Albin v. Cowing Pressure Relieving Joint Co., 317 U.S. 211 (1942)

ALBIN v. COWING PRESSURE RELIEVING

JOINT CO. ET AL.

No. 234. Submitted November 20,1942.—Decided December 7, 1942.

An order of the bankruptcy court vacating an earlier order restraining the prosecution by the alleged bankrupt of a suit in a state court, in which suit, it was alleged, counterclaims in excess of the amount claimed by the alleged bankrupt were filed, is, under § 24 (a) of the Chandler Act, appealable to the Circuit Court of Appeals. P. 212. Reversed.

Certiorari, post, p. 608, to review a decree dismissing for lack of jurisdiction an appeal from an interlocutory order of the bankruptcy court dissolving a restraining order.

Mr. Lewis E. Pennish submitted for petitioner.

Mr. Charles Aaron submitted for respondent.

Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court.

Sec. 24 (a) of the Chandler Act (52 Stat. 854,11 U. S. C. § 47) gives the Circuit Courts of Appeals appellate jurisdiction from courts of bankruptcy “in proceedings in bankruptcy, either interlocutory or final.” An order of the bankruptcy court vacating a restraining order against prosecution of a suit in a state court is, like a stay order itself, a proceeding in bankruptcy. See Harrison Securities Co. v. Spinks Realty Co., 92 F. 2d 904; Taylor v. Voss, 271 U. S. 176, 181. The amendments to § 24 (a) made by the Chandler Act practically abolished the distinction between appeals as of right and by leave. S. Rep. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 4. And see Dickinson Industrial Site v. Cowan, 309 U. S. 382, 385-388. Whatever may still be the possible limitations on the review-ability of interlocutory orders (see In re Hotel Governor Clinton, 107 F. 2d 398; Federal Land Bank v. Hansen, 113 F. 2d 82, 84-85), no reason appears why this one cannot or should not be reviewed. Nor does it appear from the record which is before us that the issue is moot. We intimate no opinion on the merits. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the Circuit Court of Appeals for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

PYLE v. KANSAS et al.

Na. 50. Argued November 9, 10, 1942.—Decided December 7, 1942.

1. Habeas corpus is a remedy available in the state courts of Kansas to persons imprisoned in violation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. P. 215.

2. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the petitioner is imprisoned upon a conviction obtained through the use of testimony known by the prosecuting officers to have been perjured, and through the suppression by them of evidence favorable to him, sufficiently alleges a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution; and the denial of the petition without a determination as to the truth of the allegations was error. P. 216.

3. In view of the inexpert drafting of the petition for the writ of habeas corpus in this case, the remand to the state court is without prejudice to any procedure there designed to achieve greater particularity in the allegations. P. 216.

Reversed.

Certiorari, 316 U. S. 654, to review the affirmance of a judgment denying an application for a writ of habeas corpus.

Mr. Joseph P. Tumulty, Jr. for petitioner.

Mr. Jay Kyle, with whom Messrs. Jay 8. Parker, Attorney General of Kansas, and Braden C. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General, were on the brief, for respondents.

Mr. Justice Murphy delivered the opinion of the Court.

On November 20, 1941, petitioner, a layman acting in his own behalf, filed an original application for writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Kansas. The crude allegations of this application charge that his imprisonment was the result of a deprivation of rights guaranteed him by the Constitution of the United States, in that the Kansas prosecuting authorities obtained his conviction by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured, and by the suppression of testimony favorable to him. Filed with this application were a brief and an abstract, also apparently prepared by petitioner himself, which are part of the record before us. These documents elaborate the general charges of the application, and specifically allege that “one Truman Reynolds was coerced and threatened by the State to testify falsely against the petitioner and that said testimony did harm to the petitioner’s defense”; that “one Lacy Cunningham who had been previously committed to a mental institution was threatened with prosecution if he did not testify for the State” ; that the testimony of one Roy Riley, material to petitioner’s defense, “was repressed under threat and coercion by the State” ; that Mrs. Roy Riley and Mrs. Thelma Richardson were intimidated and their testimony suppressed; and, that the record in the trial of one Meri Hudson for complicity in the same murder and robbery for which petitioner was convicted, held about six months after petitioner’s direct appeal from his conviction, reveals that the evidence there presented is inconsistent with the evidence presented at petitioner’s trial, and clearly exonerates petitioner.

Certain exhibits accompanied the application; among these were copies, sworn by petitioner to be true and correct copies of the originals, of an affidavit executed by Truman Reynolds in 1940, and a letter dated February 28, 1941, from the former prosecuting attorney who represented the State at petitioner’s trial. The affidavit contained a statement that affiant “was forced to give perjured testimony against Harry Pyle under threat by local authorities at St. John, Kansas and the Kansas State Police, of a penitentiary sentence for burglary if I did not testify against Mr. Pyle.” The letter stated, “Your conviction was a grave mistake,” and further that, “The evidence at the trial of Meri Hudson certainly shattered the conclusions drawn from the evidence produced at your trial.”

In connection with his application, petitioner moved for the appointment of counsel to represent him, for subpoenas duces tecum to bring up the records in the trials of Meri Hudson and one Bert (Bud) Richardson, for the subpoenaing of certain witnesses allegedly material to his case, and for his presence in court. The record does not show what disposition, if any, was made of these various motions.

No return was made to the application for the writ. On December 11, 1941, the court below entered an order that said petition be filed and docketed without costs, and thereupon, after due consideration by the court, it is ordered that said petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied.” There was no opinion. A motion to rehear was also denied without opinion. We brought the case here on certiorari, 316 U. S. 654, because of the constitutional issues involved.