Balt. & O.R. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 196 F. 690 (C.C.D. Ind. 1912)

“It is further ordered-, that the said railroad companies shall report to the Commission on the first day of July, 1910, on the first day of January, 1911, and on the first day of July, 1911, how many of their engines they have so equipped with headlights as required by this order giving the whole number [p. 693] of engine!? in use by them, and a description of the headlight installed by them,' and the numbers of the engines upon which such headlights have been placed.

It is contended by the solicitor for the Commission that such a headlight with an illumination which is far in excess of what is regarded as necessary could not have been intended by its order. But a locomotive headlight is a combination of an initial source of light with a reflector, both of which are essential and inseparable parts of it, and it may he described in the words of the solicitor for the Commission as an articulated whole. Such a combination, however, has not any candle power of its own as distinguished from the candle power of the initial source of light. It is not denied that the headlights in present use upon the locomotives of the complainant satisfy all the requirements of a marker and furnish some degree of illumination upon the track and right of way. AVhile the Commission admits that it is possible to have an excessive amount of illumination, it contends that the present [p. 695] amount of illumination is insufficient for the protection ol' persons and property. The controversy between the parties is rather over the degree, and not the kind of illumination that should be furnished by a locomotive headlight.

It has not been contended before me that the act of 1909 or the order of the Commission under it is inconsistent with any power granted by the Constitution of the United States, or a violation of any right secured by that instrument. But it has been urged with great earnestness that the act and [p. 697] order are unreasonable, and that the reasonableness of The net and order is reviews ble by a court bavins jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter. Tlie order of the Commission, if within the powers which are conferred upon it. is entitled to the same respect as an act of the Legislature. Railroad v. Commission, 172 Inti. 113, 123, 87 N. E. 966. In a. rate ease it was held that the “presumption is that the rates fixed by the Commission are reasonable, and the burden of proof is upon the railroad company to show the contrary,” and that rule applies to any order of a railroad commission. Railroad v. Minnesota, 186 TJ. S. 257, 264 , 22 Sup. Ct. 900, 903 (46 L. Ed. 1151). Neither (he wisdom nor the policy nor the expediency of the order of the Commission is reviewable by the courts.

The decision of the Supreme Court in Railroad v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453, 3:1 Sup. Ct. 275, 55 L. Ed. 290, which has been recently approved in a similar case from Indiana, in both of which statutes for the regulation of the size of “crews” on passenger or freight trains were upheld, contains a statement of the rules which apply to the present case. 219 fj. S. 465, 466, 31 Sup. Ct. 278, 279 (55 L. Ed. 290). It was originally a proceeding against the railroad by the state for a violation of the Arkansas statute. The defense was as follows: •‘Defendant states that its said train was equipped with automatic couplers and air brakes, so that the cars thereof could he coupled and uncoupled without the necessity of brakemen going between the cars, and could be stopped by the application of the air brakes by the engineer of said train without the intervention or assistance of the conductor or brakeman, as required by act of Congress and the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission made thereunder; that it had employed on said train a conductor and two brakemen, and that the employment of another brakeman on said, train was unnecessary, because there were no duties connected with the running and operating of said train to he performed by a third brakeman, and said act, in attempting to require the defendant to employ three brakemen on said train, attempted to require the defendant to expend a large amount of money for a useless and unnecessary purpose and to deprive the defendant of its property without due process of law, and is therefore a violation of and in conflict with section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” There was a judgment for the state in the trial court which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Arkansas. 86 Ark. 412, 111 S. W. 456. The case went to the Supreme Court of tiie United States on the federal questions that were involved [p. 698] in it. The whole case was not before the Supreme Court as it would have been if it had gone from a Circuit Court. Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 22 L. Ed. 429; Savings Society v. Dormitzer, 192 U. S. 125, 127, 128, 24 Sup. Ct. 221, 48 L. Ed. 373. Nevertheless the reasonableness of the statute which had been upheld by the Supreme Court of Arkansas was fully considered, and the judgment of that court was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. What it says on that subject, even if not decisive of the present ease, has an important bearing upon it. The main controversy in the Arkansas ease was over the question whether the additional and apparently superfluous trainmen required by the statute were necessary for the safe operation of trains. If unnecessary, the statutory requirement would have been arbitrary and unreasonable. But, whether necessary and reasonable or not, the Supreme Court said that it is not “so unreasonable as to justify the court in adjudging that it is merely an arbitrary exercise of power, and not germane to the objects which evidently the state Legislature had in view. It is a means employed by the state to accomplish an object which it is entitled to accomplish, and such means, even if deemed unwise, are not to be condemned or disregarded by the courts, if they have a real relation to that object.” 1 Again, it says that, until Congress has established regulations on the subject, “the statutes of the state, not in their nature arbitrary, and which really relate to the rights and duties of all within the jurisdiction, must control.”