing patented, and definitely distinguishable from the parts claimed without right, notwithstanding the specifications may embrace more than that of which the patentee was the first inventor or discoverer. But in every such case in which a judgment or decree shall be rendered for the plaintiff no costs shall be recovered unless the proper disclaimer has been entered at the Patent Office before the commencement of the suit. But no patentee shall be entitled to the benefits of this section if he has unreasonably neglected or delayed to enter a disclaimer. (R- S. § 4922.)”
locutory decrees by federal courts. Formerly, federal practice permitted appeals only from final decrees. Section 7, Act March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 828, empowered Circuit Courts of Appeals to review *an interlocutory decree granting or continuing an injunction. Ex parte National Enameling Co., 201 U. S. 156. This section was modified by Act of 1895, Chap. 96, 28 Stat. 666, and by Act of June 6, 1900, 31 Stat. 660. And the Act of April 14, 1906, 34 Stat. 116, amended it to read thus—
“ Sec. 7. That where, upon a hearing in equity in a district or in a circuit court, or by a judge thereof in vacation, an injunction shall be granted or continued, or a receiver appointed by an interlocutory order or decree, in any cause an appeal may be taken from such interlocutory order or decree granting or continuing such injunction, or appointing such receiver, to the circuit court of appeals: . .
The Judicial Code, Act March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1134, provided—
“ Sec. 129. Where upon a hearing in equity in a district court, or by a judge thereof in vacation, an injunction shall be granted, continued, refused, or dissolved by an interlocutory order or decree, or an application to dissolve an injunction shall be refused, or an interlocutory order or decree shall be made appointing a receiver, an appeal may be taken from such interlocutory order or decree granting, continuing, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve, an injunction, or appointing a receiver, to the circuit court of appeals, notwithstanding an appeal in such case might upon final decree under the statutes regulating the same, be taken directly to the Supreme Court: Provided, That the appeal must be taken within thirty days from the entry of such order or decree . .
See Act of 1925, § 227, Title 28, U. S. C., which further enlarged the right.
Opinion of the Court. 282 U.S.
Did the patentee Ensten unreasonably neglect or delay to make disclaimer of claim 2 after May 24, 1922, when the District Court in Ohio declared it invalid? He disclaimed April 30, 1924*; and only the facts narrated above are relied on for explanation or excuse.
Under the early accepted general rule a patent with an invalid claim was wholly void, and this defect effectually barred suit upon it. Congress undertook to modify this by §§ 7 and 9, Chap. 45, Act of 1837. 5 Stat. 193. In substance these became §§ 4917 and 4922, Revised Statutes, and 65 and 71, Title 35, U. S. C. The two sections “are parts of one law, having one general purpose, and that purpose is to obviate the inconvenience and hardship of the common law, which made a patent wholly void if any part of the invention was wrongfully claimed by the patentee, and which made such a defect in a patent an effectual bar to a suit brought upon it.” Hailes v. Albany Stove Co., 123 U. S. 582; Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U. S. 29, 41. Construed together they “enact that where a patentee claims materially more than that which he was the first to invent, his patent is void, unless he has preserved the right to disclaim the surplus; and that he may fail to preserve that right, by unreasonable neglect or delay to enter a disclaimer in the Patent Office.” Walker on Patents, 6th ed., § 254.
The statute is remedial; the intent is to aid the inventor free from wilful default or intention to mislead the public by permitting him to avoid the consequence of inadvertence, accident or mistake through prompt disavowal of the apparent right to exclude others from something improperly included in the words of his grant. Escape is permitted only to one who acted originally in good faith and who has complied with the prescribed conditions. “ The same principle which forbids a patentee to assert a right to more than he has actually invented compels him to disavow the right as soon as he discovers that it [p. 453] 445445 Opinion of the Court.
has been unjustly claimed. Unreasonable delay in disclaiming is thus tantamount to an original fraudulent claim, and through it the patentee loses the privilege of making the amendment by which alone his patent could be saved. The question of unreasonable delay is a question for the court, upon the facts as found either by its own investigation or the verdict of a jury. Delay begins whenever the patentee becomes aware that he has claimed more than he has invented or described. In cases where the excess is not apparent at once upon the inspection of the patent by the patentee, the allowance of his claim by the patent office raises such a presumption in its favor that he may rely on its validity until a court of competent jurisdiction decides that it is broader than his real invention.” Robinson on Patents (1890), Vol. II, p. 284.
The petitioners say that, after Judge Westenhaver by interlocutory decree declared claim 2 invalid, the patentee had several options. He might have made disclaimer immediately; he might have appealed from the interlocutory decree within 30 days; he might have awaited the final decree and appealed from that; he might have sued again in another Circuit and prosecuted such suit to final decree. Accordingly, they maintain that the delay which actually occurred cannot be declared unreasonable.
Under this view, a patentee having procured allowance of an invalid claim may hold it in the face of the public for years (here nearly two years) with large possible advantage to himself and much injury to others. By the assertion of his apparent monopoly he may deter others from legitimate action and seriously prejudice the public. See Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350, 355.
To support their position petitioners rely especially upon O’Reilly v. Morse (1853), 15 How. 62, 121, and Seymour v. McCormick (1856), 19 How. 96, 106.
O’Reilly v. Morse was decided here when appeals in federal courts lay only from final decrees,. The Circuit
Opinion of the Court. 282 U.S.
Court had sustained all claims of the patent. This court held one invalid and then disposed of the contention that because of the failure to disclaim there could be no right to recover under the valid ones. Mr. Chief Justice Taney for the court said:
“ It appears that no disclaimer has yet been entered at the patent office. But the delay in entering it is not unreasonable. For the objectionable claim was sanctioned by the head of the office; it has been held to be valid by a circuit court, and differences of opinion in relation to it are found to exist among the justices of this court. Under such circumstances the patentee had a right to insist upon it, and not disclaim it until the highest court to which it could be carried had pronounced its judgment. The omission to disclaim, therefore, does not render the patent altogether void; and he is entitled to proceed in this suit, for an infringement of that part of his invention which is legally claimed and described. But as no disclaimer was entered in the patent office before this suit was instituted, he cannot, under the act of Congress, be allowed costs against the wrongdoer, although the infringement should be proved. And we think it is proved by the testimony.”
Seymour v. McCormick declared—“ In respect to the question of unreasonable delay in making the disclaimer, as going to the whole cause of action, the court are of opinion that the granting of the patent for this improvement, together with the opinion of the court below maintaining its validity, repel any inference of unreasonable delay in correcting the claim; and that, under the circumstances, the question is one of law. This was decided in the case of the Telegraph, (15 How. [62] 121).”
Neither of these cases lends support to the petitioners. Attention also has been called to United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U. S. 224, Simmons Co. v. Grier
Bros., 258 U. S. 82, 91, and other causes; but their facts differ so materially from those now presented that special comment upon them is unnecessary.
In certain definitely defined circumstances, and to the end that the mistaken but honest inventor may obtain relief from the old rule, the disclaimer provisions permit him to deprive the public temporarily of complete freedom from the .assertion of a monopoly apparently valid, but not so in fact. When a competent court has declared his pretensions without sufficient foundation, we think good faith and the spirit of the enactment demand that he act with such promptness as the circumstances permit either to vindicate his position or to relieve the public from further evil effects of his false assertion. But for the benign provisions of the statute, such an assertion would invalidate the whole patent; and these provisions were intended to protect only those who by prompt action either seek to overturn an adverse ruling or retreat from a false position.
When the District Court in Ohio declared claim 2 invalid, the owner of the patent might have appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals within thirty days and thus secured an early determination of his rights. He did not choose this course but continued to hold himself out as possessor of the sole right to “ make, use and vend ” under the rejected claim, for nearly two years. Then he abandoned it. He made no effort promptly to vindicate what he had asserted nor did he surrender it. Thus he failed to earn the offered exemption and now he may not complain.
A similar view of the meaning and effect of §§ 65 and 71 has been often accepted by District Courts and Circuit Courts of Appeals. The doctrine there commonly approved is that, where one claim of a patent is declared invalid, the trial court may refuse a decree sustaining the [p. 456] others until there is disclaimer as to the invalid one or a prompt appeal. Walker on Patents, 6th ed., § 260, copied in the margin.* First Circuit: Suddard N. American Motor Co., 163 Fed. 852 (1908). Second Circuit: Atwater Mjg. Co. n. Beecher Mjg. Co. (C. C.) 8 Fed. 608; Tyler v. Galloway (C. C.) 12 Fed. 567; Brainard v. Cramme (C. C.) 12 Fed. 621; Matthews v. Spangenberg (C. C.) 19 Fed. 823; Hake v. Brown (C. C.) 37 Fed. 783; Electric Accumulator Co. v. Julien Electric Co. (C. C.) 38 Fed. 117; Union Paper Bag Machine Co. v. Water bury (C. C.) 39 Fed. 389; Steam Gauge Co. v. Kennedy (C. C.) 41 Fed. 38; Williams v. Barnard (C. C.) 41 Fed. 358; Smead v. School Dist. (C. C.) 44 Fed. 614; Brush Electric [p. 457] Co. v. Electrical Accumulator Co. (C. C.) 47 Fed. 48; Ballard N. McCluskey (C. C.) 58 Fed. 880. Sixth Circuit: Odell v. Stout, 22 Fed. 159; Office Specialty Mfg. Co. v. Globe Co., 65 Fed 599; Morgan Co. v. Alliance Co., 176 Fed. 100; Herman v. Y oungstown Car Mfg. Co., 191 Fed. 579, 587; Cummer Co. N. Atlas Dryer Co., 193 Fed. 993, 998; Higgin Mfg. Co. v. Watson, 263 Fed. 378. Seventh Circuit: Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Gilchrist Co., 253 Fed. 54, 58.
*
“ Sec. 260. An important question arises when a District Court, before any disclaimer has been filed, decides that a part of the claims of the patent in suit are valid, and have been infringed by the defendant, while another part are void for want of novelty, or for want of invention, and ought therefore to be disclaimed. Ought the judge in such a case, to enter a decree for an injunction and an account on the valid claims, and allow the complainant to disclaim the others or not, as he deems most prudent; or should he decline to enter any decree till the complainant shall have filed a disclaimer? The second of these courses has been the practice in the first circuit, in the sixth, in the seventh, and, prior to the decision of Page Machine Co. v. Dow, Jones & Co., in the second circuit [168 Fed. 703]; prior to the Page Machine Co. case one of the judges in the second circuit criticised that practice as arbitrary and unjust, and in at least one case in the sixth circuit the practice has not been followed by the Circuit Court, the reason being given that such a requirement would deprive the complainant of the benefit of an appeal from the decree in so far as it held the disclaimed claim invalid. The same reason is stated in the Page Machine Co. case. And one of the judges of the third circuit has held the first course to be the proper practice. “Where a patentee through inadvertence claimed that of which he was not the original inventor, but a disclaimer was not filed before suit, no recovery can be allowed or injunction, unless a disclaimer be filed within a reasonable time.”
In Page Machinery Co. v. Dow, Jones & Co., 168 Fed. 703, decided in 1909 prior to the enlarged appeal provision in the Judicial Code, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals expressed disapproval of the then prevailing practice upon the ground that an inventor should not be required to accept the opinion of a single judge. The principal reason for this objection disappeared when the Judicial Code became effective and broader appeals from interlocutory orders were permitted.
In Excelsior Steel Furnace Co. v. Meyer & Bro. Co., 36 F. (2d) 447, the Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, declared that " in no case would a court be justified in finding that a patentee unreasonably delayed the filing of a disclaimer until after the expiration of the statutory period within which he might further litigate the question of the validity of the contested claims.” But, in Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Gilchrist, supra, the same court had said ° that under the circumstances indicated in these statutes [§§ 4917, 4922, R. S.] benefit of any recovery by. the patentee is denied unless or until disclaimer is filed.” So far as we are advised no other court has sustained the theory advanced by the petitioners.
Certainly, in this case where an appeal was taken by the defendants, it would have entailed no unreasonable hardship upon the patent owner promptly to have submitted the legality of the rejected claim for determination by
Counsel for Parties. 282 U.S.
the appellate court. The route to that end was obvious, easy, inexpensive. He deliberately failed to defend his assertion of right by appealing. He has been guilty of unreasonable delay and has not brought himself within the beneficent provisions of the statute.
The judgment below must be
Affirmed.
LOUISIANA v. MISSISSIPPI.
No. 8, original. Argument commenced and suspended, and cause referred to a Special Master, October 8, 1928. Submitted on defendant’s exceptions to the report of the Special Master, January 5, 1931.—Decided February 2, 1931.
1. In a suit to establish a part of the boundary line of Louisiana and Mississippi between Willow Point and adjacent territory in the former and Township 9 North, Range 8 West, in the latter State, where the Mississippi River forms what is known as Albemarle Bend, the Court, after an examination of the documentary and oral evidence, sustains the master in finding:
(1) That changes in the course of the river which occurred at the place in question between the years 1823 and 1912-13, by which a considerable area was added to the Louisiana shore, were by gradual erosions and accretions, and not by avulsions. P. 462.
(2) That a change in 1912-13 by which the river, shifting to the west, cut off a large part of this area, was due to an avulsion. P. 465.
(3) That Mississippi did not by possession or exercise of sovereignty or dominion acquire right or title to the disputed territory. P. 466.
2. Upon these facts, the boundary is the thread of the main channel of the river as it was immediately prior to the avulsion of 1912-13. P. 467.
Final hearing of an original suit to establish part of an interstate boundary.
Messrs. Gerard Brandon, Percy Saint, Attorney General of Louisiana, John Dale, Robert Ash, Philip Hough, John
Dale, Jr., and L. D. Dale were on the brief for the State of Louisiana.
Messrs. George T. Mitchell, Attorney General of Mississippi, H. H. Creekmore, Pat Henry, Rufus Creekmore, E. C. Sharp, and Rush H. Knox were on the brief for the State of Mississippi.
Mr. Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.
The bill seeks a decree locating and establishing a portion of the boundary line of Louisiana and Mississippi, between Willow Point and adjacent premises in the former, and lands in Township 9 North, Range 8 West, in the latter state, where the Mississippi River forms what is known as Albemarle Bend.
In 1823 the thread of the navigable channel of the river was the true boundary line, and is correctly located by surveys made by the Mississippi River Commission in 1823 and 1824. At that time the territory now in dispute was within Mississippi and consisted of an island (then known as Tullos Island, which lay to the east of the thread of the river and was separated from the Mississippi mainland by a chute) and certain portions of the mainland east thereof. Prior to 1882 the island was renamed “ Island No. 98.”
The complainant asserts:
That between 1823 and 1913 erosions occurred which ate away all of Tullos Island and large portions of the Mississippi shore;
That accretions attached to the Louisiana shore;
That the river, and consequently the interstate boundary line, gradually and imperceptibly moved eastwardly and northwardly a distance of five or six miles;
That the accretions to the Louisiana shore became the territory of complainant;
That in 1912-1913 the river suddenly changed its course, cut across the bar formed by the said accretions on the Louisiana side, and by avulsion formed a new channel to the west, severing from the Louisiana shore a large portion of the accretion theretofore formed;
That as the last change was by avulsion the boundary line remained and now is at the thread of the extreme easterly and northeasterly channel of the river as it was in 1912-1913.
The Mississippi River Commission surveyed the river in 1882, and admittedly its chart made from that survey correctly shows the shore lines and bar lines and other relevant data as of that year. A further survey was made by the Commission, and a plotting taken therefrom in 1894, and a similar survey and plotting shows the river as it was in 1912-13. These demonstrate that the river had moved to the eastward from its position in 1823, each survey placing it considerably east of its location at the time of the next earlier one.
The respondent avers:
That the complainant has failed to show how the change in the channel came about between the surveys of 1823-1824 and that of 1882;
That as complainant has the burden of showing that the change took place by accretion rather than by avulsion, and has failed to carry that burden, it can make no claim for the land added to the Louisiana shore prior to 1882;
That subsequent to 1882 the river above the point in controversy cut into the Louisiana bank above and along the northern border of Willow Point, was deflected in a northeasterly direction, so that instead of striking Tullos Island it curved around the head of what then remained of the island (as it is shown on the survey of 1882) and enlarged the chute between that island and the Mississippi shore, forming a new channel there;
That subsequently the old channel, which had run to the west of the island, filled up, and thereby the island became attached to the Louisiana shore;
That the new channel running to the north and east of what was left of Tullos Island added by accretion to the easterly side of the island and cut farther into the Mississippi shore until 1912-13, when the river suddenly abandoned the new channel and returned to the old 1882 channel;
That thereby what theretofore had been Tullos Island again became an island separated from the Louisiana shore, although greatly enlarged over its dimensions in 1882 by the accretions added to its easterly side.
As an additional and alternative defense Mississippi asserts that its title to the disputed territory cannot now be assailed because of long continued possession and exercise of sovereignty and dominion, with the acquiescence of Louisiana.
On the issues thus made testimony was taken before a commissioner, and was referred to Thomas G. Haight, a member of the bar of this court, as special master, with direction and authority to report his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for a decree. He has filed his report, recommending a decree in accordance with the contentions of the complainant. The respondent has filed exceptions.
The parties are in agreement as to the applicable legal principles. The exceptions raise no questions of law, but go solely to the correctness of the master’s fact findings and conclusions. We have, therefore, examined the proofs, consisting of documentary evidence and oral testimony, to determine whether the master’s findings are in accord therewith. In brief he finds:
1. That the changes between 1823 and 1912-13 were by gradual erosion of the Mississippi shore and gradual accretions to the Louisiana shore, and not by avulsions.
Opinion of the Court. 282 U. S.
2. That the change in 1912-13 was due to an avulsion.
3. That the accretions up to the avulsion of 1912-13 and thereafter, so long as the current flowed in the easterly channel as it was prior to the avulsion, became Louisiana territory.
4. That the avulsion of 1912-13 did not change the boundary line.
5. That Mississippi did not by possession or exercise of sovereignty or dominion acquire right or title to the disputed territory; and as a consequence of the foregoing,
6. That the present true boundary line is the middle of the navigable channel prior to the avulsion of 1912—13, as that channel was when the current ceased to flow therein by reason of the formation of the new channel by the avulsion of 1912-13, and the filling of the former channel.
There is no challenge of findings 2 and 4. The whole controversy revolves about the correctness of findings 1 and 3 as to the physical changes which actually took place, and finding 5 as to the exercise of dominion by the respondent.
I. With respect to the physical changes which have taken place in the location of the Mississippi River, the proofs may conveniently be divided into two parts,—those which apply to the period prior to 1882, and those which have to do with that between 1882 and 1912.
It was impossible to procure much or very persuasive oral evidence as to conditions prior to 1882. The master had before him, however, the charts of the Mississippi River Commission of 1823-24 and of 1882, and plats from surveys made in 1866 and 1870. By comparing these and noting facts deducible from them, he concluded that the river moved eastward from its 1823 channel to its 1882 channel gradually and not by avulsion. He found that the Louisiana shore was eroded above Albemarle
Bend and extended to the eastward by accretions at Willow Point. He further found that while this was occurring the eastward sweep of the river gradually cut away the greater portion of Tullos Island. During all of this time the river remained of approximately the same width, thus negativing Mississippi’s contention as to the possibility of the change in the channel being sudden and by avulsions of nature. His conclusions were also supported by the relative locations of sand bars and river banks at the dates of the successive surveys. In 1882 a towhead, so-called, had been formed on the sand bar created by the accretions to the Louisiana shore, which was named “Newman’s Towhead” because the owner of the Louisiana mainland at the point from which the bar had made out was a man named Newman. On this towhead there had sprung up a growth of willow and cottonwood timber.
From an examination of the proofs and a checking of the pfocesses of reasoning and deduction adopted by the master we are satisfied that his findings on this branch of the case are justified; and that the contention of Mississippi that he has relied upon mere inferences, which do not rise to the dignity of affirmative proofs, is not well founded.
A more serious controversy, complicated by conflicting oral testimony, is disclosed as to what occurred between 1882 and 1912. The complainant adduced proofs tending to show that the eastward and northeastward movement of the channel continued after 1882. These further tend to show that by 1894 all that was left of Tullos Island in 1882 had been washed away, and that the main channel of the river was in part where that island had formerly been and in part east of its location; that the eastward movement of the river and the direction of the current to the east eroded a substantial portion of the
Opinion of the Court. 282 U.S.
former Mississippi mainland; that from 1894 to 1912 this movement eastward continued until whole sections of Township 9 North, Range 8 West, in Mississippi, had caved away; that in periods of high water in 1912 and 1913 the river overflowed the bar extending out from the Louisiana shore to Newman’s Towhead and took a southwesterly course, cutting across the accretions theretofore formed and leaving the eastern portions of the bar, including the towhead, an island; that a portion of this new island occupied the location of what was formerly Tullos Island. Thus complainant claimed that, prior to 1912, the old island had been washed away by the eastward progress of the river channel, and had been replaced by accretions along the westerly side of the river adjacent to Louisiana.
Respondent offered evidence tending to show that while the river reached the extreme easterly position averred by the complainant, it did so not by washing away Tullos Island and moving eastwardly over the former location of that island, but by swinging around to the north and east of that island, enlarging and scouring out the former chute or narrow channel between the island and the Mississippi mainland; that thereafter the river added by accretions to the eastern side of what was left of the island, and that the old channel to the west of it gradually filled up.
If the weight of the evidence is with the complainant, the territory in controversy belongs to Louisiana; if the contrary be found, the disputed territory, originally within the boundaries of Mississippi, so remains.
There is much conflicting testimony as to the location of the main channel between 1890 and 1912; as to whether Tullos Island was scoured away; as to the character of the soil and timber on the island; as to whether the alleged clay soil of the island disappeared and was afterwards replaced by a sand bar formed by accretion; as to [p. 465] whether the original virgin timber which was on it fell into the river and disappeared with it, or in part still stands as mute evidence that the island was never entirely washed way.
Mindful of the fact that the special master did not see and hear the witnesses, we have felt it incumbent upon us to study the proofs, documentary and oral, to examine the deductions made therefrom, and thereby to test the stated conclusions. The preponderance of the evidence supports the master’s finding that from 1882 to 1894 the river moved eastwardly, caving away Tullos Island along its western shore, until it had wiped out that island; that the continued eastward movement caved the Mississippi shore, at the same time adding to the accretions which had already formed on the Louisiana shore opposite Willow Point; and that the bar was continuous from the old high bank on the Louisiana side to the end of Newman’s Towhead. Thus by 1912 an area five or six miles in length and several miles in width had been added to the Louisiana shore.
As matters stood in 1912 and 1913, the boundary line between the states was the thread of the navigable channel far to the eastward of the present channel. As above stated, there is no controversy as to what occurred in 1912-13. The river by a sudden avulsion made a shortcut to the west of Albemarle Bend, as it then was; and subsequently the channel in the old bend to the eastward of the new channel silted and filled until it entirely closed at the upper end. This sudden avulsion did not change the boundary line between the states.
II. It remains to discuss the proofs bearing upon the master’s fifth finding. The survey of 1882 discloses that accretions attached to the Louisiana shore had at that time extended to the eastward so far as to cover a portion of the territory formerly belonging to Mississippi. The
22110°—31-------- 30
1894 survey shows these accretions covering a much larger portion, and that of 1912-13 shows a still greater extension over former Mississippi territory. The Newmans, who lived on Willow Point, Louisiana, had a house about one hundred yards east of the 1824 mainland, between the levee and the stream, and just above Albemarle Bend proper. It must, therefore, have been built on accretions formed subsequent to 1824. It caved into the river in 1905. The master found that the possession of the Newmans extended at least to those accretions which had attached to the shore up to the time that their house was destroyed. The disputed territory is low alluvial land subject to overflow at times of high water and is not protected by levees or dikes. Upon portions of it cottonwood and willow timber has grown. The land is not fitted for cultivation or settlement except in a haphazard way. It took its name from the Newman family and was known as the “ Newman Towhead.” After the avulsion of 1912-13 severed a large portion of it from the Louisiana shore the successors in title of the Newmans leased the cut-off portion of it, lying to the eastward of the new channel, to one Towns. The lease described it as part of the Bell and Willow Point plantations, located in East Carroll Parish, Louisiana. It was occupied under the lease for six or eight years for the pasturing of hogs.
The first knowledge that complainant’s witnesses had of any claim on behalf of Mississippi or its citizens was shortly before this action was brought. It appears that in or about 1923 Mississippi sold some of the land in question for delinquent taxes. On the assessment rolls of Issaquena County, Mississippi, the purchasers at these tax sales first appeared as owners in 1925-1926. The [p. 467] respondent put in evidence assessment rolls for certain years between 1848 and 1926. They show that after 1883 certain of the lands within the original boundary of Tullos Island are marked “ in river,” or “ in Mississippi River,” and from time to time these lands so designated were assessed for taxation, sometimes for nominal amounts and sometimes for substantial sums. At times “ Island No. 98 ” appears as a separate item on the rolls, although the surveys show that at those times the island had disappeared. It is described as of greatly varying sizes in different years. The evidence to be drawn from this source is quite contradictory and fails to show any dominion by Mississippi over the disputed territory.
The record sustains the master’s finding that there is no proof that Louisiana or its citizens knew of or acquiesced in any purported dominion of Mississippi over the disputed territory. The respondent has failed to meet the test laid down in Michigan v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 295, with respect to exercise of sovereignty and dominion over the disputed territory, and acquiescence by complainant in such alleged possession. The master’s fifth finding is sustained.
A decree should be entered as recommended by the master, appointing a commission to locate the thread of the main channel of the Mississippi River as the same was immediately prior to the avulsion of 1912-13; and the line when so located is decreed to be the boundary between the states, between latitude 32° 39' on the north and the division line between Issaquena and Warren Counties, Mississippi (as extended westward), on the south. The parties are accorded forty days within which to submit a decree in accordance with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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