Eagle Mining & Improvement Co. v. Hamilton, 218 U.S. 513 (1910)
Case details
Bluebook Citation
Eagle Mining & Improvement Co. v. Hamilton, 218 U.S. 513 (1910)
Full caption
EAGLE MINING & IMPROVEMENT COMPANY v. HAMILTON.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
Nov. 28, 1910
EAGLE MINING & IMPROVEMENT COMPANY v.
HAMILTON.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO.
No. 51. Submitted November 7, 1910.—Decided November 28, 1910.
Under the Territorial Practice Act of April 7, 1874, c. 80, 18 Stat. 27, the jurisdiction of this court on appeals is limited to the inquiry whether the findings of fact support the judgment and to a review of duly taken exceptions and rulings on admission or rejection of evidence.
Findings of the District Court when adopted by the Supreme Court of the Territory serve the purpose of the statement of facts required by the statute.
Rulings on questions of evidence are not properly before this court when the exceptions thereto do not appear in the record, and, even though objections to testimony may have been noted, if it does not appear what the rulings were and whether the testimony was or was not excluded, this court is confined to determining whether the findings support the judgment; and in this case the facts found by the court below unquestionably support the judgment.
14 N. Mex. 271, affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Samuel Parker, with whom Mr. George W. Prichard and Mr. Archibald G. Graham were on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. James G. Fitch for appellee.
Mr. Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico in two suits which were consolidated. The first suit was brought in August, 1903, vol. ccxviii —33 p. 514in a District Court of the Territory by the appellant, Eagle Mining and Improvement Company, against the appellees, the widow and heirs of Humphrey B. Hamilton, deceased, to have it adjudged that the decedent held a certain undivided interest in mining property in trust for the appellant, and to compel conveyance. In November, 1904, the appellees, one of whom was the administrator of the decedent’s estate, brought suit against the appellant, alleging that Hamilton had rendered services as its attorney in connection with the mining property and otherwise, and that the legal title had been taken by him pursuant to an agreement, by which it was to be held as security for the appellant’s indebtedness to him; the appellees prayed for foreclosure and recovery of the amount found to be due. The suits were consolidated and a referee was appointed to take testimony. Hearing was had, and a decree was entered in favor of appellees, which set forth separately findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The court found that Hamilton had acquired the legal title to the undivided one-half interest in question under an agreement with the appellant, by which he was to negotiate for the purchase in its behalf and was to surrender a certain equitable claim of lien upon another interest in the property; that in consideration of this surrender and of his services in acquiring the one-half interest Hamilton was to receive the difference between an agreed sum and the amounts to be advanced by the appellant to effect the purchase; that for the payment of this difference—found to amount to $9,500—Hamilton was to hold the legal title as security; and that the agreement to this effect was evidenced by writings signed by Hamilton “and delivered to, accepted and acquiesced in by the said company.”
As a conclusion of law, the court found that the heirs of Hamilton were entitled to hold the legal title to the p. 515undivided interest until the payment of $9,500, with interest and costs of suit, had been made to the administrator of Hamilton’s estate; that upon such payment they should convey to the appellant, and that in default of payment the undivided interest should be sold to satisfy the indebtedness.
It was further found that Hamilton had been retained by the appellant as its attorney, and at its request had rendered legal services from the date of its organization until his death without express agreement as to the amount to be paid therefor; that these services were reasonably worth $9,519.99, upon which, after deducting payments, there was due $8,419.99. And, as a conclusion of law, the court held that the administrator was entitled to judgment for the last-mentioned sum.
It was decreed accordingly, and from this decree appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the Territory where it was affirmed.
The record before us contains the testimony taken before the referee, and the letters and documents which, in connection with the testimony, he submitted to the court in his report; and the argument here is directed largely to the effect of the evidence and to the findings of the court below as to matters of fact.
But we are not at liberty to review these findings of fact. We cannot go behind the findings to ascertain whether they are justified by the evidence. Under the act of April 7, 1874, chapter 80, 18 Stat. 27, the jurisdiction of this court, upon this appeal, is limited to the inquiry whether the findings of fact made by the court below support its judgment, and to a review of exceptions which have been duly taken to rulings upon the admission or rejection of evidence. Stringfellow v. Cain, 99 U. S. 610; Neslin v. Wells, 104 U. S. 428; Idaho & Oregon Land Company v. Bradbury, 132 U. S. 509; Haws v. Victoria Copper Mining Company, 160 U. S. 303; Grayson v. p. 516Lynch, 163 U. S. 468; Bear Lake Irrigation Company v. Garland, 164 U. S. 1; Apache County v. Barth, 177 U. S. 538. The findings of the District Court, having been adopted and affirmed by the Supreme Court of the Territory, serve the purpose of the statement of facts required by the statute. Stringfellow v. Cain, supra; Neslin v. Wells, supra; Haws v. Victoria Copper Mining Company, supra.
Nor are there any rulings upon questions of evidence which are properly before us for review, for no exceptions to such rulings appear in the record. When the evidence was taken before the referee appointed by the District Court various objections were made and were noted upon the record, but the referee did not attempt to pass upon the objections and reported to the court the entire proceedings, including the testimony and documents to which objection had been made. What, if any, rulings were made by the court upon these objections is not shown. In the progress of the cause a memorandum of opinion was filed by the judge sitting in the District Court, in which the admissibility of certain testimony, relied upon by the appellant, was said to be doubtful, but it does not appear that the testimony was excluded, and as we have said there are no exceptions which bring up any question for review with respect to the admission or rejection of evidence.
As the facts found by the court below unquestionably support the judgment, it is
Affirmed.
UNITED STATES v. MASON.
SAME v. SAME.
SAME v. SAME.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Nos. 510, 511, 512. Argued October 18, 19, 1910.—Decided November 28, 1910.
Clerks of the Federal courts are not controlled in respect to their fees and emoluments and accounting therefor by the provisions of the act of March 3, 1875, c. 144, 18 Stat. 479, or of Rev. Stat., §§ 5490 and 5497, relating to embezzlement of moneys and property of the United States by officers and other persons charged with the safe-keeping thereof.
There is a separate system with respect to the fees and emoluments of clerks, and the amounts which the clerk receives are not moneys or property of the United States but a fund from which he receives his compensation and expenses, and as to the surplus for which he must account to the United States he is not trustee but debtor.
The facts, which involve the validity of indictments for embezzlement against a clerk of the District Court of the United States and the construction of statutes relating to the fees, salaries and accounts of clerks of United States courts, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Fowler for the United States.
Mr. Boyd B. Jones, with whom Mr. George L. Wilson was on the brief, for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the court.
The defendant, the clerk of the District Court of the p. 518United States for the District of Massachusetts, was indicted for the embezzlement of certain moneys of the United States. Separate indictments were found as tc moneys received by the clerk in the years 1906, 1907 and 1908, respectively. They are precisely alike, save for the difference in the years and the amounts specified. In each case the Circuit Court sustained a demurrer as to three counts of the indictment, the second, third and fourth, and the judgments on the demurrers are brought here for review.
Each of these three counts—which are set forth in the margin1—states that the moneys were a u portion of a p. 519surplus of fees and emoluments of his said office over and above the compensation and allowances authorized by law to be retained by him.” The charge of the second count is that the defendant “the same public moneys
1
Second count. And the jurors aforesaid, on their oath aforesaid, do further present, that said Frank H. Mason during all of the year nineteen hundred and eight was, and ever since has been, an officer of the United States, to wit, clerk of the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, and on said first day of February, in the year nineteen hundred and nine, had in his possession and under his control, to wit, at Boston aforesaid, certain public moneys of the United States, a particular description whereof is to said grand jurors unknown, to wit, moneys to the amount and of the value of three hundred and eighty-seven dollars, which during said year nineteen hundred and eight had come into his possession and under his control in the execution of his office as such officer, and under authority and claim of authority as such officer, and were a portion of a surplus of fees and emoluments of his said office over and above the compensation and allowances authorized by law to be retained by him for said year nineteen hundred and eight, which said public moneys said Frank H. Mason, on said first day of February, in the year nineteen hundred and nine, as such officer, was charged, by certain acts of Congress, to wit, §§ 823, 828, and 844 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and the act approved June 28, 1902, 32 Statutes at Large, chapter 1301, and by divers other acts of Congress, safely to keep; that said Frank H. Mason, on said first day of February, in the year nineteen hundred and nine, at Boston aforesaid, the same public moneys unlawfully did fail safely to keep as required by said acts of Congress, and, on the contrary, the same then and there unlawfully did convert to his own use; and that thereby said Frank H. Mason then and there was guilty of embezzlement of said public moneys so converted.
Third count. And the jurors aforesaid, on their oath aforesaid, do further present, that said Frank H. Mason, during all of the year nineteen hundred and eight was, and ever since has been, an officer of the United States, to wit, clerk of the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, and on said first day of February, in the year nineteen hundred and nine, had in his possession and under his control, to wit, at Boston aforesaid, certain public moneys of the United States, a particular description whereof is to said grand jurors unknown, to wit, moneys to the amount and of the value of three hundred and eighty-seven dollars, which during said year nineteen hundred and eight had come into his possession and under his control in the execution of his office as such officer, and under authority and claim of authority as such officer, and were a portion of a surplus of fees and emoluments of his said office over and above the compensation and allowances authorized by law to be retained by him for said year nineteen hundred and eight, which said public moneys said Frank H. Mason, on said first day of February, in the year nineteen hundred and nine, as such officer, was charged, by certain acts of Congress, to wit, §§ 823, 828, and 844 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and the act approved June 28, 1902, 32 Statutes at Large, chapter 1301, and by divers other acts of Congress, safely to keep; that said Frank H. Mason, on said first day of February, in the year nineteen hundred and nine, at Boston aforesaid, the last-mentioned public moneys unlawfully did fail safely to keep as required by said acts of Congress, and, on the contrary, the same then and there unlawfully and fraudulently did convert to his own use; and that thereby said Frank H. Mason then and there was guilty of embezzlement of said public moneys so converted.
Fourth count. And the jurors aforesaid, on their oath aforesaid, do further present, that said Frank H. Mason during all of the year nineteen hundred and eight was, and ever since then has been, an officer of the United States, to wit, clerk of the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, and, on said first day of February, in the year nineteen hundred and nine, had in his possession and under his control, to wit, at Boston aforesaid, a portion of the money of the United States, a particular description whereof is to said grand jurors unknown, to wit, money to the amount and of the p. 520unlawfully did fail safely to keep” as required by acts of Congress, “and, on the contrary, the same then and there unlawfully did convert to his own use,” and thereby “was guilty of embezzlement of said public moneys so converted.” The third count is the same as the second, except that it charges that the defendant converted the moneys “fraudulently” as well as “unlawfully.” The fourth count charges that he should have paid the money, that is, the alleged surplus, to the United States “in the manner provided by law,” and that he “the same money unlawfully, wrongfully, and fraudulently did convert to his own personal use and embezzle.”
To sustain the counts, the assignment of errors refers to §§ 5490 and 5497 of the Revised Statutes, and to the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 144 (18 Stat., p. 479).
Section 5490 is as follows:
“Every officer or other person charged by any act of Congress with the safe-keeping of the public moneys, who fails to safely keep the same, without loaning, using, converting to his own use, depositing in banks, or exchanging for other funds than as specially allowed by law, shall be guilty of embezzlement of the money so loaned, used, converted, deposited, or exchanged; and shall be impris-
value of three hundred and eighty-seven dollars, which during said year nineteen hundred and eight, had come into his possession and under his control in the execution of his office as such officer, and under authority and claim of authority as such officer, and was a portion of a surplus of fees and emoluments of his said office over and above the compensation and allowances authorized by law to be retained by him for said year nineteen hundred and eight, which money last aforesaid he should, on said first day of February, in the year nineteen hundred and nine, have paid to the United States at Boston aforesaid in the manner provided by law; and that said Frank H. Mason, on said first day of February, in the year nineteen hundred and nine, at Boston aforesaid, the same money unlawfully, wrongfully, and fraudulently did convert to his own personal use and embezzle.
oned not less than six months nor more than ten years, and fined in a sum equal to the amount of money so embezzled.”
Section 5497, with the addition made by the amendment of February 3, 1879, chapter 42 (20 Stat. 280), provides:
“Every banker, broker, or other person not an authorized depositary of public moneys, . . . who uses, transfers, converts, appropriates, or applies any portion of the public money for any purpose not prescribed by law, ... is guilty of an act of embezzlement of the public money so deposited, loaned, transferred, used, converted, appropriated, or applied, and shall be punished as prescribed in section fifty-four hundred and eighty-eight.
“And any officer connected with, or employed in, the internal-revenue service of the United States, and any assistant of such officer, who shall embezzle or wrongfully convert to his own use any money or other property of the United States, and any officer of the United States, or any assistant of such officer, who shall embezzle or wrongfully convert to his own use any money or property which may have come into his possession or under his control in the execution of such office or employment, or under color or claim of authority as such officer or assistant, whether the same shall be the money or property of the United States or of some other person or party, shall, where the offense is not otherwise punishable by some statute of the United States, be punished by a fine equal to the value of the money and property thus embezzled or converted, or by imprisonment not less than three months nor more than ten years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
By the act of March 3, 1875, chapter 144, § 1 (18 Stat., P- 479), “any person who shall embezzle, steal, or purloin any money, property, record, voucher, or valuable p. 522thing whatever, of the moneys, goods, chattels, records, or property of the United States, shall be deemed guilty of felony.”
It is also contended, in argument, that the facts alleged in the indictment bring it within the scope of § 5489 of the Revised Statutes, which provides that if “any public depositary fails safely to keep all moneys deposited” he shall be deemed guilty of embezzlement; and this, under § 5493, is to be construed “to apply to all persons charged with the safe-keeping, transfer, or disbursement of the public money, whether such persons be indicted as receivers or depositaries of the same.”
What, if any, application these provisions may have to the clerk of the District Court, with respect to the fees and emoluments of his office, can be determined only after a consideration of the history of his relation to these moneys and of the statutes which specifically define his rights and duties. Prior to 1841 the clerks were not required to render any account of their fees to the Government. United States v. Hilt, 120 U. S. 169, at page 176. The act of March 3, 1791, chapter 22, § 1 (1 Stat. 217), fixed their compensation for attending court and made an allowance for traveling. That of May 8, 1792, chapter 36, § 3 (1 Stat. 277), added such fees as were allowed by the Supreme Court of the State, and authorized the court to grant a reasonable compensation for the discharge of duties not performed by the clerks of the state court and for which the laws of the State made no allowance. But, under these statutes, the fees and emoluments received by the clerks were their own property. And they were to be recovered “in like manner as the fees of the officers of the States respectively for like services.” 1 Stat. 278, § 6.
In 1841, for the first time, the clerks were limited as to the amount which they were entitled to retain out of their fees. The act of March 3, 1841, chapter 35, § 1
(5 Stat. 427),- provided that the fees and emoluments retained by the clerks after the payment “of such necessary office and other expenses as shall be allowed by the Secretary of the Treasury,” within a prescribed limit, should “not exceed, in any case, four thousand five hundred dollars; the overplus of fees and emoluments to be paid into the public Treasury, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, subject to the disposition of Congress.” This was followed by the act of May 18, 1842, chapter 29 (5 Stat. 483), which limited the amount which the clerk could retain out of the fees and emoluments of his office “for his own personal compensation, over and above the necessary expenses of his office, and necessary clerk hire included, also to be audited and allowed by the proper accounting officers of the Treasury,” to the sum of thirty-five hundred dollars per year. The clerks were required to make verified returns semi-annually, “embracing all the fees and emoluments of their respective offices, of every name and character,” and also “all the necessary office expenses of such officer, together with the vouchers for the payment of the same.” It was also provided that the officer, with each return, should “pay into the Treasury of the United States, or deposit to the credit of the Treasurer thereof, as he may be directed by the Secretary of the Treasury, any surplus of the fees and emoluments of his office, which his half-yearly return so made as aforesaid shall show to exist over and above the compensation and allowances hereinbefore authorized to be retained and paid by him.” Where the return showed that a surplus might exist the Secretary of the Treasury was to cause the return to be carefully examined and the accounts of disbursements to be regularly audited “and an account to be opened with such officer in proper books to be provided for the purpose.”
The plain object of this statute was to limit the amount p. 524which the clerk was to retain and to require an accounting, an audit of expenses, and a payment of the surplus. Otherwise the established method of administering the office was not changed. The fees were to be recovered as theretofore; and to the extent of the amount of the fixed compensation of the clerk and the necessary expenses of his office, he was entitled to use and to pay as formerly. The statute suggests no other course. What, if anything, should be paid into the public treasury at the end of the half year, when he was to make his return, depended upon the amount of the fees, the amount of the expenses and the result of the audit. If his fixed compensation and his necessary expenses exhausted the fees there would be nothing to pay. The amount payable was to be determined when the return was made.
This was the state of the law as to the clerks’ fees and emoluments at the time of the passage of the act of August 6, 1846, chapter 90 (9 Stat. 59), which was entitled “An Act to provide for the better Organization of the Treasury and for the Collection, Safe-Keeping, Transfer and Disbursement of the public Revenue.” It made careful provision with respect to the duties of the Treasurer, Assistant Treasurers, and of collectors and receivers of public moneys, and the manner in which these moneys should be deposited and disbursed. By § 6 of this act “all public officers of whatsoever character” were required “to keep safely, without loaning, using, depositing in banks, or exchanging for other funds than as allowed by this act, all the public money collected by them,” until it was ordered “by the proper department or officer of the Government” to be transferred or paid out. See Revised Statutes, § 3639. By § 16 it was provided that if any officer “charged by this act, or any other act, with the safe-keeping, transfer, and disbursement of the public moneys” should use, loan, deposit or exchange, except as allowed by the act, “any portion of the public p. 525moneys entrusted to him” every such act should be deemed an embezzlement. 9 Stat. 63.
This last-mentioned section is the source of § 5490 of the Revised Statutes, which we have quoted above- as one of the statutes relied upon to sustain the counts in question, and in construing it we may refer to the purpose and scope of the act from which it was derived. McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619; United States v. Le Bris, 121 U. S. 278; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 302. Section 5493 must be construed in the same way for a similar reason. And it is clear that the Treasury act of 1846, and the provisions of § 16, did not apply to the fees and emoluments received by clerks of courts, and that the clerks were not charged, within the meaning of that act, with the safe-keeping of these fees and emoluments as public moneys. These were governed by other rules. They lay outside of the prohibition of § 16 against loaning, using, converting to his own use, depositing in banks, and exchanging for other funds, for it was upon these fees that the clerk depended for his livelihood and for the payment of the expenses of his office, subject only to the duty twice a year to make his accounting and to pay over the surplus if the fees exceeded the total amount allowed him.
The statute relating to the Treasury was speedily supplemented by the act of March 3, 1849, chapter 110, entitled “An Act requiring all Moneys receivable from Customs and from all other Sources to be paid immediately into the Treasury, without Abatement or Reduction, and for other Purposes” (9 Stat. 398). This is the source of § 3617 of the Revised Statutes, providing that “the gross amount of all moneys received from whatever source for the use of the United States,” with the exceptions stated, (not here important,) “shall be paid by the officer or agent receiving the same into the Treasury, at as early a day as practicable, without any abatement or p. 526deduction on account of salary, fees, costs, charges, expenses, or claim of any description whatever.” But this, obviously, had no application to clerks of courts who continued to receive, hold and use their fees and emoluments subject to the prescribed limitations and the duty to account.
In 1849 the supervisory power of the Secretary of the Treasury over the accounts of clerks was transferred to the Secretary of the Interior (Act of March 3, 1849, chapter 108, § 4, 9 Stat. 395). In 1853, a statute was passed regulating the fees of clerks and other officers of the courts throughout the United States, and the duties of clerks with respect to their returns and payments were defined. This established the present fee bill (Act of February 26, 1853, chapter 80, 10 Stat. 161). In 1870 the supervisory power passed to the Attorney-General. Act of June 22, 1870, chapter 150, § 15, 16 Stat. 164.
The provisions of the act of 1853, as modified by the subsequent legislation, have been incorporated in the Revised Statutes, §§ 823 to 857, and these continue the policy of the act of 1842, supra.
Section 823 provides that “the following and no other compensation shall be taxed and allowed to . . . clerks of the circuit and district courts.” Section 828 prescribes the clerks’ fees. Section 833 provides for semi-annual returns to the Attorney-General, as follows:
“Every district attorney, clerk of a district court, clerk of a circuit court, and marshal, shall, on the first days of January and July, in each year, or within thirty days thereafter, make to the Attorney-General in such form as he may prescribe, a written return for the half year ending on said days, respectively, of all the fees and emoluments of his office, of every name and character, and of all the necessary expenses of his office, including necessary clerk-hire, together with the vouchers for the payment of the same for such last half year. He shall p. 527state separately in such returns the fees and emoluments received or payable under the bankrupt act; . . . Said returns shall be verified by the oath of the officer making them.”
Section 839 defines the amount which may be retained out of the clerk’s fees for his compensation over and above expenses:
“No clerk of a district court, or clerk of a circuit court, shall be allowed by the Attorney-General, except as provided in the next section, and in section eight hundred and forty-two to retain of the fees and emoluments of his office, or, in case both of the said clerkships are held by the same person, of the fees and emoluments of the said offices, respectively, for his personal compensation, over and above his necessary office expenses, including necessary clerk-hire, to be audited and allowed by the proper accounting officers of the Treasury, a sum exceeding three thousand five hundred dollars a year for any such district clerk, or for any such circuit clerk, or exceeding that rate for any time less than a year.”
Sections 844, 845 and 846 contain the following provisions, which are applicable to the payment by clerks of the surplus shown by their returns and for the examination and audit of their accounts:
“Sec. 844. Every district attorney, clerk, and marshal shall, at the time of making his half-yearly return to the Attorney-General, pay into the Treasury, or deposit to the credit of the Treasurer, as he may be directed by the Attorney-General, any surplus of the fees and emoluments of his office, which said return shows to exist over and above the compensation and allowances authorized by law to be retained by him.
“Sec. 845. In every case where the return of a district attorney, clerk, or marshal shows that a surplus may exist, the Attorney-General shall cause such returns to be carefully examined, and the accounts of disbursements p. 528to be regularly audited by the proper officer of his Department, and an account to be opened with such officer in proper books to be provided for that purpose.
“Sec. 846. The accounts of district attorneys, clerks, marshals, and commissioners of circuit courts shall be examined and certified by the district judge of the district for which they are appointed, before they are presented to the accounting officers of the Treasury Department for settlement. They shall then be subject to revision upon their merits by said accounting officers, as in case of other public accounts.”
Section 857 brings forward the provision of the act of May 8, 1792, c. 36 (1 Stat. 278), as to the manner in which the fees shall be recovered.
Section. 5 of the act of February 22, 1875, chapter 95 (18 Stat. 334), provides that if any clerk of any District or Circuit Court of the United States shall willfully refuse or neglect to make or to forward any report, certificate, statement, or other document required by law to be made or forwarded by him, it shall be the duty of the President to remove him from office, and he shall not be eligible to any appointment as clerk or deputy clerk for the period of two years thereafter. By § 6 of the same act, the willful refusal or neglect to make or to forward the report, or other documents mentioned in the preceding section, is made a misdemeanor.
We have also to note the proviso contained in the appropriation act of June 28, 1902, chapter 1301 (32 Stat. 475, 476), as follows:
“That each clerk of the district and circuit courts shall, on the first days of January and July of each year, or within thirty days thereafter, make to the Attorney-General, in such form as he may prescribe, written returns for the half year ending on said days, respectively, of all fees and emoluments of his office of every name and character, and of all necessary expenses of his office, in- p. 529eluding necessary clerk hire, together with the vouchers for the payment of the same for such last half year; and the word ‘emoluments’ shall be understood as including all amounts received in connection with the admission of attorneys to practice in the court, all amounts received for services in naturalization proceedings, whether rendered as clerk, as commissioner, or in any other capacity, and all other amounts received for services in any way connected with the clerk’s office.”
There has thus been established a distinct system with respect to the fees and emoluments of the clerks. Its features are to be explained by the history of the clerk’s office and the requirements of its convenient administration. It is urged that the fees and emoluments are attached to the office, and are received in an official capacity. This consideration, however, does not aid the prosecution, for they were attached to the office before the statute of 1841, when they belonged to the clerk without any duty on his part to account for any portion of them. The fees and emoluments stand in a different category from other moneys which he may receive by virtue of his office, as, for example, moneys paid into court. Revised Statutes, §§ 995, 996.
In United States v. Hill, 123 U. S. 681, the action was on the official bond of the clerk of the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, and it was asserted that this court had jurisdiction to review the judgment because the suit was brought for the enforcement of a “revenue law.” The court held that § 844 of the Revised Statutes requiring the clerk to pay into the Treasury any surplus of fees and emoluments shown by his return was not a revenue law within the meaning of § 699, and in delivering the opinion of the court Chief Justice Waite said:
“Certainly it will not be claimed that the clerk of a District Court of the United States is an ‘officer of the vol. ccxviii —34 p. 530revenue,’ but there is nothing to indicate that the term revenue has any different signification in this subdivision of the section from that which it has in the other. The clerk of a court of the United States collects his taxable ‘compensation,’ not as the revenue of the United States, but as the fees and emoluments of his office, with an obligation on his part to account to the United States for all he gets over a certain sum which is fixed by law. This obligation does not grow out of any ‘revenue law,’ properly so called, but out of a statute governing an officer of a court of the United States.”
None of the statutes relating to embezzlement of moneys or property of the United States, which we have quoted, affords a basis for the counts in question. There may be an honest difference of opinion with regard to the amount, the payment of which, from the fees collected, may properly be allowed. Provision has been made for the examination of the matter and for the ascertainment of the amount due. Pending such audit there would be no justification for indicting the clerk as an embezzler upon the allegation that he had in his hands a surplus which he had converted to his own use. It is not a question of public moneys which are to be deposited as such and are to be disbursed in accordance with the Treasury system. A fixed compensation is to be retained, the expenses of the office are to be defrayed and the question of the necessity of the expenses is to be passed upon; and the clerk is not in default until he refuses or fails to make his return or to pay over the surplus shown by his return to exist or the amount found upon the audit of his accounts to be payable.
We have not before us a case where a clerk has refused or failed to make the return required by statute or to pay over the surplus shown by his return to exist or established by the audit. None of the three counts makes that charge. The second and third counts charge that the moneys in p. 531question constituted a portion of the surplus over and above his authorized allowances, and that he converted the moneys to his own use. Whether or not this surplus was shown by his return, or was the result of the audit contemplated by the statute, is not stated. The fourth count alleges that the clerk should have paid to the United States the moneys which it is said were a part of the surplus; but it is not alleged that the duty had arisen upon the return and accounting required by the statute.
But, for the reasons we have stated, even the duty to pay the surplus shown by the return or audit is not governed by the statutes, relating to embezzlement, which have been referred to in support of these counts. The amount with which the clerk is chargeable upon his accounting is not the11 public money ” or “ the money or property of the United States” within the meaning of their provisions. The fees and emoluments are not received by the clerk as moneys or property belonging to the United States, but as the amount allowed to him for his compensation and office expenses under the statutes defining his rights and duties, and with respect to the amount payable when the return is made the clerk is not trustee but debtor. Any other view must ignore not only the practical construction which the statutes governing the office have received, but their clear intent.
The second, third and fourth counts of the indictment are insufficient, and the judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore in each case
Affirmed.