State ex rel. Weiss v. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dist. No. Eight, 44 N.W. 967 (1890)

“ The said district board, further answering the allegations of said amended alternative writ, admit that the petitioners above named, top. 182gether with the children in said alternative writ named, were and are members of the Roman Catholic Church; that they believe in the doctrines, faith, and forms of worship of the Roman Catholic Church, and that by said Roman Catholic Church the translation of the Bible known as the ‘King James Version’is believed to-be incorrectas a translation, and incomplete, by reason of the omission of certain books held by said church to be integral portions of the inspired canon.

“ The said district board, upon information and belief, further deny that the reading of selections from the King James version of the Bible, as alleged in said alternative writ, is contrary to the rights of conscience or in violation of law, or that the same is sectarian instruction, or in violation of section 3 of article X of the constitution of this state, or of any provision or requirement of said constitution or of the statutes or the common law of this state; and the said board, upon information and belief, deny that the reading of such selections from the Bible by some of the teachers in said school, in some of the departments thereof, as the same were in fact read, was contrary to or in violation of law, or that the same was or is sectarian instruction, or that the same was or is p. 183in violation of section 3 of article X of the constitution of this state, or that the same was or is in violation of any provision or requirement of the constitution or the statutes or the common law of this state.

.“The said district board, upon information and belief, further show p. 184that the following are the only portions of said Bible so selected by the said teachers in said school, and read therein, and that the same were read from the King James version of said Bible.”

“ III. The said district board, for a further answer and return to the amended alternative writ issued by said court in this action, respectfully shows that prior to and at the time of the filing of the petition of the relators in this action, said school district number eight was duly formed and organized as a school district under and in pursuance of the p. 185laws of this state; that prior to the time of the filing of said petition the said school district owned and maintained a' school-house in said district; that prior to the time of filing such petition a school, with different departments therein, was maintained and taught in said schoolhouse under the direction of said district board; and that such school was being maintained and taught in said school-house at the time of the filing of the petition of the relators herein.

“ The said district board, upon information and belief, further show that prior to the time of the reading of the Bible in the school of said district, and prior to the adoption of said list of text-books by said district board, as aforesaid, the superintendent of public instruction in p. 186said state of Wisconsin recommended for adoption and use in the schools of said state a list of text-books; that in such list of text-books so recommended by said state superintendent, and as’ a part thereof, is the King James translation of the Bible; and that such recommendation has not been in any way revoked or withdrawn, but still remains in full force.

“And the said board, upon information and belief, further allege that it is the duty of said board to require said Bible to be used in said school as, a text-book at suitable and proper times, when the use thereof will aid in the education of the children attending said school; and that p. 187said board has no right to prohibit, and should not attempt to prohibit, the use of the Bible in said school at proper and suitable times, when such use will aid in making more complete the education of the children attending said school. And said board submits that for the reasons above set forth they ought not to discontinue the use of the Bible in the school of said district, and that they have no right nor authority to discontinue such use of the Bible in said school.

Lyoh, J. The petitioners are residents and tax-payers of the city of Edgerton, and their children are pupils in the public schools, of that city. They allege in their petition that certain of the teachers, employed by the district board having charge of such schools, read daily to the pupils therein, during school hours, certain portions of King James’ version of the Bible, selected by the teachers; and that the petitioners have requested the district board to require the teachers to discontinue such practice, but the board refuses to do so. The petitioners further allege that p. 188such'practice is a violation of certain provisions of the constitution of this state, hereinafter more particularly mentioned, and pray that a writ of mandamus may issue from the circuit court to the school board, commanding such board to cause the teachers to discontinue the practice and exercises complained of.

This opinion will be confined quite closely to a discussion p. 189of the question whether the adoption of the Protestant, or King James, version of the Bible, or any version thereof, in the public schools in the city of Edgerton, as a textbook, and the reading of selections therefrom in those schools at the times and in the manner stated in the answer, is sectarian instruction, within the meaning of that term as used in sec. 3, art. X, of the constitution, which ordains that no sectarian instruction shall be allowed in the district schools of this state. .

^The petitioners are members of the Soman Catholic Church and believers in its doctrines. Hence it is quite natural that most of the averments in their petition should be made, as they in fact are, from the stand-point of such doctrines. But should it be held that members of that church have no valid grounds, as such, for their objections to the reading of the Bible in the district schools, still the p. 190petition contains general averments sufficiently broad to cover any valid objection to such reading which' might be made by any citizen of the state aggrieved by the action of the school board. These averments are “ that the residents of said city of Edgerton, who are taxed for the support of said schools, are equally entitled to the benefits thereof, by having their children instructed therein according to law; ” and that such reading of the Bible “is contrary to the rights of conscience, and wholly contrary to and in violation of the law; and that j^our petitioners believe such exercises as above set forth, and each and all of them, are sectarian instruction, and in violation of section 3, article X, of the constitutiqn of the state of Wisconsin.”

■ That the reading from the Bible in the schools, although unaccompanied by any comment on the part of the teacher, is “instruction,” seems to us too clear for argument. Some of the most valuable instruction a person can receive may be derived from reading alone, without any extrinsic aid by way of comment or exposition. The question, therefore, seems to -narrow down.to this: Is the reading of the Bible in the schools — not merely selected passages therefrom, but the whole of it — sectarian instruction of the pupils? In view of the fact already mentioned, that the Bible contains numerous doctrinal passages, upon some of which the peculiar creed of almost every religious sect is based, and that such passages may reasonably be understood to inculcate the doctrines predicated upon them, an affirmative answer to the question seems unavoidable. Any pupil of ordinary intelligence who listens to the reading of the doctrinal portions of the Bible will be more or less instructed thereby in the doctrines of the divinity of Jesus Christ, the eternal punishment of the wicked, the authority of the priesthood, the binding force and efficacy of the sacraments, and many other conflicting sectarian doctrines. A most forcible demonstration of the accuracy of this statement is found in certain reports of the American Bible Society of its work in Catholic countries (referred to in one of the arguments), in which instances are given of the con.version of several persons from “Romanism ” through the reading of the Scriptures alone; that is to say, the reading p. 195of the Protestant or King James version of the Bible converted Catholics to Protestants without the aid of comment or exposition. In those cases the reading of the Bible certainly was sectarian instruction. We do not know how to frame an argument in support of the proposition that the reading thereof in the district schools is not also sectarian instruction.

It may not be uninstructive to consider somewhat certain other circumstances, existing when the constitution was adopted, which may fairly be presumed to> have influenced the inserting therein of the provision against “ sectarian instruction ” in the district schools. The early settlers of Wisconsin came chiefly from New England and the Middle States. They represented the best religious, intellectual, and moral culture, and the business enterprise and sagacity, of the people of the states from whence they came. They found here a territory possessing all the elements essential' to the development of a great state. They were intensely desirous that the future state should be settled and developed as rapidly as possible. They chose from their number wise, sagacious, Christian men, imbued with the sentiments common to all, to frame their constitution. The convention assembled at a time when immigration had become very large and was constantly increasing. The immigrants came from nearly all the countries of Europe, but most largely from Germany and Ireland. As a class, they were industrious, intelligent, honest, and thrifty — just the material for the development of a new state. Besides, they brought with them, collectively, much wealth. They were p. 198also religious and sectarian. Among them were Catholics, Jews, and adherents of many Protestant sects. These immigrants were cordially welcomed, and it is manifest the convention framed the constitution with reference to attracting them to Wisconsin. Many, perhaps most, of these immigrants came from countries in which a state religion was maintained and enforced, while some of them were non-conformists and had suffered under the disabilities resulting from their rejection of the established religion. What more tempting inducement to cast their lot with us could have been held out to them than the assurance that, in addition to the guaranties of the right of conscience and of worship in their own way, the free district schools in ■which their children were to be, or might be, educated, were absolute common ground, where the pupils were equal, and where sectarian instruction, and with it sectarian intolerance, under which they had smarted in the old country, could never enter? Such were the circumstances surrounding the convention which framed the constitution. In the light of them, and with a lively appreciation by its members of the horrors of sectarian intolerance and the priceless value of perfect religious and sectarian freedom and equality, is it unreasonable to say that sectarian instruction was thus excluded, to the end that the child of the Jew, or Catholic, or Unitarian, or Universalist, or Quaker should not be compelled to listen to the stated reading, of passages of scripture which are accepted by others as giving the lie to the religious faith and belief of their parents and themselves?

It is argued that the reading of the Bible in the district schools is not included in the constitutional prohibition of sectarian instruction therein, because the Bible is not specifically mentioned in the constitution. It is said that, if it was intended that such reading was to be excluded, it would have been so provided in direct terms. The argument p. 199may be plausible, but is believed to be unsound. Constitutions deal with general principles and policies, and do not usually descend to a specification of particulars. Such is the character of the provision in question. In general terms it excludes sectarian instruction, and the exclusion includes all forms of such instruction. Its force would or might have been weakened had the attempt been made to specify therein all the methods by which such instruction may be imparted.

/ ¶. The answer of the respondent states that the relators’ children are not compelled to remain in the school-room while the Bible is being read, but are at liberty to withdraw therefrom during the reading of the same. For this reason it is claimed that the relators have no good cause for complaint, even though such reading be sectarian instruction. We cannot give our sanction to this position. When, as in this case, a small minority of the pupils in the public school is excluded, for any cause, from a stated school p. 200exercise, particularly when such cause is apparent' hostility to the Bible which a majority of the • pupils have been taught to revere, from that moment the excluded pupil loses caste with his fellows, and is liable to be regarded with aversion and subjected to reproach and insult. But it is a sufficient refutation of the argument that the practice in question tends to destroy the equality of the pupils which the constitution seeks to establish' and protect, and puts a portion of them to serious disadvantage in many ways with respect to the others.

The petition alleges that, in addition to their objections to the King James version, the relators have conscientious scruples against the reading of any version of the Bible to their children, either in the district schools or elsewhere, without authoritative note, comment, or exposition, because the practice may lead their children to adopt dangerous errors, and irreligious faith, practice, and worship. When we remember that wise and good men have struggled and agonized through the centuries to find the correct interpretation of the Scriptures, employing to that end all the resources of great intellectual power, profound scholarship, and exalted spiritual attainment, and yet with such widely divergent results; and, further, that the relators conscientiously believe that their church furnishes them means, and the only means, of correct and infallible interp. 201pretation,— we can scarcely say their conscientious scruples against the reading of any version of the Bible to their children, unaccompanied by such interpretation, are entitled to no consideration.

By the Court.— The order of the circuit court overruling p. 203the demurrer of the relators to the answer of the school board must be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to that court to give judgment for the relators on the demurrer, awarding a peremptory writ of mandamus as prayed in the petition.

It is undoubtedly true, as once observed by Mr. Justice Baldwin, that “ in the construction of the constitution we must look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when it was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief.\ and the remedy.” Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 723. A few years later, Mr. Justice StoRy said: “Perhaps the safest rule of interpretation, after all, will be found to be to look to the nature and objects of the particular powers, duties, and rights, with all the lights and aids of contemporary history; and to give to the words of each, just such operation and force, consistent with their legitimate meaning, as may fairly secure and attain the ends proposed.” Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 610, 611. These observations were, of course, made with reference to our federal constitution, but they are equally applicable to our state constitution. In so far as the rules there suggested may aid in the construction of the provisions of our constitution here involved, they may properly be invoked. It is probably in this view that counsel have dwelt so extensively upon the history of the Christian church and its status under different charters p. 204and constitutions; although much of it has a very remote, if any, bearing upon the questions here presented.

Ail are familiar with the fact that the Jews, in the time of the apostles, were divided into “ the sect of the Sad-ducees,” and “ the sect of the Pharisees.” Paul declared, in the presence of Agrippa, “ that, after the straitest sect ” of their religion, he had “lived a Pharisee; ” and, when Ter-tullus charged him with being “ a ringleader of the sect of the Nazarenesf he boldly confessed “ that after the way which they ” called “ heresy,” or, as the new version has it, “ a sect,” he had worshiped or served the God of his fathers; and afterwards, to the “chief of the Jews” at Rome, he discoursed “ concerning this sect,” and persuaded “ them concerning Jesus, both from the law of Moses and from the prophets.” Of course, “ the sect of the Naza-renes ” subsequently acquired the more honorable name of “ Christians.” As the centuries rolled on and Christians became more numerous, disputes arose among themselves, from time to time, in matters of faith, doctrine, practice, and interpretation of cértain passages of Scripture; and these led to repeated divisions and subdivisions, until the different sects of Christians became very numerous. There is no purpose here, of indicating that the Holy Scriptures,— the Old and New Testament,— if considered as a whole and fully comprehended, would exclude from the promises therein contained any of the human race complying with the essential conditions therein prescribed; but since every translation made by man must be more or less imperfect, and since the application of particular passages is liable to be made with partial apprehension and biased or even distorted judgment, it is easy to perceive how texts of Scripture may be read with such an emphasis and tone as to become excessively sectarian. While the members of any particular sect may be willing to have one of their own number read the Bible in the public schools, vet they are p. 205not always willing to concede the same to a member of a sect believing in an opposite faith or doctrine. Bat the law is impartial, and has given no rights to any one sect that are not equally secured to every other.

Such divisions, controversies, and contentions among professing Christians were supposed by many to be repugnant to the sublime teachings and fraternal spirit revealed to the world through Jesus Christ. Many of the colonists — especially when they came to the formation of state governments— proved to be sufficiently broad and liberal to exact nothing for themselves or their particular sect that p. 206they were unwilling to grant to every other citizen and his particular sect. This benign spirit seemed to extend, as its wisdom became more manifest by experience. True, the constitution of South Carolina, adopted in 1778, declared that the “ Christian Protestant religion ” was the “ established religion” of that state; but that was modified in 1790 so as to secure freedom and prevent discrimination or preference in worship or religion. The constitution of North Carolina of 1776 excluded from office all non-believers in the Protestant religion or the divine authority of the Old or New Testament; while the constitution of Delaware, of the same year, made every official subscribe to a confession of faith; but that was abrogated sixteen years after-wards, and equal protection was extended to all sects. So the first constitutions of Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, and, later, of Connecticut, provided for the support, by taxation or otherwise, of the Christian or Protestant Christian religion, with more or less toleration guarantied to other sects. Such direct sanction and toleration seem to have been inspired by a lingering attachment for, or a sympathy with, the European theory of union between church and state. But the several states of New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Yermont, and Yirginia from the first, and, later, Maine and Rhode Island, of the New England states, and every, or neaiiy every, state admitted into the Union after the organization of the federal government, expressly secured, in effect, in their respective state constitutions, the equal freedom of every religious sect, organization, and society, with a guaranty against preference or discrimination. So firm had become the public conviction in favor of a broad liberality and equal protection in such matters, at the time of the organization of our national government, that although the federal constitution as origi-' nally adopted did not mention or refer to the subject, yet the first session of the first Congress proposed the first p. 207amendment to that instrument, prohibiting Congress from, making any “law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” notwithstanding •no power had therein been granted to enact such a law, and no such law could be legally enacted without such grant of power first being made.

Wisconsin, as one of the later states admitted into the Union, having before it the experience of others, and probably in view of its heterogeneous population, as mentioned p. 208in the opinion of my associate, has, in her organic law, probably furnished a more complete bar to any preference for, or discrimination against, any religious sect, organization, or society than any other state in the Union. Our state constitution expressly prohibits any religious test as a qualification for office, or the exclusion of any witness in consequence of his religious opinion. Sec. 19, art. I. Aside from the clause just referred to, and the one against sectarian instruction so fully considered by my Brother Lyon, our state constitution provides that (1) “ the right of every man to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed;” (2) “nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent;” (3) “nor shall any control of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of, worship;” (4) “nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.” Sec. 18, art. T. The decisions of courts in states having no such constitutional prohibition, of course, can have no application to the case at bar.

The question thus presented is not one of sectarian predilection, nor of religious belief, nor of theological conception, nor of sentiment, but one of fundamental law. It is no part of the duty of this court to make or unmake, but simply to construe this provision of the constitution. All questions of political and governmental ethics, all questions of policy, must be regarded as having been fully considered by the convention which framed, and conclusively determined by the people who adopted, the constitution more than forty years ago. The oath of every official in the state is to support that- constitution as it is, and not as it might have been. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor Co. 52 p. 209Wis. 58; Lake Co. v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 672. That oath is to be kept sacred, with strict integrity of purpose, and without any sectarian, religious, or political bias or equivocation.

The first and third clauses of the section of the constitution quoted are similar in their scope, and may therefore be considered together. They read: (1) “The right of every man to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of his own conscience'shall never be infringed;” (3) “nor shall any control of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship.” This language is quite similar to, and may have been taken in part from, the constitution of Pennsylvania, as well as other states. In commenting upon a similar clause in the Pennsylvania constitution, in the celebrated Girard Will Case, Mr. Justice Story, speaking for the whole court, obp. 210served: “Language more comprehensive for tbe complete protection of every variety of religious opinion could scarcely be used; and it must have been intended to extend equally to all sects, whether they believed in Christianity or not, and whether they were Jews or infidels. So that we are compelled to admit that, although Christianity be a part of the common law of the state, yet it is so in this qualified sense that its divine origin and truth are admitted, and ■therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled and blasphemed against, to the annoyance of believers or the injury of the public. Such was the doctrine of the supreme court of Pennsylvania in Updegraph v. Comm. 11 Serg. & R. 394.” Vidal v. Girard’s Fx’rs, 2 How. 198. In commenting upon a similar clause in the Ohio constitution, Mr. Justice ThubmaN, speaking for the whole court, said: “We sometimes hear it said that all religions are tolerated in Ohio; but the expression is not strictly accurate. Much less accurate is it to say that one religion is a part of our law, and all others only tolerated. It is not by mere toleration that every individual here is protected in his belief or disbelief. He reposes not upon the leniency of government or the Wberality of any class or sect of men, but upon bis natural, indefeasible rights of conscience, which, in the language of the constitution, are beyond the control or interference of any human authority.” Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 390.

In considering the two clauses quoted from our constitution, we are to bear in mind the general proposition conceded by all, that our state constitution is not a grant, but a limitation, of powers. State ex rel. Graef v. Forest Co. 14 Wis. 615. Viewed in this light, and it will readily be perceived that these clauses operate as a perpetual bar to the state, and each of the three departments of the state government, and every agency thereof, from the infringement, control, or interference with the individual rights of p. 211every person, as indicated therein, or the giving of any preference by law to any religious sect or mode of worship. They presuppose the voluntary exercise of such rights by any person or body of persons who may desire, and by implication guaranty protection in the freedom of such exercise. Ve neither have nor can have in this state, under our present constitution, any statutes of toleration, nor of union, directly or indirectly, between church and state — for the simple reason that the constitution forbids all such preferences and guaranties all such rights. But the exercise of such rights by one person, or any given number of persons, cannot be so extended as to interfere with the exercise of similar rights by other persons, nor so far as to prevent the legitimate exercise of the police powers of the state in preserving order, securing good citizenship, the administration of law, and the Sabbath as a day of rest. Stansbury v. Marks, 2 Dall. 213; Comm. v. Wolf, 3 Serg. & R. 48; Comm. v. Lesher, 17 Serg. & R. 155; McGatrick v. Wason, 4 Ohio St. 566; Simon’s Ex’rs v. Gratz, 23 Am. Dec. 33; Shover v. State, 10 Ark. 258; Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 469; State ex rel. Walker v. Judge, 39 La. Ann. 132. Such statutes come within no constitutional prohibition, and are founded upon an impregnable basis.

As indicated in the clauses already considered, the word p. 212“ worship,” as here used, includes any and every mode of •worshiping Almighty God. Webster has defined it as: “ The act of paying divine honors to the Supreme Being; religious reverence and homage; adoration paid to God, or a being viewed as God. . . . £The worship of God is an eminent part of religion, and prayer is a chief part of religious worship.’” Worcester defines it as: “(3) Adoration; a religious act of reverence; - honor paid to the Supreme Being, or by heathen nations to their deities. £ Worship consists in the performance of all those external acts, and the observance of all those rites and 'ceremonies, in which men engage with the professed and sole view of honoring God.’ . ’ . . ‘ They join their vocal worship to the quire of creatures wanting voice.’ ... (4) Honor; respect; civil deference.” The Imperial defines it as: “(4) Chiefly and eminently, the act of paying divine honors to the Supreme Being; or the reverence and homage paid to him in religious exercises, consisting in adoration, confession, prayer, thanksgiving, and the like.” The Bible Dictionary declares that the “ worship of God, both spiritual and visible, private and public, by individuals, families, and communities, .. . . is abundantly commanded in his word.” In theology, we are told that “ the honor which is due in a peculiar .sense -to God consists, supremely, in religious worship, in making Him the object of our supreme affection, and rendering to Him our supreme oiedienoe.” 1 Dwight’s Theo. 555.

Certainly, the reading of the Holy Scriptures as the eternal word of God, in obedience to the often-repeated injunction therein contained, whether by the individual in private, or in the family, or in the public assembly, is an essential part of divine worship. Every sermon is based upon some text of scripture. Most prayers are preceded by the reading of some passage of Scripture, as an intelligent guide to the thoughts of the worshiper or worshipers. The sermon p. 213on the mount contains' the prayer taught by the blessed Lord. Is it possible for any genuine believer in the Christian' religion to read, or listen to the reading of, that sermon, and especially that prayer, without being filled with a holy sense of honor, reverence, adoration, and homage to Almighty God, which is the very essence of worship?

Counsel seem to argue that such place of worship should be confined to some church edifice, or place where the members of a church statedly worship. Some of the earlier constitutions, having similar clauses, used the words “ building ” and “ church.” Manifestly, the words <! place of worship” were advisedly used, as applicable to any “place” or structure where worship is statedly held, and which the citizen is “ compelled to attend,” or the tax-payers are compelled to “ erect or support.” The mere fact that only a small fraction of the school hours is devoted to such worship, in no way justifies such use as against an objecting tax-payer. If the right be conceded, then the length of time so devoted becomes a matter of discretion. If such right does not exist, then any length of time, however short, is forbidden. The relators, as tax-payers of the district, were compelled to aid in the erection of the school building in question, and also to aid in the support of the school maintained therein. Secs. 430, 430a, S. & B. Ann. Stats. Being thus compelled to aid in such erection and support, they have a legal'right to object to its being used as a “ place of worship.” In fact, it has been held that it can be devoted to no other use, as against an' objecting p. 214tax-payer. School Dist. v. Arnold, 21 Wis. 657. In that case a temperance society obtained permission from a majority of the electors present at a school meeting, duly called, to hold its meetings in the school-house; but it was held that such electors had no authority to thus divert its use. The present chief justice, speaking for the court, among other things said: “ The statute has not given the board, nor the electors of the district, any authority to permit a school-house to be used for meetings of the Sons of Temperance, or anything of the kind. So the action of the electors of the district . . . was wholly unauthorized, and furnished no defense to the action.” To the same effect are Spencer v. Joint School Dist. 15 Kan. 259, 22 Am. Rep. 268; Dorton v. Hearn, 67 Mo. 301; Scofield v. Eighth School Dist. 27 Conn. 499; Weir v. Day, 35 Ohio St. 143. There are cases of a contrary import, but it is very certain that, as against an objecting tax-payer, such school-house cannot be devoted to a use expressly forbidden by the constitution of the state — as, for instance, as a place of worship.

The constitutions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and some other states differ so widely from ours as to make the adjudications in those states almost wholly inapplicable to p. 216the question here presented. It is conceded that no decision has been found, under constitutional provisions like ours, squarely sustaining the ruling of the learned trial court. Some things have been said in some of the cases cited, arising under somewhat similar constitutional provisions, that may seem to support it. Among these are Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 61 Am. Dec. 256; Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444; Moore v. Monroe, 64 Iowa, 367; Millard v. Board, 121 Ill. 297. The Maine case, largely involving other considerations, is based in part upon decisions under constitutions widely differing from ours, and was decided under a constitution containing none of the provisions upon which especial stress is here laid. The same is partially true of the Yermont case. The same is true in a limited sense of the Iowa and Illinois cases, and in neither of which is any adjudication cited. The following cases seem to be in harmony with the conclusions we have reached: State ex rel. Nevada Orphan Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373; Board v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211; State ex rel. Stallard v. White, 82 Ind. 278, 42 Am. Rep. 496; Spencer v. Joint School Dist. 15 Kan. 259, 22 Am. Rep. 268; Norton v. Hearn, 67 Mo. 301; Scofield v. Eighth School Dist. 27 Conn. 499; and Weir v. Day, 35 Ohio St. 143. They are, moreover, in harmony with prior decisions of this court. Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59; School Dist. v. Arnold, 21 Wis. 657. In the Nevada case the decision was adverse to the use of the Catholic Bible. We deem it unnecessary to enter upon an extended analysis of the numerous adjudications cited, since the constitutional provisions here involved rest upon us with an imperative command.

Obton, J. I most rully ana ooraially concur in the decision and in the opinions of Justices Lyon and Cassoday p. 217in this case. It is not needful that any other opinion should be written, but I thought it proper to state briefly some of the reasons which have induced such concurrence in the decision.

These provisions-of the constitution are- cited together to p. 218show how completely this state, as a civil government, and all its civil institutions, are divorced from all possible connection or alliance with any and all religions, religions worship, religious establishments, or modes of worship, and with everything of a religious character or appertaining to religion; and to show how completely all are protected in their religion and rights of conscience, and that no one shall ever be taxed or compelled to support any religion or place of worship, or to attend upon the same, and more especially to show that our common schools, as one of the institutions of the state created by the constitution, stand, in all these respects, like any other institution of the state, completely excluded from all possible connection or alliance with religion or religious worship, or with anything of a religious character, and guarded by the constitutional prohibition that “ no sectarian instruction shall be allowed therein.” They show, also, that the common schools are free to all alike, to all nationalities, to all sects of religion, to all ranks of society, and to all complexions. For these equal privileges and rights of instruction in them, all are taxed equally and proportionately. The constitutional name, “ common schools,” expresses their equality and universal patronage and support. Common schools are not common as being low in character or grade, but common to all alike, to everybody, and to all sects or denominations of religion, but without bringing religion into them. The common schools, like all the other institutions of the state, are protected by the constitution from all “control or interference with the rights of conscience,” and from all preferences given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship. As the state can have nothing to do with religion except to protect every one in the enjoyment of his own, so the common schools can have nothing to do with religion in any respect whatever. They are as completely secular as any of the other institutions of the state, p. 219in which all the people alike have equal rights and privileges. The people cannot be taxed for religion in schools more than anywhere else. Religious instruction in the common schools is as clearly prohibited by these general clauses of the constitution as religious instruction or worship in any other department of state supported by the revenues derived from taxation.

It is said, if reading the Protestant version of the Bible p. 220in school is offensive to the parents of some of the scholars, and antagonistic to their own religious views, their children can retire. They ought not to be compelled to go out of the school for such a reason for one moment. The suggestion itself concedes the whole argument. That version of the Bible is hostile to the belief of many who are taxed to support the common schools, and who have equal rights and privileges in them. It is a source of religious and sectarian strife. That is enough. It violates the letter and spirit of the constitution.

The common school is one of the most indispensable, useful, and valuable civil institutions this state has. It is democratic, and free to all alike, in perfect equality, where all the children of our people stand on a common platform and may enjoy the benefits of an equal and common education. An enemy to our common schools is an enemy to our state government. It is the same hostility that would cause any religious denomination that had acquired the ascendency over all others, to remodel our constitution and p. 221change our government and all of its institutions so as to make them favorable only to itself, and exclude all others from their benefits and protection. In such an event, religious and sectarian instruction will be given in all schools. Religion needs no support from the state. It is stronger and much purer without it.